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Procedure in 1938. Those Rules created a procedural system giving a 
litigant, using plain language and presenting the essential elements of 
a claim for relief, an opportunity to pursue discovery and have his or 
her rights adjudicated on the merits. This Article discusses the basic 
values underlying that system and its importance in promoting broad 
citizen access to our federal courts and enabling the private 
enforcement of substantive public policies. 
  The Article then discusses how Twombly and Iqbal have 
destabilized both the pleading and the motion-to-dismiss practices as 
they have been known for over sixty years. The cases are seen as the 
latest in a sequence of increasingly restrictive changes during the last 
quarter century. These have created expensive and time-consuming 
procedural stop signs that produce earlier and earlier termination of 
cases, thereby increasingly preventing claimants from reaching trial—
particularly jury trial. This Article contends that there has been too 
much attention paid to claims by corporate and other defense interests 
of expense and possible abuse and too little on citizen access, a level 
litigation playing field, and the other values of civil litigation. Much 
fine-grained empirical research is needed to separate fact from fiction. 
  This Article finds that setting significantly higher and more 
resource-consumptive procedural barriers for plaintiffs and moving 
to the ever-earlier disposition of civil suits—now exacerbated by the 
two Supreme Court decisions—runs contrary to many of the values 
underlying the Federal Rules. Concluding that the Court’s 
preoccupation with defense costs is misplaced and its belittlement of 
case management as a way of cabining those costs is unpersuasive, the 
Article offers several proposals that the Advisory Committee on Civil 
Rules (or Congress) might consider to reverse recent developments 
and ameliorate some of their negative aspects. 
  Ultimately, the Article asks a basic question: after Twombly and 
Iqbal, is our American court system still one in which an aggrieved 
person, however unsophisticated and under-resourced he may be, can 
secure a meaningful day in court? Finding that the important values 
of civil litigation are in jeopardy, this Article urges that the egalitarian, 
democratic ideals espoused by the original Federal Rules not be 
subordinated to one-dimensional claims of excessive litigation costs 
and abuse that have not been validated. 
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INTRODUCTION 
History matters. When adopted in 1938, the Federal Rules of 
Civil Procedure represented a major break from the common law and 
code systems. Although the drafters retained many of the prior 
procedural conventions, the Federal Rules reshaped civil litigation to 
reflect core values of citizen access to the justice system and 
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adjudication on the merits based on a full disclosure of relevant 
information.1 The structure of the Rules sharply reduced the prior 
emphasis on the pleadings and the extensive related motion practice 
that served more to delay proceedings and less to expose the facts, 
ventilate the competing positions, or further adjudication on the 
merits.2 According to the Supreme Court in Conley v. Gibson,3 
pleadings only needed to “give the defendant fair notice of what the 
plaintiff’s claim is and the grounds upon which it rests” to survive a 
motion to dismiss.4 Fact revelation and issue formulation would occur 
later in the pretrial process.5 
Moreover, rather than eliminating claims based on technicalities,6 
the Federal Rules created a system that relied on plain language and 
 
 1. See Charles E. Clark, Pleading Under the Federal Rules, 12 WYO. L.J. 177, 188, 190 
(1958) (discussing how the philosophical ideals of allowing any individual “to come in and put 
his claim before the judge” and putting “truth ahead of cleverness and tactics” shaped the 
Federal Rules); see also Christopher M. Fairman, Heightened Pleading, 81 TEX. L. REV. 551, 
554–62 (2002) (providing a more thorough treatment of the history of Rule 8 and the liberal 
ethos of the Federal Rules); Stephen N. Subrin, How Equity Conquered Common Law: The 
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure in Historical Perspective, 135 U. PA. L. REV. 909, 912, 943–1002 
(1987) (discussing “the inherent nature of the Federal Rules and . . . the basic choice of 
procedural form made by their promulgators”). 
 2. See AM. BAR ASS’N, RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE FOR THE DISTRICT COURTS OF THE 
UNITED STATES WITH NOTES AS PREPARED UNDER THE DIRECTION OF THE ADVISORY 
COMMITTEE AND PROCEEDINGS OF THE INSTITUTE ON FEDERAL RULES AT CLEVELAND, 
OHIO 240 (William W. Dawson ed., 1938); see also Jack B. Weinstein, The Role of Judges in a 
Government of, by, and for the People: Notes for the Fifty-Eighth Cardozo Lecture, 30 
CARDOZO L. REV. 1, 108 (2008) (“When the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure were first 
adopted in 1938, ‘they were optimistically intended to clear the procedural clouds so that the 
sunlight of substance might shine through.’” (footnote omitted) (quoting Jack B. Weinstein, The 
Ghost of Process Past: The Fiftieth Anniversary of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and Erie, 
54 BROOK. L. REV. 1, 2–3 (1988))). 
 3. Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41 (1957). Conley’s philosophy of pleading was previsioned 
in Hickman v. Taylor, 329 U.S. 495, 501 (1947). See generally 5 CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT & 
ARTHUR R. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE: CIVIL § 1202 (3d ed. 2004) 
(discussing how Rule 8 is the “keystone” of the pleading system created by the Federal Rules of 
Civil Procedure). 
 4. Conley, 355 U.S. at 47. 
 5. Id. at 47–48. 
 6. Under common law and code pleading, there “seem[ed] to be a persistent idea that you 
could get the other fellow to prove your case by making a misstep or by saying too much in his 
pleading.” AM. BAR ASS’N, FEDERAL RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE: PROCEEDINGS OF THE 
INSTITUTE AT WASHINGTON, D.C. AND OF THE SYMPOSIUM IN NEW YORK CITY 40 (Edward H. 
Hammond ed., 1939). 
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minimized procedural traps,7 with trial by jury as the gold standard 
for determining a case’s merits. Generalized pleadings, broad 
discovery, and limited summary judgment became integral, 
interdependent elements of the pretrial process.8 Although so-called 
notice pleading allowed a wide swath of cases into the system, 
discovery and summary judgment9 were designed to expose and 
separate the meritorious from the meritless. 
Beneath the surface of these broad procedural concepts lay 
several significant policy objectives. The Rules were intended to 
support a central philosophical principle: the procedural system of the 
federal courts should be premised on equality of treatment of all 
parties and claims in the civil adjudication process. It should abjure 
technical decisionmaking and “promote the ends of justice.”10 The 
simple but ambitious notion was that the legal rights of citizens 
should be enforced. This idea was a baseline democratic tenet of the 
1930s and then of postwar America with regard to such matters as 
civil rights, the distribution of social and political power, marketplace 
status, and equality of opportunity.11 
As significant new areas of federal substantive law emerged and 
existing ones were augmented, the importance of private enforcement 
of key national policies, of litigation as an instrument of social policy, 
and of expanding state-based tort and consumer-protection theories 
came to the fore in numerous contexts.12 The openness and simplicity 
of the Rules facilitated citizen enforcement of congressional and 
constitutional policies through civil litigation. The federal courts 
increasingly were seen as an alternative or an adjunct to centralized, 
 
 7. “The Federal Rules reject the approach that pleading is a game of skill in which one 
misstep by counsel may be decisive to the outcome and accept the principle that the purpose of 
pleading is to facilitate a proper decision on the merits.” Conley, 355 U.S. at 48. 
 8. See Swierkiewicz v. Sorema N.A., 534 U.S. 506, 512 (2002) (“This simplified notice 
pleading standard relies on liberal discovery rules and summary judgment motions to define 
disputed facts and issues and to dispose of unmeritorious claims.”). 
 9. In seeking summary judgment, the movant always has “the burden of showing the 
absence of a genuine issue as to any material fact.” Adickes v. S. H. Kress & Co., 398 U.S. 144, 
157 (1970). Cases generally narrowed in scope as they approached trial. 
 10. See 4 WRIGHT & MILLER, supra note 3, § 1029 (3d ed. 2002) (discussing the purpose 
and construction of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure). 
 11. See generally EDWARD A. PURCELL, JR., BRANDEIS AND THE PROGRESSIVE 
CONSTITUTION: ERIE, THE JUDICIAL POWER AND THE POLITICS OF THE FEDERAL COURTS IN 
TWENTIETH-CENTURY AMERICA (2000) (discussing the evolution of the American judiciary in 
the context of the Erie doctrine). 
 12. See infra notes 275–92 and accompanying text. 
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or administrative governmental oversight in fields such as 
competition, capital markets, product safety, and discrimination. 
Even though private lawsuits might be viewed as an inefficient ex 
post method of enforcing public policies, they have dispersed 
regulatory authority; achieved greater transparency; provided a 
source of compensation, deterrence, and institutional governance; 
and led to leaner government involvement. Without this private-
attorneys-general concept, the substitution of an alternative 
methodology would be necessary. This probably would mean the 
establishment of the type of continental-style, centralized 
bureaucracies and administrative enforcement that many think are 
inconsistent with our culture and heritage.13 
Perhaps the case that best represents the access-minded and 
merit-oriented ethos at the heart of the original Federal Rules is 
Dioguardi v. Durning.14 As many may remember from their law 
school civil procedure course, John Dioguardi, an immigrant and pro 
se plaintiff, asserted various grievances against the Collector of 
Customs of the Port of New York.15 His home-drawn complaint 
alleged in broken English a number of factual circumstances but 
failed to make any coherent legal presentation. Judge Charles E. 
Clark, the principal draftsman of the Federal Rules,16 wrote for the 
Second Circuit in overturning the district court’s Rule 12(b)(6) 
dismissal of Dioguardi’s action.17 The court found enough information 
within the complaint’s allegations to satisfy Rule 8(a)(2)’s pleading 
standard.18 Judge Clark’s opinion reminded the profession that the 
 
 13. See generally ROBERT A. KAGAN, ADVERSARIAL LEGALISM: THE AMERICAN WAY 
OF LAW (2003) (arguing that the United States, unlike other industrialized nations, relies on an 
adversarial legal system to develop law and public policy rather than on judges and professional 
bureaucrats). For additional discussion of the phenomenon, see infra notes 275–92. 
 14. Dioguardi v. Durning, 139 F.2d 774 (2d Cir. 1944). See generally 5 WRIGHT & MILLER, 
supra note 3, § 1220 (showing how Dioguardi is illustrative of the pleading philosophy created 
by the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure). 
 15. Dioguardi, 139 F.2d at 774. 
 16. See Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 575 (2007) (Stevens, J., dissenting) 
(describing Judge Clark as the “principal draftsman” of the Federal Rules). 
 17. Dioguardi, 139 F.2d at 775. Rule 12(b)(6) provides for a motion to dismiss the 
complaint for its “failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.” FED. R. CIV. P. 
12(b)(6). See generally 5B WRIGHT & MILLER, supra note 3, §§ 1355–1357 (discussing the 
history, purpose, and practice of Rule 12(b)(6)). 
 18. Dioguardi, 139 F.2d at 775. The rule requires a “short and plain statement of the claim 
showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” FED. R. CIV. P. 8(a)(2). See generally 5A–B 
WRIGHT & MILLER, supra note 3, §§ 1315–1354. 
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then-relatively new Rule 8 required only “a short and plain statement 
of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief” and no 
longer demanded “facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action,” as 
was required under code pleading.19 Judge Clark’s lecture on the new 
pleading standard was confirmed thirteen years later by the Supreme 
Court’s ruling in Conley v. Gibson,20 in which it famously stated, “[A] 
complaint should not be dismissed for failure to state a claim unless it 
appears beyond doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts in 
support of his claim . . . .”21 That philosophy was recited by the Court 
on several occasions during Conley’s fifty-year reign.22 
Much, however, has changed in the world of litigation in the 
sixty-six years since Dioguardi. The cultures of the law and of the 
legal profession are far different. Long gone are the days of a fairly 
homogenous community of lawyers litigating relatively small numbers 
of what today would be regarded as modest disputes involving a 
limited number of claims or parties. Law practice today has many 
attributes of a business and has succumbed to various marketing 
practices, including television advertising. And litigation in the 
federal courts has become a world unimagined in 1938: often a 
battleground for titans of industry to dispute complex claims 
 
 19. Dioguardi, 139 F.2d at 775 (quoting FED. R. CIV. P. 8(a)); see also Charles E. Clark, 
Simplified Pleading, 2 F.R.D. 456, 458–60 (1943) (discussing how the cumbersome pleading 
requirements led to a call for reform). In his dissent in Twombly, Justice Stevens noted that 
Judge Clark’s opinion in Dioguardi “disquieted the defense bar and gave rise to a movement to 
revise Rule 8 to require a plaintiff to plead a ‘cause of action,’” but that the effort failed. 
Twombly, 550 U.S. at 582 (Stevens, J., dissenting); see also O.L. McCaskill, The Modern 
Philosophy of Pleading: A Dialogue Outside the Shades, 38 A.B.A. J. 123, 125–26 (1952) 
(discussing how a plaintiff’s lawyer could use the Dioguardi ruling to more liberally plead 
cases). In 1955, the Advisory Committee rejected a proposal that Rule 8(a)(2) be amended to 
require the complaint to plead “facts constituting a cause of action.” ADVISORY COMM. ON 
RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE, REPORT OF PROPOSED AMENDMENTS TO THE RULES OF CIVIL 
PROCEDURE FOR THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURTS 18–19 (1955), available at 
http://www.uscourts.gov/uscourts/RulesAndPolicies/rules/Reports/CV10-1955.pdf. 
 20. Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 45–46 (1957) (citing Dioguardi in support of a liberal 
pleading standard). 
 21. Id. 
 22. See, e.g., Swierkiewicz v. Sorema N.A., 534 U.S. 506, 512 (2002) (“[I]mposing the Court 
of Appeals’ heightened pleading standard in employment discrimination cases conflicts with 
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a)(2) . . . .”); Leatherman v. Tarrant Cnty. Narcotics 
Intelligence & Coordination Unit, 507 U.S. 163, 168 (1993) (“We think that it is impossible to 
square the ‘heightened pleading standard’ applied by the Fifth Circuit in this case with the 
liberal system of ‘notice pleading’ set up by the Federal Rules.”); see also Dura Pharm., Inc. v. 
Broudo, 544 U.S. 336, 346 (2005); Hishon v. King & Spalding, 467 U.S. 69, 73 (1984); Scheuer v. 
Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232, 236 (1974). 
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involving enormous stakes; a forum in which disparate ideological 
forces contest some of the great issues of the day; and the situs for 
aggregate litigation on behalf of large numbers of people and entities 
pursuing theories and invoking statutes unknown in the 1930s and 
1940s. Complicated issues of technology, science, and economics are 
commonplace. In some cases, the size of the claims and the litigation 
costs are stunning. Over the years the number of lawsuits filed has 
increased, but judicial resources have not kept pace.23 Opposing 
counsel compete on a national and even a global scale and employ an 
array of litigation tactics often designed to wear out or deter 
opponents (or mount billable hours), making the maintenance of 
shared professional values difficult, if not impossible.  
Many cases seem interminable. The pretrial process has become 
so elaborate with time-consuming motions, hearings, and discovery 
that it often seems to have fallen into the hands of some systemic 
Sorcerer’s Apprentice. Yet trials are strikingly infrequent, and, in the 
unlikely event of a jury trial, only six or eight citizens typically are 
empanelled.24 What some would call cults of judicial management and 
 
 23. See RICHARD A. POSNER, THE FEDERAL COURTS: CHALLENGE AND REFORM 59–95 
(1985). A sharp increase in criminal matters, coupled with the federalization of such matters as 
securities litigation and class actions, may have outstripped the growth of the federal judiciary. I 
do not believe, however, that the data support the notion that we have been struck by a 
“litigation explosion.” See generally Marc Galanter, The Day After the Litigation Explosion, 46 
MD. L. REV. 3 (1986) (arguing that American litigation rates are not much higher than in the 
recent past and are not dissimilar to other industrialized countries); Marc Galanter, The 
Vanishing Trial: An Examination of Trials and Related Matters in Federal and State Courts, 1 J. 
EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 459 (2004) (tracing the decline in the percentage of cases that 
terminate at trial and the decline in the absolute number of trials in American courts); Jack B. 
Weinstein, After Fifty Years of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure: Are the Barriers to Justice 
Being Raised?, 137 U. PA. L. REV. 1901, 1909 (1989) (stating that businesses’ concerns about 
judicial caseloads are a “weapon of perception, not substance”). 
 24. See FED. R. CIV. P. 48(a) (setting the number of jurors between six and twelve). In 
Marc Galanter & Angela Frozena, ‘A Grin Without a Cat’: Civil Trials in the Federal Courts 
(May 1, 2010) (unpublished manuscript), available at http://civilconference.uscourts.gov/ 
LotusQuickr/dcc/Main.nsf/$defaultview/AD5073BA32C448C18525771F0038C680/$File/Marc%
20Galanter%20and%20Angela%20Frozena%2C%20A%20Grin%20Without%20a%20Cat.pdf
?OpenElement, the authors note the percentage and absolute drop in federal court trials over 
the past quarter century despite the growth in the legal system and conclude “that the civil trial 
is approaching extinction.” Id. at 1. See generally 9B WRIGHT & MILLER, supra note 3, § 2491 
(3d ed. 2008) (discussing the size of the jury); Marc Galanter, The Hundred-Year Decline of 
Trials and the Thirty Years War, 57 STAN. L. REV. 1255, 1255 (2005) (stating that “an abundance 
of data shows that the number of trials—federal and state, civil and criminal, jury and bench—is 
declining”); William G. Young, Vanishing Trials, Vanishing Juries, Vanishing Constitution, 40 
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alternative dispute resolution have arisen, eroding certain aspects of 
the adversary system and blocking access to the courtroom for a trial 
on the merits. In short, the world of those who drafted the original 
Federal Rules largely has disappeared, causing one district judge to 
remark that the “reality” is that our “system [is] becoming 
increasingly inaccessible to the average citizen.”25 Sadly, in some 
respects today’s civil litigation is neither civil nor litigation as 
previously known. 
Along with these changes in litigation realities have come 
corresponding judicial shifts in the interpretation of the Rules and the 
erection of other procedural barriers to a meaningful day in court. To 
some degree these shifts are a response to a powerful drumbeat of 
criticism from the business community, the members of the legal 
profession representing that constituency, and conservative political 
forces that have secured a significant change in the demographic 
character of the federal bench.26 Deregulation is the watchword; so-
called American litigiousness is decried and lawyers demonized; the 
system’s costs and delays are deplored; and litigation is characterized 
as a lottery.27 Federal civil procedure has been politicized and 
subjected to ideological pressures. Thus, the Supreme Court’s recent 
 
SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 67, 73 (2006) (“For some time now, circumstances and anecdotal evidence 
has been mounting that jury trials are, with surprising rapidity, becoming a thing of the past.”). 
 25. Scheetz v. Bridgestone/Firestone, Inc., 152 F.R.D. 628, 630 n.2 (D. Mont. 1993) 
(quoting Joseph R. Biden, Jr., Equal, Accessible, Affordable Justice Under Law: The Civil 
Justice Reform Act of 1990, 1 CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 1, 3 (1992) (internal quotation marks 
omitted)); see also Dondi Properties Corp. v. Commerce Sav. & Loan Ass’n, 121 F.R.D. 284, 
286 (N.D. Tex. 1988) (“[N]or can justice long remain available to deserving litigants if the costs 
of litigation are fueled unnecessarily to the point of being prohibitive.”). 
 26. See generally CASS R. SUNSTEIN, DAVID SCHKADE, LISA M. ELLMAN & ANDRES 
SAWICKI, ARE JUDGES POLITICAL? AN EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS OF THE FEDERAL JUDICIARY 
(2006) (claiming that judges’ political convictions affect their decisions in cases when the law 
does not provide a clear answer); STEVEN M. TELES, THE RISE OF THE CONSERVATIVE LEGAL 
MOVEMENT: THE BATTLE FOR CONTROL OF THE LAW (2008) (charting the development of the 
conservative legal movement from the 1970s); Adam Liptak, Court Under Roberts Is Most 
Conservative in Decades, N.Y. TIMES, July 25, 2010, at A1 (arguing that the Supreme Court 
under Chief Justice Roberts has become “the most conservative [Court] in living memory”). 
 27. The appointment of a Council on Competitiveness under the leadership of Vice 
President Dan Quayle was designed to protect and promote American business in the global 
marketplace. Its Agenda for Civil Justice Reform proposed many probusiness changes in the 
civil-justice system. See generally M.E. BEESLEY, PRIVATIZATION, REGULATION AND 
DEREGULATION (1997); WILLIS EMMONS, THE EVOLVING BARGAIN: STRATEGIC 
IMPLICATIONS OF DEREGULATION AND PRIVATIZATION (2000). 
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decisions in Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly28 and Ashcroft v. Iqbal29 
should be seen as the latest steps in a long-term trend that has 
favored increasingly early case disposition in the name of efficiency, 
economy, and avoidance of abusive and meritless lawsuits. It also 
marks a continued retreat from the principles of citizen access, private 
enforcement of public policies, and equality of litigant treatment in 
favor of corporate interests and concentrated wealth. To a significant 
degree, the liberal-procedure ethos of 1938 has given way to a 
restrictive one. 
A few illustrations of what has transpired should suffice. Two 
decades before these two pleading decisions, the 1986 trilogy of 
Supreme Court summary judgment cases30 broke with prior 
jurisprudence that sharply restricted the motion’s application to clear 
cases in which no genuine issue of material fact was present.31 The 
three decisions in one term sent a clear signal to the legal profession 
that Rule 56 provides a useful mechanism for disposing of cases short 
of trial when the district judge feels the plaintiff’s case is not 
plausible.32 Many courts responded to this invitation with 
considerable receptivity. 
A further exemplar of the shift in the focus of federal litigation to 
the pretrial phase occurred a few years after the summary judgment 
 
 28. Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (2007). The complaint charged the “Baby 
Bells” with anti-competitive conduct in the form of parallel conduct discouraging competition 
and their failure to compete with each other. Id. at 548–49. 
 29. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. 1937 (2009). The plaintiff asserted a wide range of 
constitutional and statutory violations of his civil rights by governmental officials, which was 
challenged by a motion to dismiss based on qualified immunity. Id. at 1942. 
 30. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317 (1986); Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 
U.S. 242 (1986); Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574 (1986). 
 31. The Court previously had said:  
We believe that summary procedures should be used sparingly in complex antitrust 
litigation where motive and intent play leading roles, the proof is largely in the hands 
of the alleged conspirators, and hostile witnesses thicken the plot. It is only when the 
witnesses are present and subject to cross-examination that their credibility and the 
weight to be given their testimony can be appraised. Trial by affidavit is no substitute 
for trial by jury which so long has been the hallmark of “even handed justice.” 
Poller v. Columbia Broad. Sys., Inc., 368 U.S. 464, 473 (1962) (footnote omitted); see also 
Adickes v. S. H. Kress & Co., 398 U.S. 144, 157 (1970) (holding that it was error to grant 
summary judgment because the respondent did not meet its “burden of showing the absence of 
a genuine issue as to any material fact”). 
 32. See FED. R. CIV. P. 56. For a more in-depth discussion of the impact of the 1986 trilogy, 
see Arthur R. Miller, The Pretrial Rush to Judgment: Are the “Litigation Explosion,” “Liability 
Crisis,” and Efficiency Clichés Eroding Our Day in Court and Jury Trial Commitments?, 78 
N.Y.U. L. REV. 982, 1044–73 (2003). 
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trilogy when the Supreme Court decided Daubert v. Merrell Dow 
Pharmaceuticals, Inc.,33 which established judicial gatekeeping on the 
introduction of expert testimony. The resultant challenge and hearing 
process—often time consuming and expensive—has provided 
defendants with another opportunity to eviscerate cases that depend 
on experts and proliferate the pretrial process, thereby supporting 
strategies of attrition and delay.34 
On the legislative front, and with the supposed aim of reducing 
“frivolous suits,” Congress, having been lobbied by corporate, 
accounting, and investment interests, enacted the Private Securities 
Litigation Reform Act (PSLRA) in 1995.35 The statute created a 
super-heightened pleading standard for certain aspects of securities 
claims and deferred discovery until after resolution of an inevitably 
protracted motion to dismiss, often based on complex questions such 
as scienter, loss causation, reliance, and materiality36—questions that 
formerly would have been considered trial worthy. 
 
 33. Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc., 509 U.S. 579 (1993). 
 34. Id. at 597; see also Kumho Tire Co. v. Carmichael, 526 U.S. 137, 158 (1999) (holding 
that expert testimony could be excluded); Gen. Elec. Co. v. Joiner, 522 U.S. 136, 146–47 (1997) 
(upholding the district court’s exclusion of expert testimony). Closely analogous is the intense 
judicial examination of class certifiability. See Richard A. Nagareda, Class Certification in the 
Age of Aggregate Proof, 84 N.Y.U. L. REV. 97, 100 (2009) (“Class certification is not a matter of 
mere pleading but, rather, of affirmative proof that the requirements stated in Rule 23 have 
been satisfied. The court must make a ‘definitive assessment’ that these requirements have been 
met, even if that assessment entails the resolution of conflicting proof and happens to overlap 
with an issue—even a critical one—on the merits.”); see also cases cited infra note 185. 
 35. Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995 (PSLRA), Pub. L. No. 104-67, 109 
Stat. 737 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 15 U.S.C.). Three years later, Congress 
enacted the Securities Litigation Uniform Standards Act of 1998 (SLUSA), Pub. L. No. 105-353, 
112 Stat. 3227 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 78a (2006)), which preempted almost all class 
actions related to “covered” securities, thereby virtually ending the growth of state remedial 
securities law. The same interests secured the enactment of the Class Action Fairness Act of 
2005, 28 U.S.C. §§ 1332(d), 1453 (2006), which effectively gives the supposedly defense-friendly 
federal courts exclusive jurisdiction over almost all significant class actions denying plaintiffs 
access to supposedly more receptive state courts. See Elizabeth J. Cabraser, Apportioning Due 
Process: Preserving the Right to Affordable Justice, 87 DENV. U. L. REV. 437, 448–49 (2010) (“In 
literally ‘making a federal case’ out of the vast majority of class actions, Congress intentionally 
or otherwise complicated and marked up the price tag on the delivery of ‘fair and prompt 
recovery to class members with legitimate claims’ by forcing class actions into competition for 
the scarce judicial resources of a well-respected, but under-populated, federal judicial 
community.”). 
 36. S. REP. NO. 104-98, at 4 (1995), reprinted in 1995 U.S.C.C.A.N. 679, 683; H.R. CONF. 
REP. NO. 104-369, at 32 (1995), reprinted in 1995 U.S.C.C.A.N. 730, 731. In Tellabs, Inc. v. 
Makor Issues & Rights, Ltd., 551 U.S. 308 (2007), the Court adopted a test for pleading a 
“strong inference” of scienter under the PSLRA. Id. at 314. In examining a complaint for 
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Despite the well-established position of notice pleading under 
Conley, and absent any revision of Rule 8 by the rulemaking process, 
a number of lower court federal judges—perhaps emboldened by the 
summary judgment trilogy or feeling overburdened by their 
caseloads—frequently applied more-demanding pleading standards in 
many types of cases, resulting in a greater number of Rule 12(b)(6) 
dismissals over the years.37 This arguably unauthorized shift in the 
pleading sphere provided a foundation for the Court’s Twombly 
decision.38  
Responding to the business community’s complaints about costs, 
amendments to the Federal Rules and changes in various judicial 
practices have been designed, for more than a quarter century, to 
contain or control discovery and enhance the power of judges to 
manage cases throughout the pretrial process.39 These developments 
seem to reflect a growing emphasis on efficiency, which some believe 
has enabled defense interests to employ the procedural system to 
avoid, or at least delay, reaching an adjudication of a dispute’s merits. 
Finally, the great expansion of contractual limitations on private 
law enforcement by consumers through the insertion of arbitration 
clauses into agreements that are often adhesive—and the validation 
by the Supreme Court of such clauses40—may be seen as part of an 
 
sufficiency, “an inference of scienter must be more than merely plausible or reasonable—it must 
be cogent and at least as compelling as any opposing inference of nonfraudulent intent.” Id. 
 37. See Patricia W. Hatamyar, The Tao of Pleading: Do Twombly and Iqbal Matter 
Empirically?, 59 AM. U. L. REV. 553, 556 (2010) (finding that after Conley, Rule 12(b)(6) 
motions were granted 46 percent of the time, after Twombly, the number increased to 48 
percent, and after Iqbal, the number increased to 56 percent). See generally Christopher M. 
Fairman, The Myth of Notice Pleading, 45 ARIZ. L. REV. 987, 989 (2003) (stating that “notice 
pleading as a universal standard is a myth”); Fairman, supra note 1, at 574–90 (discussing the 
rise and proliferation of judicially imposed heightened pleading requirements); Richard L. 
Marcus, The Revival of Fact Pleading Under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 86 COLUM. L. 
REV. 433, 435 (1986) (stating that fact pleading “seems to be enjoying a revival in a number of 
areas”). In the years between Conley and Twombly, attempts to convert Rule 8(a) from notice 
to fact pleading were rejected by the Advisory Committee. See supra note 19. 
 38. See Bell Atl. Co. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 560–63 (2007). 
 39. See FED. R. CIV. P. 16, 26. Rule 16 was amended in 1983 and 1993, and Rule 26 was 
amended in 1993, 2000, and 2006. For more information about the revisions, see the Advisory 
Committee’s Notes to these changes. There have been other constraints imposed on discovery. 
See, e.g., FED. R. CIV. P. 30(d)(2), 33(a). See generally Richard Marcus, Essay, Only Yesterday: 
Reflections on Rulemaking Responses to E-Discovery, 73 FORDHAM L. REV. 1, 7 (2004) 
(discussing the Advisory Committee’s response to electronic discovery). 
 40. See, e.g., Hall St. Assocs. v. Mattel, Inc., 552 U.S. 576, 587 (2008) (holding that a court 
“must grant” an application for the confirmation of an arbitration award unless certain 
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overall campaign to reduce the effectiveness of federal regulatory law 
and public enforcement proceedings.41 These clauses impair citizen 
access to a judicial forum with the possibility of jury trial. And quite 
recently the Supreme Court indicated that the availability of the class 
action in arbitration may be extremely limited,42 potentially impairing 
the effectiveness of consumer remedies in various contexts. 
In the background, several commentators have criticized 
rulemaking—once thought to reflect the efforts of neutral 
professionals—as being overly politicized by economic and 
ideological forces.43 Increasingly, it has been recognized that 
procedural rules are a source of societal power, that the formulation 
and application of those rules often are not value neutral, and that the 
manipulation of procedural rules frequently is used to advance or 
 
“prescribed” exceptions apply); Southland Corp. v. Keating, 465 U.S. 1, 7 (1984) (“Contracts to 
arbitrate are not to be avoided by allowing one party to ignore the contract and resort to the 
courts.”). 
 41. See generally Paul D. Carrington & Roger C. Cramton, Judicial Independence in 
Excess: Reviving the Judicial Duty of the Supreme Court, 94 CORNELL L. REV. 587 (2009) 
(discussing the Supreme Court’s evolving role as “superlegislator”). One accomplished 
empiricist has suggested, somewhat counter-intuitively, that the relatively limited use of 
arbitration clauses actually suggests that corporate defendants are less concerned about, and in 
need of less protection from, litigation than the Supreme Court’s Twombly and Iqbal decisions 
suggest. Has the Supreme Court Limited Americans’ Access to Courts?: Hearing Before the S. 
Comm. on the Judiciary, 111th Cong. 158–59 (2009) (statement of Theodore Eisenberg, Henry 
Allen Mark Professor of Law and Adjunct Professor of Statistical Sciences, Cornell University). 
 42. See Stolt-Nielson v. Animalfeeds Int’l Corp., 130 S. Ct. 1758 (2010). 
 43. See Robert G. Bone, The Process of Making Process: Court Rulemaking, Democratic 
Legitimacy, and Procedural Efficacy, 87 GEO. L.J. 887, 888–89 (1999) (discussing criticisms of 
court rulemaking); Paul D. Carrington, Politics and Civil Procedure Rulemaking: Reflections on 
Experience, 60 DUKE L.J. (forthcoming Dec. 2010) (manuscript at 2–19) (on file with the Duke 
Law Journal) (discussing the political stress that creates a crisis in federal rulemaking); Jack H. 
Friedenthal, The Rulemaking Power of the Supreme Court: A Contemporary Crisis, 27 STAN. L. 
REV. 673, 685 (1975) (recommending changes in Supreme Court rulemaking); Richard L. 
Marcus, Reform Through Rulemaking?, 80 WASH. U. L.Q. 901, 903 (2002) (discussing the 
“pervasive and valid concerns about a crisis in rulemaking”); Jeffrey W. Stempel, Politics and 
Sociology in Federal Civil Rulemaking: Errors of Scope, 52 ALA. L. REV. 529, 613–17, 636–37 
(2001) (noting the conservative and defense orientation of rulemaking and recommending 
greater “socio-political makeup”). See generally Linda S. Mullenix, Hope over Experience: 
Mandatory Informal Discovery and the Politics of Rulemaking, 69 N.C. L. REV. 795, 798–99 
(1991) (discussing the “politicization of the civil rulemaking process”). 
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retard substantive goals.44 Viewed realistically, rules of procedure 
represent policy tradeoffs.45 
Yet, until Twombly in 2007, the Supreme Court stood firm in its 
commitment to the rulemaking process and to the principle of access 
at the pleading stage.46 But the Court’s opinion in Twombly “retired” 
Conley’s “no set of facts” language and insisted on “more than labels 
and conclusions” or a “formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause 
of action.”47 The Court demanded “enough facts to state a claim to 
relief that is plausible on its face.”48 With the advent of “plausibility” 
pleading,49 the Rule 12(b)(6) motion seems to have stolen center 
stage. It has become the vehicle of choice for both disposing of 
allegedly insufficient claims and protecting defendants from 
supposedly excessive discovery costs and resource expenditures—
objectives previously thought to be achievable through the utilization 
of other rules and judicial practices. 
The cumulative effect of these procedural developments may 
well have come at the expense of access to the federal courts and the 
ability of citizens to obtain an adjudication of their claims’ merits. 
Some proceduralists have suggested that what has been established is 
not a neutral solution for an important litigation problem, but rather 
the use of procedure to achieve results that undermine important 
national policies by limiting their private enforcement through 
 
 44. Elizabeth M. Schneider, The Changing Shape of Federal Pretrial Practice: The 
Disparate Impact on Civil Rights and Employment Discrimination Cases, 158 U. PA. L. REV. 
517, 519–25 (2010). 
 45. See Jack B. Weinstein, Procedural Reform as a Surrogate for Substantive Law Revision, 
59 BROOK. L. REV. 827, 840 (1993) (discussing the challenge of “mov[ing] forward without 
losing hold of the basic elements that make our legal system so successful”). See generally Alan 
B. Morrison, The Necessity of Tradeoffs in a Properly Functioning Procedure System (Apr. 14, 
2010) (unpublished manuscript), available at http://civilconference.uscourts.gov/LotusQuickr/ 
dcc/Main.nsf/$defaultview/7F15D55E983415D085257707004A6316/$File/Alan%20Morrison%2
C%20The%20Necessity%20of%20Tradeoffs.pdf?OpenElement (discussing the tradeoffs 
inherent in the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure). 
 46. See supra note 22. 
 47. Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 545, 555, 579 (2007). The Court ignored its 
admonition in Poller v. Columbia Broadcasting System, Inc., 368 U.S. 464 (1962). See supra note 
31. 
 48. Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570. The Supreme Court of Arizona has retained its notice-
pleading standard and has not adopted Twombly. See Cullen v. Auto-Owners Ins. Co., 189 P.3d 
344, 348 (Ariz. 2008) (en banc) (vacating the portion of the lower court’s opinion that cited 
Twombly). 
 49. For a description of “plausibility” pleading, see infra Part I. 
MILLER IN FINAL 9/15/2010 11:50:51 AM 
2010] A DOUBLE PLAY ON THE FEDERAL RULES 15 
various systemic and process changes designed to benefit special 
economic interests.50 In recent years, the business community has 
used its influence to weaken the enforcement of public laws and 
policies regulating their activities.51 Procedural modifications have 
been employed to achieve substantive changes for defense interests. 
With Twombly and Iqbal, the favored disposition technique has 
moved earlier in time from summary judgment to the motion to 
dismiss. 
Recognizing the importance of Twombly and Iqbal, most52—but 
 
 50. To paraphrase a friend who is an accomplished proceduralist, it is the view of some that 
what we have seen is the “subversion of statutory protections to benefit Wall Street at the 
expense of Main Street.” 
 51. See TELES, supra note 26; see also Leslie M. Kelleher, Amenability to Jurisdiction as a 
“Substantive Right”: The Invalidity of Rule 4(k) Under the Rules Enabling Act, 75 IND. L.J. 1191, 
1194 (2000) (“On occasion, lobbyists have convinced Congress to bypass the rulemaking process 
entirely, and provide special procedures for specific classes of cases by legislation, in order to 
favor certain interest groups.”). For a highly partisan and rather distorted view of plaintiffs’ 
lawyers and private enforcement, see James R. Copland, A Message from the Director, TRIAL 
LAWYERS INC.: K STREET, http://www.triallawyersinc.com/kstreet/kstr01.html (last visited Aug. 
25, 2010). 
 52. See, e.g., Robert G. Bone, Twombly Pleading Rules and the Regulation of Court Access, 
94 IOWA L. REV. 873, 882–90 (2009) (discussing Twombly’s impact); Stephen B. Burbank, 
Pleading and the Dilemmas of Modern American Procedure, 93 JUDICATURE 109, 110 (2009) 
(stating that Iqbal “exacerbated confusion about pleading standards”); Kevin M. Clermont & 
Stephen C. Yeazell, Inventing Tests, Destabilizing Systems, 95 IOWA L. REV. 821, 823 (2010) 
(opining that these cases “have destabilized the entire system of civil litigation”); Thomas P. 
Gressette, Jr., The Heightened Pleading Standard of Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly and 
Ashcroft v. Iqbal: A New Phase in American Legal History Begins, 58 DRAKE L. REV. 401, 455 
(2010) (explaining that Twombly and Iqbal mark “the beginning of a new phase in the history of 
American pleading requirements”); Gregory P. Joseph, Trial Balloon: Federal Litigation—
Where Did It Go off Track?, LITIGATION, Summer 2008, at 5, 62 (stating that “Twombly 
reversed a 50-year-old precedent”).  
  Even judges and academics who one assumes are sympathetic to the decisions 
recognize their significance. See, e.g., Bhd. of Locomotive Eng’rs & Trainmen Gen. Comm. of 
Adjustment, Cent. Region v. Union Pac. R.R. Co., 537 F.3d 789, 791 (7th Cir. 2008) 
(Easterbrook, C.J., joined by Posner, J., concurring in the denial of rehearing en banc) (“In Bell 
Atlantic the Justices modified federal pleading requirements and threw out a complaint that 
would have been deemed sufficient earlier . . . .”); Richard A. Epstein, Bell Atlantic v. 
Twombly: How Motions to Dismiss Become (Disguised) Summary Judgments, 25 WASH. U. J.L. 
& POL’Y 61, 64 (2007) (“The Supreme Court in Twombly held that the phrase ‘no set of facts’ 
has been ‘questioned, criticized, and explained away long enough.’ But on this matter Justice 
Stevens’s dissent surely has the better argument. Conley has long been treated as an 
authoritative statement of the law that has been followed uniformly in the Supreme Court and 
elsewhere and the plaintiffs’ allegations are quite in the spirit of the Federal Rules. The Conley 
complaint is fact-free but gives notice of the basic elements of the claim. Twombly can not be 
defended if the only question is whether it captures the sense of notice pleading in earlier 
cases.” (footnotes omitted)). 
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not all53—observers believe these two cases represent a major 
departure from the Court’s established pleading jurisprudence and 
that the decisions have brought the long-simmering debate over the 
proper role of pleadings and pretrial motions to a fever pitch in some 
quarters. The defense bar, along with the large entities it typically 
represents, asserts that a heightened pleading standard is necessary to 
reduce the cost of litigation, weed out abusive lawsuits, and protect 
American business interests at home and abroad.54 The plaintiffs’ bar, 
supported by various civil rights, consumer, and environmental 
protection groups, argues that heightened pleading is a blunt 
instrument that will keep out or terminate meritorious claims before 
discovery, undermine various state and national policies, and increase 
the burden on under-resourced plaintiffs who typically contest with 
industrial and governmental Goliaths in cases in which critical 
information is largely in the hands of defendants and is unobtainable 
without access to discovery.55 This sharp divide even may imperil the 
credibility and effectiveness of the rulemaking process as rulemakers 
try to chart a path from this point.56 
 
 53. See Has the Supreme Court Limited Americans’ Access to Courts?: Hearing Before the 
S. Comm. on the Judiciary, supra note 41, at 175–214 (statement of Gregory G. Garre, Partner, 
Latham & Watkins, LLP) (arguing that Twombly and Iqbal were rightly decided and that 
Congress should not try to override these decisions); Access to Justice Denied: Ashcroft v. Iqbal: 
Hearing Before the Subcomm. on the Constitution, Civil Rights, and Civil Liberties of the H. 
Comm. on the Judiciary, 111th Cong. 33 (2009) (statement of Gregory C. Katsas, former 
Assistant Att’y Gen., Civil Division, U.S. Department of Justice) (claiming that Twombly and 
Iqbal “faithfully interpret” the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and are consistent with 
precedent); Douglas G. Smith, The Twombly Revolution?, 36 PEPP. L. REV. 1063, 1069 (2009) 
(arguing that the plausibility standard is both coherent and required by the Federal Rules of 
Civil Procedure). For a moderate view of the effect of the two decisions, see Adam Steinman, 
The Pleading Problem, 62 STAN. L. REV. 1293 (2010), and see also Dobyns v. U.S., 91 Fed. Cl. 
412 (2010). An optimistic view of what may be feasible under Twombly and Iqbal is offered in 
Edward A. Hartnett, Taming Twombly, Even After Iqbal, 158 U. PA. L. REV. 473 (2010). 
 54. AM. COLL. OF TRIAL LAWYERS, FINAL REPORT OF THE JOINT PROJECT OF THE AM. 
COLL. OF TRIAL LAWYERS TASK FORCE ON DISCOVERY AND THE INST. FOR THE 
ADVANCEMENT OF THE AM. LEGAL SYSTEM 2–3 (2009), available at http://www.actl.com/ 
AM/Template.cfm?Section=Home&template=/CM/ContentDisplay.cfm&ContentID=4053. 
 55. See generally Letter from John Vail, Vice President, Ctr. for Const. Lit., to the 
Advisory Comm. on Civil Rules (Nov. 10, 2008), available at http://www.uscourts.gov/uscourts/ 
RulesAndPolicies/rules/2008%20Comments%20Committee%20Folders/CV%20Comments%2
02008/08-CV-046-Testimony-Center%20For%20Constitutional%20Litigation%20(Vail).pdf 
(arguing for greater flexibility in summary judgment practice). 
 56. The cleavage between the plaintiffs’ and defendants’ bar regarding pleading and 
motion to dismiss practices is manifest throughout AM. BAR ASS’N SECTION OF LITIG., 
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Given the dramatic changes and sharp debate precipitated by 
Twombly and Iqbal, the Federal Rules—indeed, federal civil practice 
in general—stand at a critical crossroads. It is incumbent upon the 
courts and rulemakers to consider the full range of important 
questions and policy choices that have surfaced not just in Twombly 
and Iqbal, but as a result of the overarching trend toward pretrial 
disposition. That wide-angle consideration should take account of the 
various policy objectives of federal litigation, many of which have not 
been accorded sufficient weight in connection with the procedural 
alterations of the past quarter century.57 Those alterations have been 
accreting slowly. But now, with Twombly and Iqbal, their cumulative 
effect and inexorable movement toward earlier case disposition have 
become quite apparent. 
Part I of this Article explores the nature and implications of the 
new plausibility-pleading standard. Part II critiques the Court’s 
disparagement of case management and the role that the fears of 
discovery abuse, meritless lawsuits, and litigation costs have played in 
influencing changes in pleading and pretrial motion practice. It also 
explores some of the competing system values that may have been 
impaired in recent years. Part III discusses the impact of the Court’s 
decisions in Twombly, Iqbal, and the 1986 summary judgment trilogy 
on the continued viability of the rulemaking process; the future of the 
Federal Rules’ transsubstantivity; and the possibility of corrective 
legislation. Part IV offers some suggestions for tackling the difficult 
issues and questions that have arisen concerning the pretrial process. 
The Article concludes by asking how the new pleading and pretrial-
motion philosophy might lead a judge to rule on Dioguardi’s 
complaint or a contemporary variant thereof. Because of my sense of 
the dimension of the subject and its ramifications, I have written at 
length and asked many questions, some of which, of necessity, have 
been left unanswered. For that I apologize to the reader. 
I.  PLEADING UNDER TWOMBLY AND IQBAL 
The Supreme Court’s enhancement of the Rule 8(a) pleading 
burden and its extension to all cases has far-reaching consequences. 
As argued in this Part, the center of gravity of federal litigation has 
 
MEMBER SURVEY ON CIVIL PRACTICE: DETAILED REPORT (2009), as well as other surveys 
presented at the Duke Conference. 
 57. See infra Part II.C. 
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been shifted forward in time and the Court has accorded the Rule 
12(b)(6) motion to dismiss potentially life-or-death significance for 
the pleader of an affirmative claim.58 The enhanced scope of the 
district court’s inquiry on the motion established by Twombly and 
Iqbal, especially its extra-pleading and discretionary elements, alters 
the motion’s limited historic function, obscures the long-standing 
distinction between Rule 12(b)(6) and Rule 56 motions, and poses a 
number of other difficulties for judges and lawyers. 
A. Plausibility in the Eye of the Beholder 
1. The Transmogrification of Notice Pleading and the Motion to 
Dismiss.  Under Conley’s notice-pleading standard, courts were 
authorized to grant motions to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6) only when 
“it appear[ed] beyond doubt that the plaintiff [could] prove no set of 
facts in support of his claim which would entitle him to relief.”59 
Judges were to accept all factual—but not conclusory—allegations as 
true and draw all inferences in favor of the pleader. With limited 
exceptions, they were not to look beyond the pleading. Despite the 
vagueness of the Conley standard, judges employing it on a motion to 
dismiss had years of precedent providing some consistency and 
continuity. Moreover, they understood, in accordance with Conley, 
that the motion should be denied except in clear cases.60 The Rules, it 
was thought, were designed to keep cases in court at the pleading 
stage, rather than to exclude them. Something in the nature of a 
bend-over-backwards principle favoring the pleader was in force. 
Although in the decades immediately preceding Twombly and Iqbal a 
number of lower courts effectively ignored the standard while 
insisting on heightened or what amounted to fact pleading in certain 
 
 58. See infra notes 70–75 and accompanying text. 
 59. Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 45–46 (1957). This passage applied to the legal 
sufficiency of the complaint—whether any legally cognizable wrong has been stated—not the 
quality of its notice-giving content. The former is a Rule 12(b)(6) function; the latter should be 
addressed under Rule 12(e). See Leimer v. State Mut. Life Assurance Co., 108 F.2d 302, 305–06 
(8th Cir. 1940). This distinction was ignored in both Twombly and Iqbal, and that has recurred 
repeatedly ever since. 
 60. For numerous cases illustrating the liberal and simplified pleading regime under 
Conley, see 5 WRIGHT & MILLER, supra note 3, §§ 1202, 1215–1218. 
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types of cases,61 Conley’s notice-pleading approach remained the 
accepted, articulated benchmark.62 
By establishing plausibility pleading, Twombly and Iqbal, have 
transformed the function of a complaint from Conley’s limited role by 
imposing a more demanding standard that requires a greater factual 
foundation than previously was required or originally intended.63 
Indeed, it is striking to note that the Iqbal majority did not once use 
the word “notice” in its opinion or cite the Court’s other basic pre-
Twombly decisions.64 After Twombly and Iqbal, mere notice of a 
claim for relief likely does not satisfy the Court’s newly minted 
demand for a factual showing.65 To state it differently, whereas Conley 
 
 61. Fairman, supra note 37, at 988; Marcus, supra note 37, at 435. 
 62. Swierkiewicz v. Sorema N.A., 534 U.S. 506, 512 (2002). As Justice Stevens noted in his 
Twombly dissent, “today’s opinion is the first by any Member of the Court to express any doubt 
as to the adequacy of the Conley formulation.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 578 
(2007) (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
 63. For a glimpse at the initial application of the enhanced factual pleading established by 
Twombly and Iqbal in a variety of substantive contexts, see Am. Dental Ass’n v. Cigna Corp., 
605 F.3d 1283 (11th Cir. 2010) (RICO and conspiracy claims; Rules 8 and 9(b) applied); Sanchez 
v. Pereira-Castillo, 590 F.3d 31 (1st Cir. 2009) (Fourth Amendment rights and supervisory 
liability claim); Hensley Mfg., Inc. v. ProPride, Inc., 579 F.3d 603 (6th Cir. 2009) (consumer 
confusion regarding trademark and fair use claims); Sinaltrainal v. Coca-Cola Co., 578 F.3d 1252 
(11th Cir. 2009) (Alien Tort Statute and Torture Victims Protection Act claims); Moss v. U.S. 
Secret Serv., 572 F.3d 962 (9th Cir. 2009) (First Amendment viewpoint-discrimination claim); 
Doe I v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 572 F.3d 677 (9th Cir. 2009) (employment standards); St. Clair v. 
Citizens Fin. Group, 340 F. App’x 62 (3d Cir. 2009) (per curiam) (RICO claim); Farash v. Cont’l 
Airlines, Inc., 337 F. App’x 7 (2d Cir. 2009) (negligence and assault claims under New York 
law); Morgan v. Hubert, 335 F. App’x 466 (5th Cir. 2009) (per curiam) (Eighth Amendment 
deliberate-indifference claim); Sheehy v. Brown, 335 F. App’x 102 (2d Cir. 2009) (§§ 1983 and 
1985 claims); Lopez v. Beard, 333 F. App’x 685 (3d Cir. 2009) (per curiam) (First, Eighth, 
Fourteenth Amendment, and Age Discrimination Act claims); Major Tours, Inc. v. Colorel, 
Civil No. 05-3091 (JBS/JS), 2010 WL 2557250 (D.N.J. June 22, 2010) (§§ 1981 and 1985 claims); 
Spencer v. DHI Mortg. Co., Ltd., 642 F. Supp. 2d 1153 (E.D. Cal. 2009) (negligent breach of 
duty claim); Logan v. Sectek, Inc., 632 F. Supp. 2d 179 (D. Conn. 2009) (Age Discrimination Act 
claim); Vallejo v. City of Tucson, No. CV 08-500TUC DCB, 2009 WL 1835115 (D. Ariz. July 26, 
2009) (Voting Rights Act claim). 
 64. The Court seemed to reaffirm notice pleading in Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89 
(2007), three weeks after Twombly, id. at 93, but its unique facts and Iqbal cast doubt on the 
significance of that case, see A. Benjamin Spencer, Understanding Pleading Doctrine, 108 MICH. 
L. REV. 1, 6–9 (2009); see also Dottolo v. Byrne Dairy, Inc., No. 5:08-CV-0390 (GTS/ATB), 2010 
WL 2560551, at *4 (N.D.N.Y. June 22, 2010) (stating that Erickson was merely an application of 
the statement in Twombly that a pleading does not need to set out in detail the facts upon which 
a claim is based). 
 65. See Tahir v. Import Acquisition Motors, L.L.C., No. 09 C 6471, 2010 WL 2836714, at *1 
(N.D. Ill. July 15, 2010) (holding that “simply providing a defendant with notice of the claims 
against her is not enough”); Ghaster v. City of Rocky River, No. 1:09CV02080, 2010 WL 
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accepted complaints showing the possibility of a right to relief, 
Twombly requires a pleading to show the plausibility of a claim; the 
Court has not demanded that the pleader demonstrate a probability 
of the claim prevailing on the merits, however. At a minimum, the 
pleading requirement has become one of notice-plus. In reality, that is 
a form of fact pleading by another name.66 
The Court’s signal was loud and clear. Motions to dismiss based 
on Twombly and Iqbal have become routine, and the perception 
among many practicing attorneys and commentators is that the grant 
rate has increased, particularly in civil rights cases, employment 
discrimination, private enforcement matters, class actions, and 
proceedings brought pro se. Some initial empirical evidence supports 
these impressions.67 A two-year study of post-Twombly antitrust cases 
 
2802682, at *3 (N.D. Ohio July 13, 2010) (holding that “fair notice” cannot be enough to survive 
dismissal); see also Spencer, supra note 64, at 19–21 (“[A] complaint that adequately provides 
notice is not necessarily sufficient to state a claim.”). One hopes that Judge Wood was not being 
too optimistic in her majority opinion in Swanson v. Citibank, N.A., No. 10-1122, 2010 WL 
2977297 (7th Cir. July 30, 2010), when she wrote: “The Court was not engaged in a sub rosa 
campaign to reinstate the old fact-pleading system called for by [New York’s 1848] Field Code 
or even more modern codes. We know that because it said so in Erickson . . . .” Id. at *2. 
 66. See Rakesh N. Kilaru, Comment, The New Rule 12(b)(6): Twombly, Iqbal, and the 
Paradox of Pleading, 62 STAN. L. REV. 905, 918 (2010) (claiming the complaints in both 
Twombly and Iqbal would have been sufficient under Conley and would have survived had they 
pled more facts, thereby suggesting a heightened fact-pleading requirement). 
 67. See Schneider, supra note 44, at 519–26. As of this writing, only a small amount of data 
is available. Moreover, the research techniques employed thus far generally have been limited 
to what is reported in Westlaw and LEXIS, which omits decisions from the bench, thought by 
some to be more commonly denials than grants of a Rule 12(b)(6) motion. There are, however, 
a few studies suggesting a greater frequency of dismissal under Twombly and Iqbal than under 
Conley. See Hatamyar, supra note 37, at 556 (finding that after Conley, Twombly, and Iqbal, 
respectively, Rule 12(b)(6) motions were increasingly granted); Joseph A. Seiner, Pleading 
Disability, 51 B.C. L. REV. 95, 118 (2010) (finding dismissals increased from 54.2 percent to 64.6 
percent in disability cases after Twombly); Joseph A. Seiner, The Trouble with Twombly: A 
Proposed Pleading Standard for Employment Discrimination Cases, 2009 U. ILL. L. REV. 1011, 
1014 (finding a higher rate of dismissals in Title VII cases after Twombly); see also Kendall W. 
Hannon, Much Ado About Twombly? A Study on the Impact of Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly 
on 12(b)(6) Motions, 83 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1811, 1813 (2008) (stating that Twombly has had 
“almost no substantive impact” except in civil rights cases). But cf. Memorandum from Andrea 
Kuperman, Rules Law Clerk to Judge Lee H. Rosenthal, to the Civil Rules Advisory Comm. 
and the Standing Rules Comm.: Application of Pleading Standards Post-Ashcroft v. Iqbal (Nov. 
25, 2009), available at http://www.uscourts.gov/uscourts/RulesAndPolicies/rules/Memo%20re 
%20pleading%20standards%20by%20circuit.pdf (providing a summary of cases). Some 
fragmentary statistics from the Administrative Office of the United States Courts show little 
change in the frequency of the motion to dismiss. ADMIN. OFFICE OF THE U.S. COURTS, 
MOTIONS TO DISMISS (2009), http://www.uscourts.gov/uscourts/RulesAndPolicies/rules/motions 
%20to%20dismiss.pdf. 
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by a prominent New York City defense firm, after noting a 2 to 1 
dismissal ratio, concludes that the case has had a “substantial impact” 
and has “raised the bar” for plaintiffs.68 The Supreme Court’s change 
in policy seems to suggest a regression in time, taking federal civil 
practice back toward code and common law procedure and their 
heavy emphasis on detailed pleadings and frequent resolution by a 
demurrer to the complaint or code motion to dismiss69—all of this 
without any real reason to believe that demanding stricter pleading 
provides an adequate basis for identifying meritless claims. 
Twombly and Iqbal, in fact, have altered the Rule 12(b)(6) 
procedure even more dramatically. By insisting on a showing of 
plausibility, the past practice of construing the complaint in the light 
most favorable to the pleader and drawing all inferences in his favor 
effectively has been replaced in some quarters by the long-rejected 
practice of construing a pleading against the pleader.70 In the same 
vein, some lower court opinions appear to reflect an impairment of 
the principle that allegations of fact are to be accepted as true,71 even 
though the Iqbal opinion states that a court should assume the 
veracity of “well-pleaded factual allegations.”72 Most significantly, the 
 
 68. SHEARMAN & STERLING LLP, ANTITRUST DIGEST: EMERGING TRENDS AND 
PATTERNS IN FEDERAL ANTITRUST CASES AFTER BELL ATLANTIC CORP. V. TWOMBLY 3, 6 
(2009), http://www.shearman.com/files/upload/AT-030609-Antitrust%20Digest.pdf; see also 
REPORT OF THE NEW YORK STATE BAR ASSOCIATION SPECIAL COMMITTEE ON STANDARDS 
FOR PLEADING IN FEDERAL LITIGATION 18–19 (2010), available at http://www.nysba.org/ 
AM/Template.cfm?Section=URL_Manager&TEMPLATE=/CM/ContentDisplay.cfm&CONT
ENTID=37197 (“[S]tatistics . . . do not tell the whole story.”). 
 69. See AM. BAR ASS’N, supra note 2, at 225. 
 70. See, e.g., Am. Dental Ass’n v. Cigna Corp., 605 F.3d 1283, 1296 (11th Cir. 2010) 
(affirming dismissal of the case for failure to state a claim); Sinaltrainal v. Coca-Cola Co., 578 
F.3d 1252, 1268 (11th Cir. 2009) (holding that the court was “not required to admit as true this 
unwarranted deduction of fact”). Although a PSLRA case, In re Synchronoss Securities 
Litigation, No. 08-4437, 2010 WL 1409664 (D.N.J. Apr. 7, 2010), shows an extremely grudging 
application of Rule 8 and Rule 9(b). Similarly, in Market Trading, Inc. v. AT&T Mobility, No. 
09-55445 (GEB), 2010 WL 2836092 (9th Cir. 2010), the Ninth Circuit was unwilling to accept a 
“bare allegation” of the pleader’s intent. Id. at *1. 
 71. See, e.g., Phillips v. Bell, 365 F. App’x 133, 141 (10th Cir. 2010) (finding it “fairly 
implausible” that the defendant would use self-damning information for the purposes the 
plaintiff contended); Hollis v. Gonzalez, No. 1:08-cv-1834 OWW DLB PC, 2010 WL 2555781, at 
*5 (E.D. Cal. June 18, 2010) (finding the same factual allegations plausible to state a retaliation 
claim against a prison guard, but not the prison director). See generally A. Benjamin Spencer, 
Iqbal and the Slide Toward Restrictive Procedure, 14 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 185, 196–97 
(2010) (noting that Iqbal clearly challenged the principle that a plaintiff’s allegations are 
assumed to be true). 
 72. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. 1937, 1950 (2009). 
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decisions have unmoored our long-held understanding that the 
motion to dismiss simply tests a pleading’s notice-giving and 
substantive-law sufficiency. 
The Federal Rules replaced the demurrer and the code motion to 
dismiss with the Rule 12(b)(6) motion in order to reduce 
adjudications based on “procedural booby traps.”73 Yet even the more 
technical and much harsher demurrer and code motion focused 
exclusively on the legal sufficiency of the plaintiff’s statement of each 
substantive element of a cause of action, and did not involve a judicial 
assessment of the case’s facts or actual merits.74 Twombly and Iqbal 
may have transformed the relatively delineated purpose of the Rule 
12(b)(6) motion into a potentially draconian method of foreclosing 
access based on an evaluation of the plausibility of a challenged 
pleading’s factual presentation, filtered through the Court’s 
invocation of extra-pleading “judicial experience and common sense” 
factors.75 But should the motion to dismiss be transmogrified in this 
fashion? How far should this threshold procedure be allowed to drift 
from its historical function and defined scope of inquiry? 
Not only has plausibility pleading undone the relative simplicity 
of the Rule 8 pleading regime and the limited function of the Rule 
12(b)(6) motion, but it also has granted virtually unbridled discretion 
to district court judges. This enhanced discretion has sparked a 
concern that some judges will allow their own views on various 
substantive matters to intrude on their decisionmaking and no longer 
will feel bound by the four corners of the complaint, as historically 
was true.76 Over two decades ago, Professor Richard L. Marcus 
 
 73. Surowitz v. Hilton Hotels Corp., 383 U.S. 363, 373 (1966). 
 74. For discussions of the earlier procedures, see 1 CHITTY’S TREATISE ON PLEADING AND 
PARTIES TO ACTIONS 692–702 (J.C. Perkins ed., Springfield, G. & C. Merriam 16th Am. ed. 
1876) (describing the requirements for a demurrer); CHARLES EDWARD CLARK, HANDBOOK 
OF THE LAW OF CODE PLEADING §§ 78–79 (2d ed. 1947); HENRY JOHN STEPHEN, A TREATISE 
ON THE PRINCIPLES OF PLEADING IN CIVIL ACTIONS 157–62 (Samuel Tyler ed., Washington, 
William H. Morrison 3d Am. ed. 1882) (same); Robert Wyness Millar, The Fortunes of the 
Demurrer, 31 ILL. L. REV. 429, 429–30 (1936) (comparing the Anglo-Saxon demurrer with civil 
law equivalents). 
 75. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. at 1950. As the famed fictional English barrister Horace Rumpole 
might say: “I’m afraid what we have here is a case of premature adjudication.” JOHN 
MORTIMER, RUMPOLE MISBEHAVES 176–77 (2007). 
 76. See Colleen McMahon, The Law of Unintended Consequences: Shockwaves in the 
Lower Courts After Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 41 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 851, 852–53 (2008) 
(“As both district court and appellate court judges try to parse the meaning of a few key phrases 
in the Twombly decision, what was once uniform dogma about the pleading standard for most 
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recognized the reemergence of fact pleading and cautioned that a 
threshold filtering system based on individual judicial discretion 
carried dangerous implications for the Federal Rules’ foundational 
principles.77 He explained that the application of Rule 12(b)(6) would 
depend on “the very real attitudinal differences among judges,” who, 
lacking the benefit of a developed record, would feel free to decide 
motions on instinct.78 Professor Marcus’s forewarning appears to have 
materialized. 
2. Iqbal’s Two-Step Process.  Under the plausibility-pleading 
standard, the Court has vested trial judges with the authority to 
evaluate the strength of the factual “showing”79 of each claim for 
relief and thus determine whether it should proceed.80 In Iqbal, 
Justice Kennedy’s opinion for the Court described a two-step 
approach for the plausibility inquiry that is quite different from the 
questions of legal sufficiency and notice giving that were the focus of 
the “showing” required under prior Rule 12(b)(6) and Rule 12(e) 
practice.81 First, district court judges are to distinguish factual 
 
causes of action is being fragmented on a circuit-by-circuit—or sometimes a judge-by-judge—
basis. We district court judges suddenly and unexpectedly find ourselves puzzled over 
something we thought we knew how to do with our eyes closed: dispose of a motion to dismiss a 
case for failure to state a claim.”). 
 77. See Marcus, supra note 37, at 482 (noting that increased judicial discretion could allow 
judges to dismiss claims simply because they disfavor them). 
 78. Id. at 482–83; see also Burbank, supra note 52, at 115–16 (arguing that increasing 
judicial discretion allows judges to rely on their personal preferences when deciding motions). 
 79. FED. R. CIV. P. 8(a)(2). It appears that the textual core of the Twombly decision, 
namely its focus on the sufficiency of a complaint’s factual “showing,” is the first time the Court 
emphasized that word in Rule 8 in considering a motion to dismiss. In Iqbal, the Court offered 
what many would regard as a new construction of the word “generally” in the second sentence 
of Rule 9(b) relating to that provision’s mandate allowing the simplified pleading of conditions 
of a person’s mind. See Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. at 1954 (explaining that the term “generally” is relative 
and should be construed in light of the particularity requirements necessary to show fraud or 
mistake under Rule 9). 
 80. Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 556 & n.3 (2007). See Kilaru, supra note 66, 
at 910–11 (clarifying that the Supreme Court set forth a legal plausibility standard that assesses 
whether the facts plausibly suggest illegal conduct, rather than factual plausibility, which 
questions whether the conduct actually occurred). 
 81. The critical allegation in Iqbal stated that Attorney General Ashcroft and FBI Director 
Mueller “knew of, condoned, and willfully and maliciously agreed to subject [Iqbal] to harsh 
conditions of confinement as a matter of policy, solely on account of [Iqbal’s] religion, race, 
and/or national origin and for no legitimate penological reason.” Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. at 1944 
(quotations omitted). Ashcroft was alleged to have been the “principal architect” of the plan 
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allegations from legal conclusions, since only the former need be 
accepted as true.82 Then, they must decide on the basis of the factual 
allegations and their “judicial experience and common sense” 
whether a plausible claim for relief has been shown.83 
The fact–legal conclusion dichotomy presented by Twombly’s 
first step is shadowy at best. Worse, the categories are likely to 
generate motion practice unrelated to the merits. Moreover, it is 
precisely what the drafters of the original Rules intentionally rejected 
as counterproductive and sought to eliminate by substituting “short 
and plain” and “claim for relief” for any reference to the troublesome 
code categories of “facts,” “conclusions,” “evidence,” and “cause of 
action.”84 
Although Justice Souter, Twombly’s author, consented to the 
theory of this first step, his disagreement with the Iqbal majority lay 
in the undefined method by which the Court distinguished the 
complaint’s factual allegations from its legal conclusions.85 In his 
dissenting opinion, the Justice criticized “[t]he fallacy of the 
majority’s position” because it classified many of the allegations as 
conclusory and considered only a select number of factual allegations 
in isolation, rather than construing the entire pleading in the 
plaintiff’s favor.86 He and three other dissenters argued that the 
majority’s classification was entirely arbitrary and failed to guide the 
lower courts on how to draw the fact-conclusion distinction.87 
Some post-Iqbal decisions suggest the Justice’s concern may have 
been well founded. The conclusion category is being applied quite 
expansively, embracing allegations that one reasonably might classify 
 
and Mueller was alleged to have executed it. Id. at 1944, 1951. The Court found these to be 
conclusions. Id. at 1951. 
 82. The classic article on the subject is Walter Wheeler Cook, ‘Facts’ and ‘Statements of 
Fact,’ 4 U. CHI. L. REV. 233 (1936). 
 83. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. at 1950. 
 84. See generally 5 WRIGHT & MILLER, supra note 3, §§ 1215–1218 (discussing the pleading 
requirements of Rule 8); Walter Wheeler Cook, Statements of Fact in Pleading Under the Codes, 
21 COLUM. L. REV. 416 (1921) (noting that there is no logical distinction between categories 
such as “statements of fact” and “conclusions of law”); Miller, supra note 32, at 1082–93 
(describing the conceptual and practical difficulties inherent in the law-fact distinction); Subrin, 
supra note 1, at 963, 975–77 (describing how the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure avoided the 
factual and cause of action requirements of civil codes). 
 85. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. at 1960 (Souter, J., dissenting). 
 86. Id. 
 87. Id. at 1960–61. 
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as factual and therefore potentially jury triable,88 including the key 
allegations in Iqbal itself. It is now fairly common for federal courts to 
channel words used in Iqbal and characterize allegations as merely 
“formulaic,” “conclusory,” “speculative,” “cryptic,” “generalized,” or 
“bare.”89 By transforming arguably factual allegations into legal 
conclusions and refusing to draw favorable inferences from them—
thereby ignoring portions of the complaint—judges are both failing to 
construe the complaint in favor of the pleader as prior Rule 12(b)(6) 
doctrine required and performing functions previously thought more 
appropriate for the factfinder. And they are doing so based only on 
the complaint.90 If nothing else, the emerging case law is revealing 
 
 88. See sources cited supra note 63; cf. al-Kidd v. Ashcroft, 580 F.3d 949, 975–77 (9th Cir. 
2009) (distinguishing the complaint before the court from the complaint in Iqbal and finding 
sufficient facts to satisfy plausibility). 
 89. See, e.g., Maldonado v. Fontanes, 568 F.2d 263, 274 (1st Cir. 2009) (characterizing some 
allegations as “conclusory” before determining whether the remaining facts plausibly stated a 
claim); Knaus v. Town of Ledgeview, No. 10-C-502, 2010 WL 2640272, at *3 (E.D. Wis. June 24, 
2010) (characterizing the plaintiff’s allegations as “conclusory”); Ocasio-Hernandez v. Fortuno-
Burset, 639 F. Supp. 2d 217, 222 (D.P.R. 2009) (characterizing the allegations as “generic” and 
“conclusory”); Air Atlanta Aero Eng’g Ltd. v. SP Aircraft Owner I, LLC, 637 F. Supp. 2d 185, 
200 (S.D.N.Y. 2009) (characterizing the allegations as “cryptic”); Consumer Protection Corp. v. 
Neo-Tech News, No. CV-08-1983-PHX-JAT, 2009 WL 2132694, at *2 (D. Ariz. July 16, 2009) 
(holding that the complaint contained enough factual allegations to be more than “conclusory”); 
Fletcher v. Phillip Morris USA, Inc., No. 3:09CV284-HEH, 2009 WL 2067807, at *6 (E.D. Va. 
July 14, 2009) (characterizing the allegations as “conclusory”). In Starr v. Sony BMG Music 
Entertainment, 592 F.3d 314 (2d Cir. 2010), an antitrust case, the court asserted, without 
explanation, that an allegation that the defendants agreed to a price floor “is obviously 
conclusory” and would not be accepted as true. Id. at 319 n.2. A number of courts have 
acknowledged that complaints that would have survived under Conley do not (or might not) 
survive under Twombly and Iqbal. See, e.g., Coleman v. Tulsa Cnty. Bd. of Cnty. Comm’rs, No. 
09-3008, 2009 WL 2513520, at *3 (N.D. Okla. Aug. 11, 2009) (noting that the complaint might 
have survived under the pre-Iqbal standard); Ansley v. Fla. Dep’t of Revenue, No. 4:09cv161-
RH/WCS, 2009 WL 1973548, at *2 (N.D. Fla. July 8, 2009) (noting that the allegations might 
have survived a motion to dismiss prior to the Twombly and Iqbal decisions); Kyle v. Holinka, 
No. 09-cv-90-slc, 2009 WL 1867671, at *1 (W.D. Wis. June 29, 2009) (noting that conclusions 
about allegations must be revisited in light of Iqbal). 
 90. This concern and the ramifications of it are strikingly demonstrated in Dan M. Kahan, 
David A. Hoffman & Donald Braman, Whose Eyes Are You Going to Believe? Scott v. Harris 
and the Perils of Cognitive Illiberalism, 122 HARV. L. REV. 837 (2009). Professor Suja Thomas 
discussed a similar principle. See Suja A. Thomas, The Fallacy of Dispositive Procedure, 50 B.C. 
L. REV. 759, 760–61 (2009) (asserting that judges dismiss cases based on their own views of the 
facts). Examples may be Marrero-Gutierrez v. Molina, 491 F.3d 1, 9–10 (1st Cir. 2007), where 
the First Circuit upheld the discharge of a government worker allegedly based on political 
activity, and Adams v. Lafayette College, No. 09-3008, 2009 WL 2777312, at *4 (E.D. Pa. Aug. 
31, 2009), where the Eastern District of Pennsylvania upheld an employment discipline measure 
allegedly based on age. With a few exceptions, the application of facts to legal principles 
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that, like the Emperor in the well-known fable, the fact–conclusion 
dichotomy has no clothes.91 
As to Iqbal’s second step, once trial judges have identified the 
factual allegations, they then must decide whether a plausible claim 
for relief has been shown. They may do so, according to the Court’s 
majority opinion, by relying on their “judicial experience and 
common sense,”92 highly ambiguous and subjective concepts largely 
devoid of accepted—let alone universal—meaning. Further, the 
plausibility of factual allegations appears to depend on the relative 
likelihood that legally actionable conduct occurred versus a 
hypothesized innocent explanation. In both Twombly and Iqbal, the 
Court proposed explanations for the alleged factual pattern that were 
thought to be an “obvious alternative”93 to or “more likely”94 than the 
plaintiffs’ inferences of wrongdoing—findings strikingly analogous to 
those made by factfinders in the trial setting. 
As Justice Souter stated during oral argument in Iqbal, Twombly 
presented “an either-or choice” between conspiracy and lawful 
parallel conduct, which made the “obvious alternative explanation” 
of a lack of wrongdoing highly logical given the case’s context.95 This 
in turn made it easier for the Court’s majority to demand more than 
what it characterized as legal conclusions to support a plausible 
antitrust conspiracy claim.96 In Iqbal, however, the majority’s 
description of the alleged conduct—the rounding up of Muslim men 
following the September 11 terror attack on New York City—as 
merely having incidental disparate impact on the plaintiff seemed 
neither obvious nor more likely to the dissenting Justices because the 
 
historically has been left to the jury. See generally James B. Thayer, Law and Fact in Jury Trials, 
4 HARV. L. REV. 147, 170 (1890) (describing the jury’s role in weighing facts). 
 91. In Steinman, supra note 53, an excellent and highly analytic article, the author argues 
that the key to Twombly-Iqbal is that critical allegations were conclusory and that the Court’s 
new pleading paradigm is that a complaint will be sufficient if it “provides non-conclusory 
allegations for each element of a claim for relief.” Id. at 1314. But that simply is another way of 
describing fact pleading. The author offers what he calls a “transactional approach,” calling for 
the pleader to provide a narrative that identifies “real-world acts or events underlying the 
plaintiff’s claim.” Id. at 1344. He acknowledges that there is no formula for distinguishing 
between an adequate and inadequate identification of the liability-creating events. Id. at 1335. 
 92. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. 1937, 1950 (2009). A newly or recently appointed judge 
theoretically is relegated to his or her common sense. 
 93. Bell Atl. Co. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 567 (2007). 
 94. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. at 1950. 
 95. Transcript of Oral Argument at 10, Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. 1937 (No. 07-1015). 
 96. Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556–57. 
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same simple dichotomy was not present.97 This point seems enhanced 
by the fact that several critical allegations involved the defendants’ 
states of mind, which may be alleged “generally.”98 
At the same time, it is not entirely clear how this either-or 
concept fits in. It seems that any issue essentially could be reduced to 
an either-or choice. In Twombly, the conduct was either 
conspiratorial or it was not. In Iqbal, the either-or choice was 
between the plaintiffs having been affected by the rounding up of 
Muslim men, or not having been impacted. The latter situation may 
be more ambiguous, but is the inquiry really analytically different? Is 
the argument that no cases can be reduced to an either-or 
determination, or that most cases cannot be analyzed in that way? 
Was that analysis appropriately applied in Twombly but not in Iqbal, 
or was it inappropriate in both cases? 
There are reasons to believe that Iqbal actually establishes a 
more demanding pleading standard than Twombly.99 First, whereas 
the earlier case only requires the complaint to suggest plausibility, the 
later case calls for a reasonable inference of plausibility. Second, 
Iqbal seems to favor a somewhat sterilized evaluation of the 
complaint by stating that conclusions may be disregarded on a motion 
to dismiss. The plausibility analysis is thus limited to what the court 
deems to be the purely factual allegations. This analysis is 
inconsistent with the notion that the entire complaint should be 
examined holistically on a motion to dismiss.100 The effect of this 
limitation is compounded by the aforementioned tendency to expand 
the conclusion category, thereby inevitably contracting the fact 
category and the judge’s field of vision. This phenomenon is 
exacerbated by yet another development: dismissals based on the 
court’s use of what has been termed a “slice and dice” technique of 
making a sufficiency judgment by telescopically looking at each 
element separately rather than taking a wide-angle view of the 
 
 97. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. at 1959–61 (Souter, J., dissenting). 
 98. See id. at 1954 (majority opinion). 
 99. See Robert G. Bone, Plausibility Pleading Revisited and Revised: A Comment on 
Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 85 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 849, 851 (2010) (arguing that the Iqbal standard is 
stricter than the Twombly standard). 
 100. See Tellabs, Inc. v. Makor Issues & Rights, Ltd., 551 U.S. 308, 322–23 (2007) (stating 
that courts must consider complaints in their entirety). 
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pleading.101 Thus, Iqbal may eliminate a range of arguably weak but 
potentially meritorious cases, not merely meritless actions. Twombly 
seemed to focus only on the latter. Obviously, that heightens the risk 
of premature terminations. 
Many, if not most, aspects of judicial experience and common 
sense—which have become elements of balancing potential litigation 
costs against the likelihood that a claim plausibly has merit102—are not 
matters found within the four corners of a pleading. Thus, the Court 
in Twombly and Iqbal implicitly rejected the long-standing 
proposition that only matters found within or integrally related to the 
complaint may be considered on a motion to dismiss, unless the 
district judge chooses to convert the motion into one for summary 
judgment, which would make the full discovery process available to 
the parties, thereby further confusing Rule 12(b)(6) practice.103 
This radical departure from prior practice raises novel questions 
of how the new pleading-motion regime will work going forward, and 
whether efficiency actually is achieved by it. Given the expanded 
judicial scope of inquiry on a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, is it now 
incumbent on a plaintiff to negate any and all potentially innocent 
explanations for the defendant’s challenged conduct, a long-
proscribed form of anticipatory pleading?104 If a plaintiff must plead 
 
 101. See, e.g., In re Synchronoss Sec. Litig., No. 08-4437 (GEB), 2010 WL 1409664 (D.N.J. 
Apr. 7, 2010). 
 102. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. at 1940 (citing Bell Atl. Co. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 556 (2007)). 
Surprisingly, the Court cites to Twombly for the proposition, but the Twombly opinion makes 
no explicit mention of these two terms. Twombly does indicate that sufficiency “turns on the 
suggestions raised by this conduct when viewed in light of common economic experience.” 
Twombly, 550 U.S. at 565. In addition, the judge only is authorized to consult “prior rulings and 
considered views of leading commentators.” Id. at 556. The Iqbal interpretation of this passage, 
one that should have been construed in the antitrust context, seems like an overly broad 
expansion of a minor suggestion. 
 103. Before Twombly and Iqbal, trial judges only had the ability to consider “matters 
incorporated by reference or integral to the claim, items subject to judicial notice, matters of 
public record, orders, items appearing in the record of the case, and exhibits attached to the 
complaint whose authenticity is unquestioned; these items may be considered by the district 
judge without converting the motion into one for summary judgment.” 5B WRIGHT & MILLER, 
supra note 3, § 1357; see also Tellabs, 551 U.S. at 322–23 (stating that courts may consider 
documents incorporated by reference and items subject to judicial notice). If “matters outside 
the pleadings” are presented and not excluded by the court on a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, it “must 
be treated” as one for summary judgment. FED. R. CIV. P. 12(d). 
 104. See sources cited infra note 137. The Second Circuit, however, has stated that an 
antitrust complaint does not need to allege facts that exclude independent, self-interested 
conduct. Starr v. Sony BMG Music Entm’t, 592 F.3d 314, 325, 327 (2d Cir. 2010). 
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self-protectively, will it result in “phone book” pleading? Is this 
specter a realistic one? Should parties be permitted to explore and 
contest the relevance as well as the content of a judge’s experience 
and common sense in their Rule 12(b)(6) motion submissions?105 
Since the costs of and time needed for discovery and a possible trial 
often cannot be appraised accurately by examining the complaint, 
should those issues also be a matter of adversarial combat on a 
motion to dismiss? This expansion of pleading under Rule 8(a)(2) and 
Rule 12(b)(6) may well dissipate the supposed time and resource 
economies early termination is thought to achieve. 
As is true of the division between facts and legal conclusions, the 
Court provided little direction on how to measure the palpably 
subjective factors of “judicial experience,” “common sense,” and a 
“more likely” alternative explanation it has inserted into the Rule 
12(b)(6) dynamic.106 Although judicial discretion normally is to be 
applauded, it should be constrained in the context of a threshold 
motion theoretically addressed solely to the notice-giving quality and 
legal sufficiency of the complaint. If unconstrained, it allows judges to 
deny access to a merits adjudication whenever an equivocal set of 
facts can be interpreted as “more likely” to reflect lawful conduct.107 
 
 105. The decisions are an invitation to counsel to investigate the background of district 
judges, not only for purposes of the motion to dismiss but also for forum selection. The 
existence of websites such as THE ROBING ROOM, http://www.therobingroom.com (last visited 
Aug. 26, 2010), suggest that judicial privacy may be at risk. 
 106. See Lonny S. Hoffman, Burn up the Chaff with Unquenchable Fire: What Two Doctrinal 
Intersections Can Teach Us About Judicial Power over Pleadings, 88 B.U. L. REV. 1217, 1257 
(2008) (“Virtually everyone (except, perhaps, the five Justices in the majority in Twombly) 
regards plausibility as an ambiguous standard.”). For a particularly striking example of this 
subjectivity, see Mangum v. Town of Holly Springs, 551 F. Supp. 2d 439, 443–46 (E.D.N.C. 
2008). 
 107. There is no obvious benchmark for what information is necessary to overcome a “more 
likely” explanation. Some courts are more lenient than others in allowing a claim to go forward 
even if there is an alternative explanation. Compare Foust v. Stryker Corp., No. 2:10-cv-00005, 
2010 WL 2572179, at *4–5 (S.D. Ohio June 22, 2010) (“The fact that Plaintiff’s hip replacement 
could have failed for multiple reasons is not relevant at this stage in the pleadings.”), and Cole v. 
FBI, No. CV-09-21-BLG-RFC-CSO, 2010 WL 2541216, at *22 (D. Mont. June 17, 2010) (finding 
facts sufficient even though there “may be alternative explanations”), with Am. Dental Ass’n v. 
Cigna Corp., 605 F.3d 1286 (11th Cir. 2010); and Phillips v. Bell, No. 08-1420, 2010 WL 517629, 
at *7 (10th Cir. Feb. 12, 2010) (dismissing the complaint because it was “fairly implausible” 
given there were more plausible reasons). Many are concerned, however, that the “more likely” 
explanation analysis will impact civil rights claims disproportionately because discrimination 
may be viewed as “an aberration from 21st century norms . . . [and] thus considered an 
implausible explanation for a particular event or occurrence.” Has the Supreme Court Limited 
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This process is uncomfortably close to a weighing of the evidence and 
an invasion of the jury’s domain, suggesting that the Court’s decisions 
represent a potentially significant change in the division of functions 
between judge and jury.108 In other words, a trial-like scrutiny of the 
merits is being shifted to an extremely early point in the pretrial 
phase. This concern is compounded by the fear that rulings on 
motions to dismiss may be affected by differences in background and 
pre-judicial life experiences or turn on individual ideology regarding 
the claim being advanced or personal attitudes toward the private 
enforcement of federal statutes and other public policies, perhaps 
coupled with an evaluation of extra-pleading matters hitherto 
considered far beyond the legitimate scope of a motion to dismiss. 
As a result, inconsistent rulings on virtually identical complaints 
may well be based on individual judges having quite different 
subjective views of what allegations are plausible.109 For instance, the 
Iqbal majority decided that its “judicial experience” and “common 
sense” refuted Iqbal’s claims of intended invidious discrimination by 
government officials.110 Yet the four dissenting Justices—and a 
 
Americans’ Access to Courts?: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, supra note 41, at 
70 (statement of John Payton, President, NAACP Legal Defense and Educational Fund). 
 108. See A. Benjamin Spencer, Plausibility Pleading, 49 B.C. L. REV. 431, 445 (2008) (noting 
that plaintiffs no longer can survive a motion to dismiss by pleading equivocal facts); see also 
Suja A. Thomas, Why the Motion to Dismiss Is Now Unconstitutional, 92 MINN. L. REV. 1851, 
1867–71 (2008) (analyzing the constitutional implications of the Twombly standard on the role 
of the jury); Kilaru, supra note 66, at 925–26 (comparing the plausibility standard to the 
standard for the weighing of evidence in Pullman-Standard v. Swint, 456 U.S. 273 (1982)). 
 109. Cf. Hoffman, supra note 106, at 1259–60 (“A more significant, though less well 
publicized, finding reached by the FJC [Federal Judicial Center] was that summary judgment 
filing and grant rates vary—and sometimes wildly—by case type and by court. . . . These stark 
disparities in filing rates and, more importantly in grant rates, offer a powerful reason to be 
wary of expanding the scope of judicial pleading review authority, at least if the goal of 
transsubstantive rules is not to be entirely jettisoned.”). 
 110. Relying on facts found outside Iqbal’s complaint, the majority reasoned as follows:  
The September 11 attacks were perpetrated by 19 Arab Muslim hijackers who 
counted themselves members in good standing of al Qaeda, an Islamic fundamentalist 
group. Al Qaeda was headed by another Arab Muslim—Osama bin Laden—and 
composed in large part of his Arab Muslim disciples. It should come as no surprise 
that a legitimate policy directing law enforcement to arrest and detain individuals 
because of their suspected link to the attacks would produce a disparate, incidental 
impact on Arab Muslims, even though the purpose of the policy was to target neither 
Arabs nor Muslims.  
Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. 1937, 1951 (2009). But cf. Tim Reid, George W. Bush ‘Knew 
Guantánamo Prisoners Were Innocent,’ TIMES ONLINE (Apr. 9, 2010), 
http://www.timesonline.co.uk/tol/news/world/us_and_americas/article7092435.ece (reporting 
that former Secretary of State Colin Powell’s chief of staff had signed a declaration stating that 
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majority of the Second Circuit panel111—disagreed and found that his 
allegations established a plausible claim of constitutional violations.112 
If each of the nine Supreme Court Justices had been serving instead 
as district court judges in separate cases, Iqbal’s complaint would 
have survived the motion to dismiss nearly half the time. 
Other inconsistencies and uncertainties of application have 
arisen, causing confusion and disarray among judges and lawyers. For 
example, the Third Circuit has ruled that the 2002 Supreme Court 
decision in Swierkiewicz v. Sorema N.A.,113 which upheld notice 
pleading in employment discrimination actions,114 was no longer 
authoritative after Iqbal.115 Iqbal did not refer to Swierkiewicz. The 
Seventh Circuit116 and courts in other circuits have disagreed.117 
 
the president, the vice president, and the Secretary of Defense knew that “hundreds of innocent 
men” were sent to the Guantánamo Bay prison camp). 
 111. Iqbal v. Hasty, 490 F.3d 143, 177–78 (2d Cir. 2007) (Newman & Sack, JJ.), rev’d sub. 
nom. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. 137; id. at 178 (Cabranes, J., concurring). 
 112. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. at 1954–61 (Souter, J., dissenting). 
 113. Swierkiewicz v. Sorema N.A., 534 U.S. 506 (2002). 
 114. Id. at 513. The continued validity of this decision seemingly was accepted in Twombly. 
Bell Atl. Co. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 569–70 (2007). 
 115. Guirguis v. Movers Specialty Servs., Inc., 346 F. App’x 774, 776 n.7 (3d Cir. 2009); 
Fowler v. UPMC Shadyside, 578 F.3d 203, 211 (3d Cir. 2009); see also Francis v. Giacomelli, 588 
F.3d 186, 192 n.1 (4th Cir. 2009) (“The standard that the plaintiffs quoted from 
Swierkiewicz . . . was explicitly overruled in Twombly.”). According to Steinman, supra note 53, 
the Third Circuit’s “logic is deeply flawed.” Id. at 1332. However, a different panel of the Third 
Circuit now has referred to its previous analysis of Swierkiewicz in Fowler as dictum and 
approvingly cited the Second Circuit’s analysis that Twombly is consistent with Swierkiewicz. In 
re Ins. Brokerage Antitrust Litig., Nos. 08-1455, 08-1777, 07-4046, 2010 WL 3211147, at *9, n.17 
(3d Cir. Aug. 16, 2010). (stating that although Fowler said Twombly and Iqbal “repudiated” 
Swierkiewicz, “we are not so sure”); see also Arista Records, LLC v. Doe 3, 604 F.3d 110, 120 
(2d Cir. 2010) (stating that Twombly and Iqbal were consistent with Swierkiewicz in not 
requiring heightened fact pleading). 
 116. Swanson v. Citibank, N.A., No. 10-1122, 2010 WL 2977297 (7th Cir. July 30, 2010). The 
court’s division is an exemplar of the problem. Chief Judge Easterbrook joined in Judge Wood’s 
opinion finding plausibility in a pro se plaintiff’s housing discrimination complaint relying on 
Swierkiewicz. Id. at 4. Judge Posner dissented, concluding that the plaintiff’s “hypothesis of 
racial discrimination does not have substantial merit; it is implausible,” id. at *9 (Posner, J., 
dissenting in part), and finding Swierkiewicz distinguishable. 
 117. al-Kidd v. Ashcroft, 580 F.3d 949, 974 (9th Cir. 2009) (noting in dictum that Twombly 
“reaffirmed the holding of Swierkiewicz”); EEOC v. Universal Brixius, LLC, No. 09-c-774, 2009 
WL 3400940, at *3 (E.D. Wis. Oct. 15, 2009); Gillman v. Inner City Broad. Corp., No. 08 Civ. 
8909 (LAP), 2009 WL 3003244, at *3 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 18, 2009) (“Iqbal was not meant to 
displace Swierkiewicz’s teachings about pleading standards for employment discrimination 
claims because in Twombly, which heavily informed Iqbal, the Supreme Court explicitly 
affirmed the vitality of Swierkiewicz.”); see also Arista Records, 604 F.3d at 119–21 (citing and 
implicitly recognizing Swierkiewicz’s continued vitality). But see Argeropoulos v. Exide Techs., 
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Moreover, in some instances when a multiparty or multiclaim case is 
partially dismissed, the plaintiff has been authorized to use discovery 
in connection with the surviving portion of the litigation to see if it 
will yield information that will resuscitate the dismissed portion,118 
creating a practice that is discontinuous with what is possible in a 
dismissed single-defendant-single-claim dispute. The ability to access 
the discovery system should not turn on the particular party structure 
or substantive complexity of an action. 
It is possible that the Iqbal Court’s willingness to substitute a 
benign explanation for the government defendants’ alleged 
purposeful discrimination and illicit treatment of the plaintiff may 
have been based on the case’s sensitive nature—a terrorism suspect 
claiming discrimination by federal officials in the wake of September 
11—as much as it was on an assessment of the legal standards 
involved.119 But allowing trial judges to take external considerations 
into account on a threshold motion that historically has been resolved 
on a pleading’s contents may provide yet another avenue for 
unrestrained discretion to deny a plaintiff access to an adjudication 
 
No. 08-cv-3760, 2009 WL 2132443, at *6 (E.D.N.Y. July 8, 2009) (“[T]his kind of non-specific 
allegation might have enabled Plaintiff’s hostile work environment claim to survive under the 
old ‘no set of facts’ standard for assessing motions to dismiss. But it does not survive the 
Supreme Court’s ‘plausibility standard,’ as most recently clarified in Iqbal.” (citation omitted)). 
 118. See, e.g., Arocho v. Nafziger, 367 F. App’x 942, 954–55 (10th Cir. 2010); Mitchell v. 
Township of Pemberton, Civil No. 09-810 (NLH) (AMP), 2010 WL 2540466, at *6 (D.N.J. June 
17, 2010); Ibrahim v. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., No. C 06-00545 WHA, 2009 WL 2246194, at *12 
(N.D. Cal. July 27, 2009); Kyle v. Holina, No. 09-cv-90-slc, 2009 WL 1867671, at *3 (W.D. Wis. 
June 29, 2009). However, one academic who is in favor of exploiting discovery for related claims 
cautions that if such a procedure is followed, judges should toll the statute of limitations on 
dismissed claims while discovery is underway so plaintiffs are not disadvantaged if they uncover 
facts sufficient to state a claim. See Has the Supreme Court Limited Americans’ Access to 
Courts?: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, supra note 41, at 245 (statement of Alan 
B. Morrison, Professor, George Washington University Law School). 
 119. The majority cited Judge Cabranes’ concurring opinion in the Second Circuit, which 
“expressed concern at the prospect of subjecting high-ranking Government officials—entitled to 
assert the defense of qualified immunity and charged with responding to ‘a national and 
international security emergency unprecedented in the history of the American Republic’—to 
the burdens of discovery on the basis of a complaint as nonspecific as respondent’s.” Iqbal, 129 
S. Ct. at 1945 (quoting Iqbal v. Hasty, 490 F.3d 143, 179 (2d Cir. 2007) (Cabranes, J., 
concurring), rev’d sub. nom. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. 137). Arguably, by terminating the case on the 
complaint, the Court preempted what might have been a useful constitutional exploration of 
governmental immunity by substituting something tantamount to absolute immunity for what 
only should have been an issue of qualified immunity. See, e.g., al-Kidd, 580 F.3d at 957–79 
(distinguishing between claims of absolute and qualified immunity). That, however, should have 
been treated a matter of substantive law, not pleading. 
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based on a developed summary-judgment or trial record. Given the 
realpolitik of modern litigation, the two Supreme Court decisions 
have provided defendants with a plethora of possibilities for attacking 
complaints. 
Although judicial discretion—and its potential for 
inconsistency—is hardly a novel aspect of Rule 12(b)(6) motion 
practice, the invocation in Twombly and Iqbal of highly subjective 
factors may have made it the determinative factor in deciding 
whether a plaintiff will be allowed to proceed to discovery. Without 
question, according discretion to experienced, talented judges is a 
valuable keystone of the federal civil-justice system; but it threatens 
to become excessive when taken to the extreme of causing 
unpredictability and permitting reliance on individual predilection, 
especially in light of the terminal potential of pretrial motions to 
dismiss and summary judgment. Both jurists and academics 
frequently have suggested that the application of a judge’s subjective 
impressions can lead to inappropriate and inconsistent results if 
devoid of strictures.120 
It is somewhat ironic that in Burnham v. Superior Court,121 
Justice Scalia, who joined the majority in Twombly and Iqbal, argued 
that Justice Brennan’s dissenting proposal for using “fairness” and 
“contemporary notions of due process” in deciding personal 
jurisdiction questions based on the defendant’s physical presence in 
the forum was grounded in the “subjectivity” of a presiding judge 
and, thus, provided an “uncertain[]” and “inadequate” standard for 
lower courts to apply.122 Yet by instructing judges to use their “judicial 
experience” and “common sense” to determine the plausibility of 
complaints, the Court has introduced the subjectivity and resulting 
variances that Justice Scalia suggested in Burnham should be 
avoided.123 If the protection of constitutional norms and the 
 
 120. See McMahon, supra note 76, at 867 (noting that different courts invariably will reach 
different results when confronted with complaints that do not contain detailed facts); Michael S. 
Vogel, Unmasking “John Doe” Defendants: The Case Against Excessive Hand-Wringing over 
Legal Standards, 83 OR. L. REV. 795, 809–10 (2004) (arguing that judicial subjectivity produces 
inconsistent results). See generally Hoffman, supra note 106, at 1259–60 (detailing the disparities 
in summary judgment filing and grant rates across court and case types). 
 121. Burnham v. Superior Court, 495 U.S. 604 (1990). 
 122. Id. at 623, 626. 
 123. Not surprisingly, as of this writing, courts have adopted varying approaches to 
interpreting Twombly and Iqbal. Although many courts have applied a demanding reading of 
the decisions in cases dealing with a defendant’s mental state—such as agreement, conspiracy, 
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enforcement of substantive legislation and common law principles are 
to be entrusted in significant part to federal civil litigation, 
consideration must be given to whether the pleading and motion 
structure currently evolving strikes a proper balance between the 
need to rely on private attorneys general to effectuate important 
policies and responding to the concerns about costs and abusive 
litigation that apparently has motivated the Court. 
3. A New Model of Civil Procedure.  Plausibility pleading and 
trial-type determinations on a motion to dismiss are the latest step 
toward a far different model of civil procedure than previously has 
existed: the Federal Rules once advanced trials on the merits, but 
cases post-Twombly and Iqbal now turn on Rule 12(b)(6) and Rule 
56 motions; jurors once were trusted with deciding issues of fact and 
applying their findings to the applicable principles of law following 
the presentation of evidence, but now judges are authorized to make 
these determinations using nothing but a naked complaint and their 
own discretion.124 In sum, this new reliance on judicial experience and 
common sense to the exclusion of juror experience and popular 
common sense comes at the expense of the democratic values 
inherent in a jury-trial system and the utility of private enforcement 
of a wide range of public policies.125 
Even if our civil litigation system has moved from a trial to a 
settlement culture, the pretrial process should not simply be a series 
of procedural stop signs. Rather, it should be crafted to permit the 
parties to achieve resolution of their dispute on the basis of an 
intelligent and fair agreement, which often can be achieved only if 
both parties have the information needed to appraise the costs and 
risks of continued litigation.126 It is imperative that policymakers on 
 
and discrimination—others apply a liberal repleading approach to ensure that plaintiffs have 
another opportunity to meet the standard. See supra note 63; see also Moss v. U.S. Secret Serv., 
572 F.3d 962, 972 (9th Cir. 2009) (“Having initiated the present lawsuit without the benefit of 
the Court’s latest pronouncements on pleadings, Plaintiffs deserve a chance to supplement their 
complaint with factual content in the manner that Twombly and Iqbal require.”). 
 124. See, e.g., R.R. Co. v. Stout, 84 U.S. (17 Wall.) 657, 664 (1873) (Story, J.) (“It is assumed 
that twelve men know more of the common affairs of life than does one man, that they can draw 
wiser and safer conclusions from admitted facts thus occurring than can a single judge.”). 
 125. For an expression of concerns along these lines, see In re Travel Agent Comm’n 
Antitrust Litig., 583 F.3d 896, 912 (6th Cir. 2009) (Merritt, J., dissenting). 
 126. Professor Richard A. Nagareda, who also sees the developments of the last quarter 
century as erecting a series of procedural cost-imposition stop signs and the replacement of trial 
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and off the bench give thought to what is a critical inquiry: identifying 
what type of pleading and pretrial-motion system would be 
appropriate for the future, and determining what is really meant by 
the words “just,” “speedy,” and “inexpensive” in Federal Rule 1.127 
Are the conventions regarding the construction of pleadings and 
the inferences to be drawn therefrom a thing of the past? Is there an 
inverse relationship between whether a stated claim is plausible and 
the projected extent and resource burdens of continued litigation—
the claim being treated as less plausible when the assumed discovery 
activity appears extensive and vice versa? And has the traditional de 
novo standard used on appellate review of a grant of a Rule 12(b)(6) 
motion been compromised by the subjective appraisals the Court has 
authorized? If the answer to any of these questions is yes, then 
federal practice has moved even further from its original premises 
than the Court may have realized when it decided Twombly and 
Iqbal. 
There are a few rays of light for parties asserting claims, 
however. The Court’s opinions do not call for a probability showing 
or “detailed factual allegations” or require the pleading of evidence.128 
Fortunately, they merely require “enough fact to raise a reasonable 
expectation that discovery will reveal evidence of illegal[ity].”129 
Moreover, in reaching its conclusions in Twombly, the Court stated 
that it did “not apply any ‘heightened’ pleading standard.”130 Nor did 
 
with pretrial, has noted that in our settlement-oriented culture, the procedural system should 
develop mechanisms that would help parties appraise the value of their cases rather than simply 
give them a binary choice between dismissal and full-throttle movement forward. Richard A. 
Nagareda, 1938 All Over Again? Pre-trial as Trial in Complex Litigation, 60 DEPAUL L. REV. 
(forthcoming 2011) (manuscript at 1–6, 33–34), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/ 
papers.cfm?abstract_id=1568127; see also Geoffrey P. Miller, Preliminary Judgments, 2010 U. 
ILL. L. REV. 165, 167–68 (proposing that the use of preliminary judgments as “tentative 
assessment[s] of the merits of a case” would “provide litigants with a highly credible evaluation 
of the case” and avoid settlement obstacles). 
 127. FED. R. CIV. P. 1. Spencer, supra note 64, argues that Twombly (and he presumably 
would extend his view to Iqbal) has “determined that efficiency is the priority.” Id. at 23–25. See 
generally Elizabeth J. Cabraser, Uncovering Discovery 3 (2010) (unpublished manuscript), 
available at http://civilconference.uscourts.gov/LotusQuickr/dcc/Main.nsf/$defaultview/12C00D 
75EEE2711D8525764800454561/$File/Elizabeth%20Cabraser%2C%20Uncovering%20Discove
ry.pdf?OpenElement (summarizing various proposals to solve discovery problems and modify 
pleading standards). 
 128. See Steinman, supra note 53, at 1328–33 (noting that Twombly and Iqbal commonly are 
misread to require evidentiary support at the pleadings stage). 
 129. Bell Atl. Co. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 556 (2007). 
 130. Id. at 569 n.14. This statement is questioned in Part I.C, infra. 
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the Court overrule its decision in Swierkiewicz.131 Perhaps the most 
significant source of optimism is that the concepts articulated by the 
Court are malleable enough to enable federal judges to apply them in 
a manner consistent with systemic values other than cost and 
efficiency. In that vein, the Seventh Circuit took a restrained view of 
Twombly and Iqbal in Swanson v. Citibank, N.A.,132 a case alleging 
racial discrimination in connection with the denial of a housing loan. 
In her majority opinion, Judge Diane P. Wood remarked, 
“Plausibility” . . . does not imply that the district court should decide 
whose version to believe, or which version is more likely than 
not. . . . As we understand it, the Court is saying instead that the 
plaintiff must give enough details . . . to present a story that holds 
together. . . . [C]ould these things have happened, not did they 
happen.133 
If Judge Wood proves accurate, we may be entering an age of 
storytelling pleading. But will the tales be happy or sad ones? The 
answer may lie in the eye of the beholder. 
B. Should the Plausibility Standard Be Cabined? 
In Iqbal, the Court laid to rest any thought that Twombly might 
be limited to antitrust actions by announcing that plausibility pleading 
“governs . . . all civil actions and proceedings in the United States 
district courts.”134 The Court did not have to reach that far. Nothing in 
 
 131. See Twombly, 550 U.S. at 569–70 (explaining why the Court’s holding accorded with 
Swierkiewicz). The Second Circuit, in Arista Records LLC v. Doe 3, 604 F.3d 110 (2d Cir. 2010), 
adverted to a number of these factors in concluding that the notion that Twombly imposed a 
heightened pleading standard including “specific evidence, factual allegations in addition to 
those required by Rule 8, and declarations from persons who collected the evidence is belied by 
the Twombly opinion itself.” Id. at 119–20; see also Dobyns v. U.S., 91 Fed. Cl. 412, 425 (2010) 
(holding that notice pleading is affirmed by the “part of Twombly in which the Court stated that 
‘once a claim has been stated adequately, it may be supported by showing any set of facts 
consistent with the allegations in the complaint.’ This statement would not be accurate, of 
course, if all the facts ‘consistent with the allegations in the complaint’ had to be in the 
complaint” (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 561)). 
 132. Swanson v. Citibank, N.A., No. 10-1122, 2010 WL 2977297 (7th Cir. July 30, 2010). 
 133. Id. at *3. Judge Posner’s dissent concluded that Twombly and Iqbal established a much 
more demanding pleading standard than his two colleagues acknowledged. Id. at *8–10 (Posner, 
J., dissenting in part). 
 134. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. 1937, 1953 (2009) (quoting FED. R. CIV. P. 1) (internal 
quotation marks omitted). Some courts and commentators had concluded that the Twombly 
opinion was narrow and possibly applied only to antitrust cases. E.g., Allan Ides, Bell Atlantic 
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its pre-Twombly jurisprudence suggests that the plausibility 
requirement somehow has been embedded in the word “showing,” 
which has been in Rule 8 since 1938.135 Nor did the situation in Iqbal 
require the universal application of plausibility pleading. The official 
immunity at issue in that case is a judicially created doctrine. Thus, 
rather than altering the Rule 8 pleading regime, a limited fact- or 
heightened-pleading requirement obliging the plaintiff to negate that 
defense in the complaint could have been mandated as a matter of 
federal common law to effectuate the doctrine’s underlying policies,136 
although that would have created a somewhat awkward anticipatory-
pleading requirement.137 
Despite the Court’s global statement, the Iqbal majority made 
clear that the determination of a complaint’s plausibility is a context-
specific task.138 It requires courts to examine “the [substantive] 
elements a plaintiff must plead to state a claim,”139 a concept firmly 
embedded in the case law.140 But context is not a simple, unitary 
 
and the Principle of Substantive Sufficiency Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a)(2): 
Toward a Structured Approach to Federal Pleading Practice, 243 F.R.D. 604 (2006). 
 135. None of the hundreds of pre-Twombly cases cited in 5 WRIGHT & MILLER, supra note 
3, §§ 1202, 1215–1219, place any emphasis on “showing.” 
 136. Other academics also have questioned the Iqbal Court’s decision to extend its holding 
beyond the qualified immunity context. See Has the Supreme Court Limited Americans’ Access 
to Courts?: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, supra note 41, at 93 (statement of 
Stephen B. Burbank, David Berger Professor for the Administration of Justice, University of 
Pennsylvania Law School) (“Alternatively, the Court should have forthrightly required fact 
pleading as a matter of substantive federal common law, that is, as a necessary protection for the 
judge-made defense of qualified immunity.”). 
 137. Anticipatory pleading long has been thought inappropriate in federal practice because 
it violates the “well-pleaded complaint” rule. See Louisville & Nashville R.R. Co. v. Mottley, 
211 U.S. 149, 152–53 (1908) (holding that plaintiffs could not establish federal question 
jurisdiction by anticipating a defense); see also Gomez v. Toledo, 446 U.S. 635, 638–42 (1980) 
(holding that qualified immunity is an affirmative defense and need not be negated by the 
plaintiff). See generally Arthur R. Miller, Artful Pleading: A Doctrine in Search of Definition, 76 
TEX. L. REV. 1781, 1783–85 (1998) (noting that federal courts generally dislike attempts by 
plaintiffs to fashion federal question jurisdiction by anticipating defenses). 
 138. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. at 1940. 
 139. Id. at 1947. 
 140. See, e.g., Starr v. Sony BMG Music Entm’t, 592 F.3d 314, 323–27 (2d Cir. 2010) 
(reversing the lower court’s dismissal on grounds that the plaintiff had asserted sufficient, non-
conclusory factual allegations); Breaux v. Am. Family Mut. Ins. Co., 554 F.3d 854, 862 (10th Cir. 
2009) (reversing the lower court’s dismissal because it had interpreted the plaintiff’s complaints 
too narrowly); Ross v. Bank of Am., N.A. (USA), 524 F.3d 217, 225 (2d Cir. 2008) (reversing 
the lower court’s dismissal because plaintiffs had alleged a sufficient injury in fact for purposes 
of standing); Robbins v. Oklahoma, 519 F.3d 1242, 1248 (10th Cir. 2008) (noting the importance 
of context in examining factual allegations). 
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measure. Not only does it refer to the substantive law governing a 
case but also, among other things, to whether the action turns on 
objective facts or subjective matters such as the intent or motive of 
the parties, the complexity or simplicity of the case, and whether or 
not the litigation will be resource consumptive.141 These variations in 
context may confine the seemingly unbridled grant of discretion and 
universality that the Court appears to have promised for plausibility 
pleading. 
For instance, in the antitrust context, substantive precedent 
clearly influenced the Court’s judgment in deciding Twombly, leading 
the Justices to reach a similar conclusion on a motion to dismiss as it 
did on summary judgment in Matsushita Electric Industrial Co. v. 
Zenith Radio Corp.,142 in which the Court found that circumstantial 
evidence of parallel conduct was not enough to make claims of 
conspiracy factually or economically plausible.143 Similarly, the Iqbal 
Court looked to existing jurisprudence regarding unconstitutional 
discrimination144 when it held that the complaint had to plead 
sufficient facts regarding defendants’—Attorney General John 
Ashcroft and FBI Director Robert Mueller—purposeful mental states 
 
 141. For a useful discussion of the relevance of context, see Spencer, supra note 64, at 32–36. 
 142. Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574 (1986). It has been 
argued that “plausibility” was used in Matsushita as an element of antitrust law, and therefore it 
was improperly absorbed into pleading doctrine in Twombly. See Edward Brunet, Antitrust 
Summary Judgment and the Quick Look Approach, 62 SMU L. REV. 493, 510–11 (2009). 
 143. Matsushita, 475 U.S. at 587; see also Stephen B. Burbank, Pleading and the Dilemmas of 
“General Rules,” 2009 WIS. L. REV. 535, 552 (noting that the Court in Twombly interpreted the 
plaintiff’s complaint as alleging only parallel conduct); Miller, supra note 32, at 1030 (same); 
Spencer, supra note 108, at 487 (same). In Sony, the Second Circuit upheld allegations of an 
antitrust conspiracy relying on the difference in factual context between the complaint before it, 
which contained allegations that went beyond parallel conduct, and the one in Twombly. Sony 
BMG Music Entm’t, 592 F.3d at 324–27. 
 144. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. at 1947. The Court effectively altered the law of official immunity. Cf. 
Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520, 547 (1993) (holding 
that a city ordinance designed to prohibit a specific religious practice was unconstitutional 
discrimination when there was no compelling governmental interest to prohibit the practice); 
Pers. Adm’r v. Feeney, 442 U.S. 256, 279–81 (1979) (holding that a Massachusetts policy of 
giving preference to military veterans when hiring for state jobs was not unconstitutional sex 
discrimination); Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 279 (1976) (holding that the racially 
disproportionate impact of a written test used in the process of hiring police officers was not 
racial discrimination). 
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despite the very modest pleading standard set out in the second 
sentence of Rule 9(b).145 
Adherents of the Court’s more demanding pleading direction as 
well as those who argue that the two recent cases have changed little 
or nothing rely on pre-Twombly Supreme Court decisions to support 
their contentions. But, these cases do not justify Iqbal’s extension of 
Twombly to “all civil actions and proceedings.”146 Dura 
Pharmaceuticals, Inc. v. Broudo,147 for example, was a securities fraud 
action governed by the pleading strictures of the Private Securities 
Litigation Reform Act. The Court concluded that the plaintiff had 
failed to identify loss causation, a critical substantive requirement of 
such actions comparable to issues of consideration or negligence in 
breach-of-contract or tort actions. Typically overlooked is the passage 
in Justice Breyer’s opinion for the Court indicating that pleading loss 
causation should not be “burdensome”; it simply calls for indicating 
the loss and its connection with the fraud the plaintiff “has in mind.”148 
A second case referred to in support of Twombly and Iqbal, 
Associated General Contractors of California, Inc. v. California State 
Council of Carpenters,149 was a sizable antitrust action that failed to 
identify the coercion alleged to be at the heart of a conspiracy. Justice 
Stevens, who dissented in both Twombly and Iqbal, did remark in his 
opinion for the Court that the district judge could require “some 
specificity” in pleading.150 But he was referring to the district court’s 
ability to require a more definite statement under Rule 12(e), not a 
dismissal under Rule 12(b)(6).151 In neither of these cases did the 
Court go outside the four corners of the pleading or attempt to assess 
 
 145. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. at 1948–54. See generally 5A WRIGHT & MILLER, supra note 3, § 1301 
(discussing the requirement of Rule 9(b) that allegations of malice or intent be made generally). 
 146. FED. R. CIV. P. 1; see also Has the Supreme Court Limited Americans’ Access to 
Courts?: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, supra note 41, at 11–12 (statement of 
Gregory G. Garre, Partner, Latham & Watkins, LLP) (arguing prior Supreme Court precedent 
already established a stricter pleading standard). 
 147. Dura Pharm., Inc. v. Broudo, 544 U.S. 336, 347–48 (2005). 
 148. Id. at 347. Also mentioned by those claiming that little change has occurred is Papasan 
v. Allain, 478 U.S. 265 (1985), a case challenging Mississippi’s distribution of public-school land 
funds, which raised a difficult, fact-driven, controversial constitutional question. Nothing in the 
Court’s opinion in that case, however, previsions Twombly and Iqbal. 
 149. Associated Gen. Contractors of Cal., Inc. v. Cal. State Council of Carpenters, 459 U.S. 
519 (1983). 
 150. Id. at 528 n.17. 
 151. Id. 
MILLER IN FINAL 9/15/2010 11:50:51 AM 
40 DUKE LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 60:1 
or weigh the factual allegations, the most significant departures from 
prior practice taken in Twombly and Iqbal. 
Moreover, antitrust, securities-fraud, and constitutional-
deprivation claims represent an extremely small fraction of federal 
court dockets, raising the obvious question: what was the reason—
and the motivation—for the Court’s extension of plausibility to all 
cases, the vast majority of which do not raise the concerns articulated 
to justify the need for heightened pleading? Perhaps it was out of 
respect for the transsubstantivity principle, which requires uniform 
application of the Federal Rules. As discussed below,152 that is 
unlikely. In any event, it is a slim rationale indeed, because the Court 
also made it clear that the plausibility inquiry was context specific. 
Philosophically, that is at odds with the prior understanding of the 
universal, transsubstantive application of the pleading formulation in 
Rule 8(a), although that is not necessarily inconsistent with the actual 
practice in some federal courts prior to Twombly and Iqbal. 
It remains to be seen, however, whether district courts will 
extend the demands of plausibility pleading to require factual 
allegations of the elements of relatively uncomplicated civil actions, 
as exemplified by Official Form 11—formerly Form 9—the paradigm 
negligence complaint.153 Although the Twombly Court was careful to 
assert the continuing validity of Form 11,154 it nevertheless stated that 
factual allegations—not mere conclusions—would be required to 
surmount the plausibility hurdle. However, a word such as 
“negligently,” which appears in Form 11, may be viewed as either a 
factual allegation or a legal conclusion analogous to the treatment of 
“agreement” in Twombly, or a mixture of the two categories. If it is 
 
 152. See infra notes 338–58 and accompanying text. 
 153. FED. R. CIV. P. form 11. 
 154. Bell Atl. Co. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 554, 565 n.10 (2007). “Negligence” is also implicated 
in Forms 12 and 14. The forms are said to “suffice under these rules” in Rule 84. FED. R. CIV. P. 
84; see also Swanson v. Citibank, N.A., No. 10-1122, 2010 WL 2977297, at *3 (7th Cir. July 30, 
2010) (“[I]n many straightforward cases, it will not be any more difficult today for a plaintiff to 
meet that burden than it was before the Court’s recent decisions.”). Questions also have been 
raised about the sufficiency of Form 18 for a patent-infringement complaint. Compare McZeal 
v. Sprint Nextel Corp., 501 F.3d 1354, 1360 (Fed. Cir. 2007) (finding that “a bare allegation of 
literal infringement using the form is inadequate to provide sufficient notice to an accused 
infringer under a theory of literal infringement”), with Colida v. Nokia, 347 F. App’x 568, 571 
n.2 (Fed. Cir. 2009) (noting that the claimant did not argue sufficiency under Form 18 and that 
the form is not suited for infringement claims with respect to design patents). If the forms are 
held to be outside the ambit of Twombly and Iqbal, there would be significant variance in 
practice between words in the forms and words not found in the forms. 
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considered a fact, courts should accept an allegation of negligent 
conduct as true and thereby confirm that Form 11 remains a sufficient 
model for this category of actions. On the other hand, if courts begin 
interpreting “negligently” as a legal conclusion, plaintiffs may have to 
channel tort law and specify the factual elements to qualify as a 
plausible claim.155 For example, plaintiffs may have to recite the 
precise actions taken or not taken by a defendant motorist that made 
his or her driving negligent.156 In highlighting the benefits of the 
liberal ethos of the Federal Rules, Judge Charles E. Clark specifically 
pointed to this type of pleading burden as one that happily would be 
avoided and that probably motivated the way Form 11 was drafted.157 
In one striking negligence case that relied on Twombly and Iqbal 
and involved a simple slip and fall, the complaint was dismissed 
because it failed to allege “facts that show how the liquid came to be 
on the floor, whether the Defendant knew or should have known of 
the presence of the liquid, or how the Plaintiff’s accident occurred.”158 
In addition to the dubious propriety of demanding that level of 
particularity in such a common, garden-variety case, it is unrealistic to 
expect the plaintiff to know or have access to information about the 
facts relating to many of these matters without discovery. 
Should Iqbal’s assertion of universality prove accurate, federal 
courts will be required to devote much more time to evaluating 
factual allegations than in the past—time that might be better spent 
 
 155. The same may be said of a number of other critical words—for example, “conspiracy,” 
“illicit,” and “motive.” Under a “transactional approach” to pleading, Form 11 would be 
sufficient since the challenged event is identified in time and space. See Steinman, supra note 53, 
at 1328–31. 
 156. In Farash v. Continental Airlines, Inc., 337 F. App’x 7 (2d Cir. 2009), the court indicated 
that the plaintiff is required to allege in what manner he was injured and how the defendant was 
negligent. Id. at 9. In connection with the plaintiff’s assault claim, the court also wanted 
allegations of the circumstances that would induce a reasonable apprehension of bodily harm. 
Id. at 10; see also Branham v. Dolgencorp, Inc., No. 6:09-CV-00037, 2009 WL 2604447, at *2 
(W.D. Va. Aug. 24, 2009) (finding that the plaintiff’s allegations of negligence did not meet the 
Twombly standard because the plaintiff did not allege sufficient facts as to the circumstances 
leading to the accident); Doe ex rel. Gonzales v. Butte Valley Unified Sch. Dist., No. 09-245 
WBS CMK, 2009 WL 2424608, at *8 (E.D. Cal. Aug. 6, 2009) (noting that the sufficiency of the 
Official Forms has “been cast into doubt”). 
 157. Judge Clark told a story about a negligence lawyer who, under the code-pleading 
regime, regularly attached “two and a half pages of type-written allegations of detailed things 
that might happen in an automobile accident” to his complaint in order to allege every fact that 
possibly could constitute negligence while driving. AM. BAR ASS’N, supra note 2, at 224; see also 
Clark, supra note 1, at 191 (stating that the forms are “the most important part of the rules”). 
 158. Branham, 2009 WL 2604447, at *2. 
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appraising the merits of a well-developed record presented at 
summary judgment or trial, especially with regard to uncomplicated 
matters. Add to that burden the possibility that defendants might be 
obliged to show the plausibility of affirmative defenses like 
contributory negligence or assumption of risk—or even a simple 
denial of negligence—a subject to be explored later.159 In other words, 
the full effect plausibility pleading will have on judicial time and party 
resource expenditures is very uncertain.160 This uncertainty raises a 
basic question as to what, if anything, has been gained by Twombly 
and Iqbal in terms of time, expense, and efficiency, the Court’s 
primary justifications for the newly announced pleading 
requirement.161 
The federal courts may well face something of a Catch-22 in the 
complex litigation environment. Those cases, frequently involving 
constitutional and statutory rights implicating national or state 
policies and affecting large numbers of people, include actions in 
which factual sufficiency is most difficult to achieve at the pleading 
stage and in which the pretrial process tends to be highly resource 
consumptive. Courts may well apply the plausibility standard more 
rigorously, claiming that complex cases require more extensive 
pleading to address the supposed shortfalls of notice pleading.162 
Recent decisions suggest that complex cases—such as those involving 
claims of discrimination, conspiracy, and antitrust violations—have 
been particularly vulnerable to the demands of Twombly and Iqbal.163 
 
 159. See infra notes 386–96 and accompanying text. 
 160. See supra notes 102–05 and accompanying text. 
 161. In DeLotta v. Dezenzo’s Italian Restaurant, Inc., No. 6:08-cv-2033-Orl-22KRS, 2009 WL 
4349806 (M.D. Fla. Nov. 24, 2009), the court, relying on Twombly-Iqbal, refused to enter an 
otherwise-appropriate default judgment because the plaintiff had not pled facts showing he was 
a covered employee under the Fair Labor Standards Act. Id. at *2–4. 
 162. See Stephen B. Burbank, The Complexity of Modern American Civil Litigation: Curse 
or Cure?, 91 JUDICATURE 163, 165 (2008) (discussing the historical and normative causes of the 
complexity of litigation in the United States); Epstein, supra note 52, at 66, 98 (noting the 
benefits of a stricter pleading requirement in the context of antitrust litigation); see also 
Hoffman, supra note 106, at 1224 (discussing when and whether claims should receive greater 
scrutiny). 
 163. See, e.g., In re Travel Agent Comm’n Antitrust Litig., 583 F.3d 896, 908–11 (6th Cir. 
2009) (dismissing an antitrust collusion claim because the “defendants’ conduct ‘was not only 
compatible with, but indeed was more likely explained by, lawful, unchoreographed free market 
behavior’” (quoting Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. 1937, 1950 (2009))); Cooney v. Rossiter, 583 
F.3d 967, 971 (7th Cir. 2009) (dismissing a conspiracy claim based on lack of “any suggestion, 
beyond a bare conclusion, that the remaining defendants were leagued in a conspiracy with the 
MILLER IN FINAL 9/15/2010 11:50:51 AM 
2010] A DOUBLE PLAY ON THE FEDERAL RULES 43 
Yet, these are the very cases that should be given greater pleading 
latitude and necessitate other forms of attention and oversight by 
district judges. 
It is uncertain how plaintiffs with potentially meritorious claims 
are expected to plead with factual sufficiency without the benefit of 
some discovery, especially when they are limited in terms of time or 
money, or have no access to important information that often is in the 
possession of the defendant,164 especially when the defendant denies 
access.165 As Professor A. Benjamin Spencer writes, “claims for which 
intent or state of mind is an element—such as discrimination or 
conspiracy claims—are more difficult to plead in a way that will 
satisfy the plausibility standard.”166 Demands for plausibility pleading 
may shut “the doors of discovery”167 on the very litigants who most 
need the procedural resources the Federal Rules previously made 
 
dismissed defendants”); Dorsey v. Ga. Dep’t of State Road & Tollway Auth., No. 1:09-CV-482-
TWT, 2009 WL 2477565, at *6–7 (N.D. Ga. Aug. 10, 2009) (holding that “numerous” racially 
discriminatory remarks were insufficient for a hostile-work-environment claim); Ibrahim v. 
Dep’t of Homeland Sec., No. C 06-00545 WHA, 2009 WL 2246194, at *8–11 (N.D. Cal. July 27, 
2009) (dismissing a discrimination complaint because plaintiff failed to allege sufficient facts to 
establish that defendants took action because of, and not merely in spite of, the fact that 
plaintiff was a Muslim and a citizen of Malaysia); Vallejo v. City of Tucson, No. CV08-500 TUC 
DCB, 2009 WL 1835115, at *3 (D. Ariz. July 26, 2009) (dismissing a Voting Rights Act claim 
brought by a disabled Mexican American veteran because the asserted denial of a provisional 
ballot was an “isolated incident”); Fletcher v. Phillip Morris USA, Inc., No. 3:09CV284-HEH, 
2009 WL 2067807, at *5–7 (E.D. Va. July 14, 2009) (dismissing an employment discrimination 
claim based on plaintiff’s failure to plead specific factual allegations that similarly situated 
employees, who were not members of a protected class, received more favorable treatment than 
plaintiff); see also sources cited supra note 67. 
 164. See Burbank, supra note 143, at 561 (“Perhaps the most troublesome possible 
consequence of Twombly and Iqbal is that they will deny access to court to plaintiffs and 
prospective plaintiffs with meritorious claims who cannot satisfy their requirements either 
because they lack the resources to engage in extensive pre-filing investigation or because of 
informational asymmetries.”); Spencer, supra note 64, at 36 (concluding that the pleading 
standard now embodies a view toward increased judicial efficiency). The Court took no note of 
Rule 11(b)(3), which specifically addresses situations in which a document presented to the 
court is signed by someone who lacks but expects to obtain information to support its content 
through “investigation or discovery.” FED. R. CIV. P. 11(b)(3). 
 165. See Pa. Chiropractic Ass’n v. Blue Cross Blue Shield Ass’n, No. 09 C 5619, 2010 WL 
1979569, at *13–14 (N.D. Ill. May 17, 2010) (finding that allegations that defendants withheld 
information that made it impossible to identify which plan participants did not receive benefits 
and which provisions were violated excused plaintiff’s failure to provide facts to state ERISA 
claim). 
 166. See Spencer, supra note 108, at 459 (arguing that plaintiffs will face a higher pleading 
hurdle when evidence supporting an allegation of wrongdoing is more difficult to identify). 
 167. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. at 1950. 
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available. Perhaps it is appropriate to obligate plaintiffs to plead in 
greater detail about those matters on which they are informed or on 
which they reasonably can inform themselves, even though there may 
be understandable tactical reasons why they might not want to do so. 
The pleading system should not be reduced to a game of hide the ball 
nor should it tolerate laziness or sloth.168 But to demand fact pleading 
on pain of dismissal when the facts are unknown or unknowable is a 
negation of the pleader’s ability to access the civil justice system. 
It is difficult to quarrel with the proposition that a prospective 
plaintiff should inform himself prior to instituting litigation. Indeed, 
Rule 11(b) requires that every signer of any paper submitted to the 
court make “an inquiry reasonable under the circumstances.”169 And 
in our information-rich society there is no doubt that modern 
technology, mandatory disclosure laws, and governmental 
investigations make a great deal of data available that is useful to 
many potential plaintiffs. Some of it will support and some of it will 
undermine their claims. What is available will not be useful—let 
alone determinative—on the plausibility issue in many cases, 
however.170 
But any presuit-inquiry requirement must itself be a 
“reasonable” one. It is much too facile to say that the pleader should 
be obliged to explore the entire public domain.171 That is a universe of 
incomprehensible vastness today, one that is expanding with every 
 
 168. The difference in the pleader’s obligation based on what is known and what is not is 
demonstrated by two fact patterns District Judge John G. Koeltl of the Southern District of 
New York has presented in conversation and in public. In the first, the plaintiff simply asserts “I 
have been subjected to a hostile work environment because I am black and request damages” 
but pleads nothing else. In the second the plaintiff simply asserts “I have been fired because I 
am white and request damages.” In the first situation, the plaintiff presumably knows the events 
that led her to conclude that she has been exposed to a hostile work environment and can plead 
enough to enable the court to determine the plausibility of the assertion. Perhaps she should be 
obliged to do so. In the second, the plaintiff may not know the facts underlying his 
discriminatory firing or have access to them, let alone access to the employer’s records to 
determine whether his discharge is part of a pattern of improper conduct. Cf. PETER L. 
MURRAY & ROLF STÜRNER, GERMAN CIVIL JUSTICE 231 n.211, 595 (2004) (noting that in the 
German procedural system, which requires the pleadings to contain developed factual assertions 
and identify potential sources of proof for them, less detail is required when the necessary 
information is held by the opposing party or nonparty).  
 169. FED. R. CIV. P. 11(b). 
 170. See Colin Reardon, Note, Pleading in the Information Age, 85 N.Y.U. L. REV. 
(forthcoming Dec. 2010) (manuscript at 49–59) (on file with the Duke Law Journal). 
 171. It is true that declining search costs and widespread Internet availability are facilitating 
pretrial investigation. See id. at 27–33. 
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passing moment.172 Moreover, speaking autobiographically, not 
everyone in our society—including lawyers—has access to the 
necessary technological tools or the knowledge of how to use them 
effectively, even when they are available. And, of course, the Internet 
and social networks are a world of both fact and fiction, it often being 
difficult to tell one from the other. 
This problem of information asymmetry—which generally is a 
much more formidable concern for plaintiffs than for defendants173—
presents itself in many litigation contexts. It is prevalent in actions 
challenging the conduct of large institutions—for example, antitrust 
and securities cases—when the necessary information relating to 
issues such as fraud, conspiracy, price-fixing, and corporate 
governance can be found only in the defendant’s files and 
computers.174 The problem is exacerbated in multiple–defendant 
situations in which access to information is critical to indicating the 
alleged wrongdoing in order to focus on the alleged wrongdoer. 
The same is true of questions like intent and malice. A similar 
asymmetry exists in other important litigation contexts such as actions 
against governmental entities. Particularly affected are civil rights and 
employment-discrimination cases, in which issues of motivation, state 
 
 172. In Richard A. Epstein, Of Pleading and Discovery: Reflections on Twombly and Iqbal 
with Reference to Antitrust (Aug. 2, 2010) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with the Duke 
Law Journal), the author argues that a prospective plaintiff should be obliged to plumb public 
domain sources prior to pleading. In Spencer, supra note 64, at 26–31, the interesting notion is 
advanced that requiring detailed pleading in information-asymmetry situations is inconsistent 
with the Constitution’s Petition Clause, U.S. CONST. amend. I. 
 173. Because it is the defendant’s conduct that has been challenged, the defendant generally 
will have more access to the information relevant to the litigation. Moreover, unless the 
defendant wishes to assert a counterclaim, in many, if not most cases, it will not be called upon 
to plead until after a motion to dismiss is resolved—or, if it does plead, it typically can do so in 
conclusory fashion. Information asymmetry occasionally is used to describe the imbalance in the 
costs of discovery, which are assumed to fall more heavily on defendants than on plaintiffs. See 
Swanson v. Citibank, N.A., No. 10-1122, 2010 WL 2977297, at *3 (7th Cir. July 30, 2010); id. at 
*9 (Posner, J., dissenting in part). Given the current preoccupation with defense costs and the 
radical differences in the economic situations of plaintiffs’ and defendants’ lawyers, see infra 
Part II.B, that assumption may be questioned, at least in terms of the comparative impact of the 
cost burden. 
 174. See Alison Frankel, Two More ‘Iqbal’ Dismissals Emerge in Product Liability Cases, 
LAW.COM (Aug. 4, 2009), available at http://www.law.com/jsp/article.jsp?id=1202432738346& 
Two_More_Iqbal_Dismissals_Emerge_in_Product_Liability_Cases (arguing that Iqbal, and 
implicitly Twombly, are “the best thing to happen to the products liability defense bar since 
Daubert” because plaintiffs will not have access to information necessary to support their claims 
without discovery). 
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of mind, and insidious practices are hidden by agents and employees 
or are buried deep within an entity’s records.175 Discrimination in 
hiring, promotion, or employee discipline depends on comparative 
data drawn from the employer’s records that simply are inaccessible 
absent discovery. Several176—but not all177—post-Twombly-Iqbal 
discrimination cases seem insensitive to the seriousness of this 
problem. 
As early as 1947, the Supreme Court recognized the central role 
access to discovery under the Federal Rules plays in achieving the 
objectives of the American civil justice system when it penned the 
line: “Mutual knowledge of all the relevant facts gathered by both 
parties is essential to proper litigation.”178 Fifty years later, Court of 
Appeals Judge Patrick E. Higginbotham echoed that philosophical 
principle: 
Congress has elected to use the private suit, private attorneys-
general as an enforcing mechanism for the anti-trust laws, the 
securities laws, environmental laws, civil rights and more. In the 
main, the plaintiff in these suits must discover his evidence from the 
defendant. Calibration of discovery is calibration of the level of 
enforcement of the social policy set by Congress.179 
 
 175. See generally Has the Supreme Court Limited Americans’ Access to Courts?: Hearing 
Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, supra note 41, at 256–69 (statement of John Payton, 
President, NAACP Legal Defense and Educational Fund) (cautioning about the adverse effect 
of the heightened pleading standard on civil rights cases); Access to Justice Denied: Ashcroft v. 
Iqbal: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on the Constitution, Civil Rights, and Civil Liberties of the 
H. Comm. on the Judiciary, supra note 53, at 79–92 (statement of Depo P. Adegbile, Director of 
Litigation, NAACP Legal Defense and Education Fund) (noting the detrimental impact of 
Twombly and Iqbal in both civil rights cases and more generally in all cases); Bone, supra note 
99, at 876 (noting the potential problems posed by the new pleading standard for civil rights 
cases); Schneider, supra note 44 (arguing that the heightened pleading standard will result in an 
increase in dismissals for civil rights cases). 
 176. See, e.g., Adams v. Lafayette Coll., No. 09-3008, 2009 WL 2777312 (E.D. Pa. Aug. 31, 
2009) (dismissing an employment discrimination claim); Ocasio-Hernández v. Fortuno-Burset, 
639 F. Supp. 2d 217 (D.P.R. 2009) (dismissing equal-protection and related claims by former 
employees of governor’s mansion); Logan v. Sectek, Inc., 632 F. Supp. 2d 179 (D. Conn. 2009) 
(dismissing the complaint in a case about federal regulations’ level of protection for airline 
employees). 
 177. See, e.g., Braden v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. 588 F.3d 585, 597–98 (8th Cir. 2009) (ERISA 
claim); Bryant v. Pepco, Civ. No. 09-CV-1063 (GK), 2010 WL 3118705, at *6 (D.D.C. Aug. 9, 
2010) (Title VII claim); Mitchell v. Township of Pemberton, Civil No. 09-810 (NLH)(AMD), 
2010 WL 2540466, at *6 (D.N.J. June 17, 2010) (§ 1983 claim). 
 178. Hickman v. Taylor, 329 U.S. 495, 507 (1947). 
 179. Patrick E. Higginbotham, Foreword, 49 ALA. L. REV. 1, 4–5 (1997). 
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The federal court system once championed access for potentially 
meritorious claims in all cases, but Twombly and Iqbal have swung 
the pendulum in the opposite direction, significantly confining a 
plaintiff’s ability to reach information needed for a meaningful 
adjudication. Inevitably, the challenge facing future policymakers will 
be how to construct pleading and motion standards that make sense 
given the substantive variety of federal litigation. This may 
necessitate exploring the merits of a differential pleading system, 
which obviously departs from the long-standing transsubstantivity 
principle, a possibility discussed below.180 In effect, the plausibility-
pleading standard risks increased difficulty for many prospective 
claimants—some with claims that may well have merit and involve 
important public policies—to survive a Rule 12(b)(6) motion.181 In an 
unknowable number of instances, the increased risk of dismissal and 
the resources needed to defend against it may deter the institution of 
a potentially meritorious case. That result would be a far cry from the 
foundational philosophy of the original Rules and the handling of 
certain other procedural issues in the not-too-distant past. 
In the late 1990s, for instance, the Civil Rules Committee 
considered a proposal to amend the Rule 23 procedures for certifying 
subdivision (b)(3) classes that, in effect, would vest judges with 
discretion to deny certification according to something in the nature 
of an “it ain’t worth it” standard. Under this standard, district courts 
would balance “whether the probable relief to individual class 
members justifie[d] the costs and burdens of class litigation.”182 When 
numerous people and groups raised objections, the rulemakers 
abandoned the plan. It was inconsistent with the importance of merits 
adjudication, and the rulemakers were concerned that what is and is 
 
 180. See infra notes 338–59, 401–34 and accompanying text. 
 181. See Spencer, supra note 108, at 460 (“Such a fluid, form-shifting standard is 
troubling . . . . [I]t is likely to impose a more onerous burden in those cases where a liberal 
notice pleading standard is needed most: actions asserting claims based on states of mind, secret 
agreements, and the like, creating a class of disfavored actions in which plaintiffs will face more 
hurdles to obtaining a resolution of their claims on the merits.” (emphasis added)). 
 182. COMM. ON RULES OF PRACTICE & PROCEDURE, FED. JUDICIAL CONFERENCE OF THE 
U.S., MEETING OF JUNE 19–20, 1997, DRAFT MINUTES 19 (statement of Judge Paul V. 
Niemeyer, Chair, Advisory Committee on Civil Rules), available at http://www.uscourts.gov/ 
uscourts/RulesAndPolicies/rules/Minutes/ST06-1997-min.pdf. Judge Niemeyer, the then-chair of 
the Civil Committee, “pointed out that the debate over the amendment had disclosed 
competing economic interests and basic philosophical differences as to the very purposes of 
Rule 23 and class actions.” Id. 
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not “worth it” often lies solely in the eyes of the beholder.183 The 
Committee’s decision echoed a similar judgment by the Supreme 
Court more than twenty years earlier in Eisen v. Carlisle & 
Jacquelin,184 in which the Court rejected a “preliminary inquiry into 
the merits of a suit” on a class-certification motion as contrary to that 
procedure’s purpose.185 These episodes illustrate the dramatic shift in 
attitude regarding the federal civil-procedure system that plausibility 
pleading reflects. Whereas the Justices and rulemakers once refused 
to grant district judges the authority to filter out class actions on the 
basis of an evaluation of the merits or a cost-benefit analysis, years 
later the Court has done precisely that in the context of pleadings and 
motions to dismiss. 
No procedural system can entirely avoid discarding some wheat 
with the chaff. But how many potentially meritorious claims should 
 
 183. For a glimpse of some reactions to the proposed Rule 23(b)(3)(F) amendment, see 
COMM. ON RULES OF PRACTICE & PROCEDURE, FED. JUDICIAL CONFERENCE OF THE U.S., 
REPORT OF THE ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON CIVIL RULES 36–38 (1997), available at 
http://www.uscourts.gov/uscourts/RulesAndPolicies/rules/Reports/CV5-1997.pdf.  
This proposal drew more comment than any other. The comments ranged from 
strong support to vehement opposition. In many ways, the proposal became the focal 
point for abiding disputes over the “private attorney-general” function of (b)(3) class 
actions. The most fundamental question is whether a procedural rule that emanated 
from the Enabling Act process should become the authority that supports private 
initiation and control of public law-enforcement values. 
Id.; see also COMM. ON RULES OF PRACTICE & PROCEDURE, FED. JUDICIAL CONFERENCE OF 
THE U.S., MEETING OF OCTOBER 17–18, 1996, DRAFT MINUTES, http://www.uscourts.gov/ 
uscourts/RulesAndPolicies/rules/Minutes/cv10-1796.htm (“As a group, these changes can be 
read either to encourage or to discourage small-claim class actions. A more accurate assessment 
is that they increase trial court flexibility, expanding discretion in ways that will further reduce 
the scope of effective appellate review.” (statement of Judge Niemeyer)). 
 184. Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin, 417 U.S. 156 (1974). 
 185. Id. at 177. In the past decade, there has been a notable expansion in the procedures for 
class-action certification, as a result of which the merits of a suit may be examined—
theoretically only as part of the inquiry into the prerequisites for class certification, such as 
predominance of the common questions and superiority. See, e.g., In re New Motor Vehicles 
Canadian Exp. Antitrust Litig., 533 F.3d 6, 20 (1st Cir. 2008) (“A district court must formulate 
some prediction as to how the specific issues will play out in order to determine whether 
common or individual issues predominate in a given case.”); In re Hydrogen Peroxide Antitrust 
Litig., 522 F.3d 305, 311 (3d Cir. 2008) (vacating class certification in antitrust claim based on 
lack of predominance); In re Initial Pub. Offerings Sec. Litig., 471 F.3d 24, 32 (2d Cir. 2006) 
(noting Rule 23’s additional requirements of predominance and superiority and rejecting the 
argument based on Eisen that a judge cannot consider the prerequisites of Rule 23 that overlap 
with the merits of the case); see also Oscar Private Equity Inv. v. Allegiance Telecom, Inc., 487 
F.3d 261, 271 (5th Cir. 2007) (vacating class certification in a securities fraud claim because 
plaintiffs failed to prove that defendants’ misrepresentations were the proximate cause of 
plaintiffs’ loss). 
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the system be permitted to sacrifice to achieve a reasonable quantum 
of filtration? It seems obvious that in many contexts attempting to 
distinguish the frivolous from the potentially meritorious on the basis 
of a single pleading is a dangerously uncertain endeavor.186 And where 
is the evidence that fact-based pleading enhances the extrusion of 
meritless, as opposed to potentially meritorious, cases? And what is 
the comparative proportion between the two? To my knowledge 
there is none. Indeed, some preliminary research suggests the 
opposite may be true;187 heightened pleading may not be a better 
filter. 
There are some critical macro-questions that need to be 
addressed as well. How frequently should plaintiffs have their cases 
terminated without a meaningful day in court when they lack 
sufficient information to plead with factual plausibility because they 
cannot effectively access it? Should our judicial system only open its 
doors to claimants who have the necessary resources and pre-action 
information to satisfy a judge’s judicial experience and common 
sense? Have courts abandoned the gold standard—adjudication on 
the merits, with a jury trial when applicable—and replaced it with 
threshold judicial judgments based on limited information? Will 
district courts discard all suits they believe are not plausible—today’s 
version of “it ain’t worth it”? 
C. Plausibility and the Pressure for Pre-Adjudicatory Disposition 
The advent of plausibility pleading suggests obvious parallels to 
the rise of the Supreme Court’s plausibility test for summary 
judgment motions.188 As a result of the Court’s 1986 summary 
judgment trilogy,189 which formally equated that motion with the 
 
 186. See Elaine M. Korb & Richard A. Bales, A Permanent Stop Sign: Why Courts Should 
Yield to the Temptation to Impose Heightened Pleading Standards in § 1983 Cases, 41 BRANDEIS 
L.J. 267, 293–95 (2002). 
 187. See Alexander A. Reinert, The Costs of Heightened Pleading, 86 IND. L.J. (forthcoming 
2011) (manuscript at ii), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1666770 
(finding “no correlation between the heft of a pleading and the ultimate success of a case”). 
 188. See Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587 (1986) 
(holding that to survive a motion for summary judgment, the nonmoving party must come 
forward with specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial). 
 189. See Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 312 (1986); Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 
U.S. 242 (1986); Matsushita, 475 U.S. 574. 
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directed-verdict motion190 and introduced a new plausibility standard 
in the pretrial context, Rule 56 motions have become a potent 
weapon for terminating cases before trial. As I have discussed 
elsewhere at length,191 the 1986 trilogy produced a significant 
escalation of summary judgment activity and, in my opinion, 
occasionally has taken the procedure beyond its function of 
separating the factually trial-worthy from the factually trial-
worthless.192 As one of the nation’s most accomplished procedure 
scholars writes, ultimately, the federal judiciary’s “retreat from the 
goal of adjudication on the merits [saw] the trial-termination rate 
decline precipitously, to the point that it is a quarter or less of the 
termination rate by summary judgment.”193 The same expanded 
characterization of allegations as conclusory, rather than factual, and 
increased judicial decisionmaking in the fact-application arena now 
being seen in post-Twombly-Iqbal pleading decisions has occurred 
under Rule 56. But the Court’s summary judgment shift did not 
satisfy those demanding that the system be tightened further; the new 
pleading regime seems designed to meet the pressures created by 
those interests. 
Just as the 1986 trilogy was concerned with restraining the so-
called—but unproven—litigation explosion through the “powerful 
tool” of summary judgment,194 so too the Court in both Twombly and 
Iqbal was concerned with developing a stronger judicial gatekeeping 
role for Rule 12(b)(6) motions.195 Plausibility pleading may well 
become the federal courts’ primary vehicle for achieving pre-
adjudicatory disposition.196 If so, the Supreme Court has transferred 
 
 190. A motion for directed verdict is now called a motion for judgment as a matter of law. 
See FED. R. CIV. P. 50. 
 191. Miller, supra note 32, at 1048–56. 
 192. Id. at 1048–49; see also Joe S. Cecil, Rebecca N. Eyre, Dean Miletich & David 
Rindskopf, A Quarter-Century of Summary Judgment Practice in Six Federal District Courts, 4 J. 
EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 861, 863–69 (2007) (“Overuse of summary judgment is a recent 
complaint. . . . [S]ome commentators have become concerned that courts now rely too heavily 
on summary judgment and other procedural means of disposing of cases prior to trial.”). 
 193. Burbank, supra note 143, at 561. 
 194. Miller, supra note 32, at 1056; see also supra text accompanying notes 30–32. 
 195. See Hoffman, supra note 106, at 1220, 1224. 
 196. See Spencer, supra note 108, at 450 (“In effect, then, the Court has moved forward the 
burden that plaintiffs must carry at later stages in the litigation up front to the pleading stage.”). 
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the primary gatekeeping function performed by summary judgment 
motions even earlier in the action to motions to dismiss.197 
This morphing of the directed verdict into summary judgment 
and then into the motion to dismiss is unsettling. There are significant 
differences among these procedures. A directed-verdict motion under 
Rule 50 follows the presentation of evidence subject to cross-
examination before the trier of fact in open court and only eliminates 
cases that are not jury-worthy.198 A summary judgment motion under 
Rule 56 typically is based on a developed record that follows 
discovery and only prevents cases lacking genuine issues of material 
fact from proceeding.199 In sharp contrast, plausibility pleading 
employs a gatekeeping function at a case’s genesis. The decision as to 
whether it can proceed will be based solely on one document, without 
giving the plaintiff an opportunity to unlock the doors of discovery. 
This is particularly true if a district judge stays all proceedings during 
the often-lengthy period between the motion to dismiss and its 
determination. For many plaintiffs, this effectively denies any hope of 
investigating and properly developing their claims, and leads to 
judicial decisionmaking without a meaningful record.200 The absence 
of the focusing effect of a developed record is likely to magnify the 
subjective aspects of the judge’s thinking about the motion. 
Plausibility—the Court’s word du jour—now applies both to 
summary judgment and to pleadings, although the difference between 
these two uses of the word is murky at best. Not surprisingly, some 
have argued that the motion to dismiss under Twombly and Iqbal has 
become a disguised summary judgment motion, attacking not only the 
legal sufficiency of a pleading, but striving for a resolution by 
 
 197. See id. at 447 n.93 (“It is my contention that such scrutiny inappropriately moves 
forward summary judgment-like screening to the pleading phase.”). 
 198. FED. R. CIV. P. 50(a)(1). 
 199. Id. 56(c)(2). 
 200. See Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. 1937, 1950 (2009). The pleading stage is far too early 
for courts to make reasoned decisions on the cost-benefit value of proceeding to discovery in 
many cases. See Scott A. Moss, Litigation Discovery Cannot Be Optimal but Could Be Better: 
The Economics of Improving Discovery Timing in a Digital Age, 58 DUKE L.J. 889, 896 (2009) 
(“[P]roportionality rules ask the impossible: judges must decide when discovery cost is 
proportional to some measure of ‘value’ that includes both evidence value . . . and case 
value . . . . This yields a fundamental information-timing problem: discovery disputes occur 
before parties marshal all the evidence, so how can courts measure the value of particular 
evidence, much less case merits?”). 
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appraising the facts.201 The positions of the two motions on opposite 
sides of the discovery process means that only plaintiffs who have 
survived the first hurdle have an opportunity to find relevant 
information to back up their factual allegations in the hope of 
surviving the second. As Professor Spencer writes, “[t]he only 
distinction is that at the pleading stage, the plaintiff’s factual 
allegations simply may be asserted rather than evidenced. But in both 
instances, if the facts presented do not present a plausible picture of 
liability, the claims will not survive.”202 This approach contradicts—or 
at least obscures—the text of the two Rules: whereas Rule 56 
demands that claimants “set forth specific facts” that remain in 
dispute following the availability of discovery, Rule 8(a)(2) only asks 
for a “showing” of the pleader’s entitlement to relief based on 
preinstitution investigation. The current confusion suggests that the 
time may come when it will be necessary either to return to prior 
principles regarding the two motions or to redefine their respective 
roles, standards, procedures, and limitations to illuminate the 
distinction between them and rationalize pretrial motion practice. 
Moreover, why were Twombly and Iqbal necessary? The 1986 
summary judgment trilogy had made that motion a powerful pretrial 
terminator, especially when coupled with judicial control over the 
pretrial process. For a quarter century, successive amendments to the 
Federal Rules had impressed limits on the extent of discovery, 
established mandatory disclosure, and narrowed the scope of what 
matters could be inquired into under the discovery rules. For years 
 
 201. See Epstein, supra note 52, at 69; Suja A. Thomas, The New Summary Judgment 
Motion: The Motion to Dismiss Under Iqbal and Twombly, 14 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 15, 18 
(2010) (“The motion to dismiss is the new summary judgment motion.”); see also Clermont & 
Yeazell, supra note 52, at 833 (“This unavoidably probabilistic standard appears equivalent to 
the standard of decision for summary judgment.”). 
 202. See Epstein, supra note 52, at 69; Thomas, supra note 201, at 28–31 (“[T]he Supreme 
Court has established standards for summary judgment and for the motion to dismiss that are 
substantially the same. . . . [U]nder both standards, a court determines the plausibility of the 
claim.”); see also Clermont & Yeazell, supra note 52, at 834 (“To explore this jarring novelty 
further, consider the actual complaints that the Twombly and Iqbal courts held insufficient 
because the allegations were too conclusory to pass into the promised land of plausibility.”). 
Professor Epstein has offered the following clarification of his statements: 
[T]he point of the disguised summary judgment motion was not to appraise the facts 
in each and every case, but to examine a narrow subset of cases where it makes no 
sense to bear the heavy costs of discovery when its massive dislocation and expense is 
manifestly unlikely to produce any evidence of value. 
Epstein, supra note 172, at 10. 
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before Twombly and Iqbal, the Rule 12(b)(6) dismissal rate had been 
rising.203 Judicial gatekeeping seemed to be working. The Supreme 
Court’s coup de grace simply was not needed. To be sure, new 
challenges are always arising. The expanding e-discovery 
phenomenon presents real and troubling cost and logistical problems. 
But that subject is being intensely studied, a first generation of 
Federal Rule changes is in place, and experience is developing.204 
And, again, why focus on Rule 8 and Rule 12(b)? The Court’s 
concerns more appropriately should be viewed as matters of 
promoting effective judicial management, especially methods of 
controlling discovery and improving lawyer behavior. 
II.  CASE MANAGEMENT, LITIGATION COSTS, 
AND COMPETING SYSTEM VALUES 
The advent of plausibility pleading in Twombly and Iqbal was 
motivated in significant part by a desire to develop a stronger role for 
motions to dismiss to filter out a hypothesized excess of meritless 
litigation, to deter allegedly abusive practices, and to contain costs. 
Indeed, repeatedly sounded assumptions concerning the frequency 
and significance of these phenomena have led to dramatic changes in 
pretrial litigation practice—most notably an increase in judicial case 
management, a more powerful summary judgment motion, and, since 
Twombly and Iqbal, a heightened pleading standard—many of which 
have not been sanctified by amendments to the Federal Rules. 
Although some criticisms of today’s civil justice system have 
merit, as discussed below,205 the picture generally portrayed is 
incomplete and is distorted by a lack of definition and empirical data 
regarding the alleged negative aspects of federal litigation. This 
generates rhetoric that often reflects ideology or economic self-
interest, rather than reality. As a result, reliance on these assertions 
threatens to impair the ability of courts, rulemakers, and 
commentators to reach dispassionate, reasoned conclusions as to 
 
 203. See, e.g., EMERY G. LEE III & THOMAS E. WILLGING, FED. JUDICIAL CTR., 
NATIONAL, CASE-BASED CIVIL RULES SURVEY: PRELIMINARY REPORT TO THE JUDICIAL 
CONFERENCE ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON CIVIL RULES 1(2009), http://www.fjc.gov/public/ 
pdf.nsf/lookup/dissurv1.pdf/$file/dissurv1.pdf. 
 204. See infra note 216 and accompanying text. There was a heavy focus on e-discovery at 
the Duke Conference, both in the panel discussions and in the papers. 
 205. See infra Part II.B. 
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what is needed. Moreover, the picture of how our federal procedure 
system is functioning generally has been viewed for a number of years 
through a lens trained on concerns voiced by defense interests, with 
the difficulties faces by the other side of the litigation equation going 
largely ignored.206 If assumptions about litigation costs, judicial 
management, and abusive use of the system are driving pretrial 
process changes, the policymakers must strive to understand these 
matters fully and appraise what is real and what is illusion before the 
procedure is altered any further. 
A. Combating Cost and Delay with Pretrial Management 
The increased complexity, magnitude, and number of cases on 
federal court dockets in the past few decades have caused many to 
lament the “twin scourges” of the federal civil litigation system—
namely, cost and delay—concerns that apparently affect other legal 
systems and whose existence can be traced back to ancient times.207 
Reacting to these complaints, increased judicial control over the 
pretrial process has been provided in recent decades through 
legislation, rulemaking, Supreme Court decisions, and various less 
formal means, most notably the Manual for Complex Litigation.208 
 
 206. See, e.g., Robert L. Rothman, Twombly and Iqbal: A License to Dismiss, 35 
LITIGATION 3 (2009); Schneider, supra note 44, at 562. The Court’s Twombly and Iqbal 
opinions focus on defense costs. In thinking about system costs, it should be remembered that 
the period under discussion is one in which federal court caseloads have dramatically increased, 
the number of federal judges has remained relatively constant, a significant number of 
judgeships have been vacant for significant periods of time, judicial salaries have been frozen, 
docket-control mechanisms have become commonplace, and the Supreme Court has reduced 
the frequency of granting certiorari petitions—leaving certain issues unresolved. 
 207. See Learned Hand, The Deficiencies of Trials to Reach the Heart of the Matter, in 3 
LECTURES ON LEGAL TOPICS 87, 88 (1926) (noting that in the third millennium before Christ 
people were complaining about the inefficiency of the legal process); Arthur R. Miller, The 
Adversary System: Dinosaur or Phoenix, 69 MINN. L. REV. 1, 1 (1984) (“The inefficiency with 
which the wheels of justice grind is not unique to our time. In ancient China, a peasant who 
resorted to the courts was considered ruined, no matter what the eventual outcome of the suit. 
Hamlet rued ‘the law’s delay.’ Goethe quit the legal profession in disgust over cases that had 
been languishing in the German courts for three hundred years. And in Bleak House Charles 
Dickens applied his great talent for social criticism to the ramifications of one of the classic 
examples of English legal ineptitude—Jarndyce v. Jarndyce.”). See generally CHARLES 
DICKENS, BLEAK HOUSE (George Ford & Sylvere Monod ed., Modern Library 1985) (1853) 
(focusing his social commentary on the long-running litigation in Jarndyce v. Jarndyce, which 
concluded only after the lawyers’ fees had consumed all of the money in the estate in question). 
 208. MANUAL FOR COMPLEX LITIGATION (FOURTH) (2004). For a discussion of judicial 
control through management, see infra notes 207–43. 
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During my tour as Reporter to the Advisory Committee on Civil 
Rules beginning in the late 1970s, it became increasingly clear that 
rulemaking policy should turn its attention away from the trial and 
toward the increasingly important and protracted pretrial process. 
The Committee consciously chose to concentrate on the pretrial 
phase as the best hope for meaningfully attacking cost and delay, 
especially because only a small percentage of cases actually reached 
trial even then. The 1983 amendments to the Federal Rules, 
therefore, were an attempt to reduce cost and delay by giving district 
judges the tools to prevent excessive discovery and to take a more 
active role in moving cases through pretrial and encouraging 
settlement.209 The techniques included formally validating the concept 
of judicial management by expanding the role and scope of Rule 16, 
giving the district judge the power to impose some constraints on 
redundant and disproportionate discovery in Rule 26, and enhancing 
the functionality of sanctions under Rule 11 in the hope of improving 
lawyer behavior.210 Subsequent amendments to Rule 16 and Rule 26 
reflected the Committee’s continued commitment to case 
management as an effective means to combat cost and delay211 and to 
encourage rational, merits-based settlements.212 
 
 209. See generally ARTHUR R. MILLER, FED. JUDICIAL CTR., THE AUGUST 1983 
AMENDMENTS TO THE FEDERAL RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE: PROMOTING EFFECTIVE CASE 
MANAGEMENT AND LAWYER RESPONSIBILITY, EDUCATION AND TRAINING SERIES (1984) 
(summarizing the objectives of the Federal Rules Advisory Committee in drafting the 1983 
Amendments, including an effort to increase pretrial efficiency by establishing the principle of 
judicial management). 
 210. As the Advisory Committee noted at that time, 
[e]mpirical studies reveal that when a trial judge intervenes personally at an early 
stage to assume judicial control over a case and to schedule dates for completion by 
the parties of the principal pretrial steps, the case is disposed of by settlement or trial 
more efficiently and with less cost and delay than when the parties are left to their 
own devices. 
FED. R. CIV. P. 11 Advisory Committee Notes to the 1983 Amendment, reprinted in 12A 
CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT, ARTHUR R. MILLER, MARY KAY KANE & RICHARD L. MARCUS, 
FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE: CIVIL, at app. C (3d ed. 2010); see also 5A WRIGHT & 
MILLER, supra note 3, at 1334 (outlining the purpose and effects of Rule 11); 6A CHARLES 
ALAN WRIGHT, ARTHUR R. MILLER & MARY KAY KANE, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND 
PROCEDURE: CIVIL § 1521 (3d ed. 2010) (summarizing the history of Rule 16). 
 211. See Ettie Ward, The After-Shocks of Twombly: Will We “Notice” Pleading Changes?, 82 
ST. JOHN’S L. REV. 893, 913 (2008) (“The amendments to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 
in 1983, 1993, and 2000 have provided the parties and courts greater resources to control 
runaway, excessive discovery. The amendments to the rules include giving greater authority to 
district court judges to exercise meaningful managerial control of the scheduling and scope of 
discovery under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 16.”); see also Edward D. Cavanagh, Twombly: 
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Since the 1983 amendments, case management has been 
encouraged as a valuable judicial tool and enjoys widespread use in 
various forms. In 1985, the second edition of the Manual for Complex 
Litigation213 was released, and like the original Manual, suggested 
various case management techniques that had proven successful and 
deserved further use and development.214 Most would say that the 
Manual, now in its fourth edition, has been highly instructive for the 
members of the bar and valuable in helping judges manage complex 
cases effectively.215 
Congress participated in the management trend by enacting the 
Civil Justice Reform Act of 1990,216 which required all district courts 
to develop and implement plans to reduce expense and delay. 
“Litigation management,” systematic differential treatment, and early 
 
The Demise of Notice Pleading, the Triumph of Milton Handler, and the Uncertain Future of 
Private Antitrust Enforcement, 28 REV. LITIG. 1, 25 (2008) (“The judicial role in supervising 
discovery was broadened significantly by the 1993 Amendments to the Federal Rules.”). 
 212. “For example, there is evidence that pretrial conferences may improve the quality of 
justice rendered in the federal courts by sharpening the preparation and presentation of cases, 
tending to eliminate trial surprise, and improving, as well as facilitating, the settlement process.” 
FED. R. CIV. P. 11 Advisory Committee Notes to the 1983 Amendment, reprinted in 12A 
WRIGHT, MILLER, KANE & MARCUS, supra note 210, at app. C; see also THOMAS E. WILLGING, 
LAURA L. HOOPER & ROBERT J. NIEMIC, FED. JUDICIAL CTR., EMPIRICAL STUDY OF CLASS 
ACTIONS IN FOUR FEDERAL DISTRICT COURTS: FINAL REPORT TO THE ADVISORY 
COMMITTEE ON CIVIL RULES 69 (1996) (concluding that case management practices “limit the 
ability of a party to coerce a settlement without regard to the merits of the case” in the class 
action context). 
 213. MANUAL FOR COMPLEX LITIGATION (SECOND) (1985). The original Manual was 
published in 1969. 
 214. See Thomas E. Willging, Beyond Maturity: Mass Tort Case Management in the Manual 
for Complex Litigation, 148 U. PA. L. REV. 2225, 2231 (2000) (“In the introduction, Judge 
Pointer wrote that ‘[t]he various techniques suggested . . . either have been used regularly with 
success or deserve, in the opinion of the Board of Editors, further use and experimentation in 
appropriate cases.’”). 
 215. See, e.g., Edward D. Cavanagh, Twombly, the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and the 
Courts, 82 ST. JOHN’S L. REV. 877, 888 (2008) (“The Manual has been used successfully in 
numerous cases to keep down discovery costs and reduce unnecessary delay, proving that a 
willing court can exercise meaningful control over claims and defenses asserted by the parties 
and discovery.”). In 2006, the Federal Judicial Center published a pocket book for judges that 
describes some additional management techniques thought to be useful. See WILLIAM W. 
SCHWARZER & ALAN HIRSCH, FED. JUDICIAL CTR., THE ELEMENTS OF CASE MANAGEMENT: 
A POCKET GUIDE FOR JUDGES (2d ed. 2006). 
 216. 28 U.S.C. §§ 471–482 (2006). In major part, the 1990 legislation was sunset after seven 
years. For a chronicling of the formulation and early developments under the Act, see generally 
Terence Dunworth & James S. Kakalik, Preliminary Observations on Implementation of the 
Pilot Program of the Civil Justice Reform Act of 1990, 46 STAN. L. REV. 1303 (1994). 
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ongoing control by a judicial officer were elements to be considered 
by each district.217 Although the resultant plans varied, most of them 
further developed the core elements of Rule 16 and the Manual, 
thereby calling for a considerable amount of district judge 
involvement, especially with regard to the discovery process. While 
the Rules, the Manual, and the expense and delay plans were making 
more tools available for managing pretrial procedure, the Supreme 
Court’s strengthening of the summary judgment motion with its 1986 
trilogy was having an effect in the lower federal courts.218 Summary 
judgment, coupled with the district judge’s power to manage, were 
thought to be an effective combination for controlling the pretrial 
process.219 
Until Twombly, the Supreme Court consistently sanctioned the 
efficacy of these techniques for containing discovery costs and 
eliminating meritless cases. In Leatherman v. Tarrant County 
Narcotics Intelligence & Coordination Unit,220 Chief Justice Rehnquist 
wrote that, without formal amendments to Rule 8 and Rule 9, 
“federal courts and litigants must rely on summary judgment and 
control of discovery to weed out unmeritorious claims sooner rather 
than later.”221 The Court reaffirmed these sentiments in Crawford-El 
v. Britton222 in 1998223 and in Swierkiewicz in 2002.224 And both the 
 
 217. The quoted words appear in a number of the statute’s sections. See, e.g., 28 U.S.C. 
§§ 471, 473. For further discussion of the statute, see infra notes 463, 471–72. 
 218. See supra text accompanying notes 30–32, 37. 
 219. Some commentators, myself included, even have argued that the more stringent 
summary judgment procedure has provided the bench with too much authority to dispose of 
cases before trial and that the motion occasionally has been (and continues to be) used too 
hyperactively. See Miller, supra note 32, at 1044–48. 
 220. Leatherman v. Tarrant Cnty. Narcotics Intelligence & Coordination Unit, 507 U.S. 163 
(1993). 
 221. Id. at 168–69. 
 222. Crawford-El v. Britton, 523 U.S. 574 (1998). 
 223. Id. at 599 (“The trial judge can therefore manage the discovery process to facilitate 
prompt and efficient resolution of the lawsuit; as the evidence is gathered, the defendant-official 
may move for partial summary judgment on objective issues that are potentially dispositive and 
are more amenable to summary disposition than disputes about the official’s intent, which 
frequently turn on credibility assessments.”). The preceding pages of the opinion provide an 
extended look at the ways a federal judge can manage a case in the context of qualified 
immunity. 
 224. Swierkiewicz v. Sorema N.A., 534 U.S. 506, 512–13 (2002) (“The provisions for 
discovery are so flexible and the provisions for pretrial procedure and summary judgment so 
effective, that attempted surprise in federal practice is aborted very easily, synthetic issues 
detected, and the gravamen of the dispute brought frankly into the open for the inspection of 
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1983 and 1993 amendments to Rule 16, which dramatically expanded 
the scope and delineated the contours of judicial conferences, were 
approved by the Court, as was the 2006 group of amendments that 
gave the district court extensive control and discretion in the context 
of e-discovery.225 
Therefore, the Court’s shift in attitude toward case management 
in Twombly was unexpected. Based largely on a somewhat dated and 
highly theoretical 1989 journal article by Judge (then Professor) 
Frank H. Easterbrook,226 Justice Souter expressed the view that “the 
success of judicial supervision in controlling discovery has been on the 
modest side.”227 This was the first time the Court had questioned the 
ability of district judges to manage pretrial procedures in a way that 
might limit cost and delay.228 This conclusion served as an important 
 
the court.” (quoting 5C WRIGHT, MILLER & KANE, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE: 
CIVIL, § 1202 (2d ed. 1990))). 
 225. See FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(2)(B), 33(d), 34(b)(2)(E), 37(e), 45(d)(1). See generally 
SEVENTH CIRCUIT ELECTRONIC DISCOVERY PILOT PROGRAM: REPORT ON PHASE ONE 
(2010); WORKING GRP. ON BEST PRACTICES FOR ELEC. DOCUMENT RETENTION & PROD., 
THE SEDONA CONFERENCE, THE SEDONA PRINCIPLES: BEST PRACTICES RECOMMENDATIONS 
AND PRINCIPLES FOR ADDRESSING ELECTRONIC DOCUMENT PRODUCTION (2005); Rachel 
Hytken, Electronic Discovery: To What Extent Do the 2006 Amendments Satisfy Their 
Purposes?, 12 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 875 (2008). The e-discovery field is canvassed in 
MILBERG LLP & HAUSFELD LLP, E DISCOVERY TODAY: THE FAULT LIES NOT IN OUR 
RULES (2010). The K&L Gates law firm maintains a computerized file of over 1000 e-discovery 
matters. 
 226. “Judges can do little about impositional discovery when parties control the legal claims 
to be presented and conduct the discovery themselves.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 
544, 559 (2007) (quoting Frank H. Easterbrook, Discovery as Abuse, 69 B.U. L. REV. 635, 638 
(1989)). The Court also cited data that discovery can account for 90 percent of litigation costs 
when it is actively employed. Id. (citing Memorandum from Judge Paul V. Niemeyer, Chair, 
Advisory Comm. on Civil Rules, to Judge Anthony J. Scirica, Chair, Comm. on Rules of 
Practice & Procedure (May 11, 1999), 192 F.R.D. 354, 357 (2000)). This data, which is 
questionable as to its coverage and is not borne out by more contemporary surveys, does not 
necessarily corroborate the failure of case management to control discovery costs. But its 
association with the claim that case management has failed seems to imply that Justice Souter 
did feel that it supported his conclusion that case management has failed. 
 227. Twombly, 550 U.S. at 559. The basis for that statement is unknown. There is no data 
indicating how a particular case might fare without management. Not cited was the excellent 
essay by Judge Richard A. Posner, later Judge Easterbrook’s Seventh Circuit colleague, on the 
use of management techniques to avoid a premature dismissal in American Nurses’ Ass’n v. 
Illinois, 786 F.2d 716 (7th Cir. 1986), which appeared almost contemporaneously with the 
article. Justice Stevens’s dissent contended that the Court’s majority “vastly underestimates a 
district court’s case management arsenal.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 593 n.13 (Stevens, J., 
dissenting). 
 228. See Bone, supra note 52, at 898–99 (pointing out that Twombly is the first time the 
Supreme Court questioned the effectiveness of case management and that prior to that case, the 
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justification for Twombly’s establishing the plausibility-pleading 
standard,229 with Justice Souter citing the potential for imposing large 
discovery costs on defendants as a reason to weed out cases not 
deemed plausible at the very beginning of litigation.230 The Iqbal 
majority extended this line of thinking to government defendants.231 
Dissenting in Iqbal, however, Justice Breyer explicitly endorsed 
“alternative case-management tools”232 designed “to prevent 
unwarranted litigation.”233 He argued, 
The law, after all, provides trial courts with other legal weapons 
designed to prevent unwarranted interference. As the Second 
Circuit explained, where a Government defendant asserts a 
qualified immunity defense, a trial court, responsible for managing a 
case and “mindful of the need to vindicate the purpose of the 
qualified immunity defense,” can structure discovery in ways that 
diminish the risk of imposing unwarranted burdens upon public 
officials. A district court, for example, can begin discovery with 
lower level government defendants before determining whether a 
case can be made to allow discovery related to higher level 
government officials.234 
Twombly and Iqbal appear to have set up a somewhat illogical 
dichotomy. In deciding a motion to dismiss, judges may consider the 
hypothesized cost of discovery to the defendant, but they cannot look 
at the potential techniques for cabining those costs with effective 
judicial management.235 It is curious that, in the same opinions, the 
 
Advisory Committee had operated on the assumption that the management tools were quite 
useful). 
 229. Twombly, 550 U.S. at 559. The Iqbal opinion refers to Justice Souter’s conclusion as the 
“rejection of the careful-case-management approach.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. 1937, 1953 
(2009). 
 230. Twombly, 550 U.S. at 558 (“Thus, it is one thing to be cautious before dismissing an 
antitrust complaint in advance of discovery . . . but quite another to forget that proceeding to 
antitrust discovery can be expensive.”). The Court’s opinion pays little attention to the various 
developments in case management described in the text. 
 231. “Our rejection of the careful-case-management approach is especially important in 
suits where Government-official defendants are entitled to assert the defense of qualified 
immunity.” Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. at 1953. 
 232. Id. at 1962 (Breyer, J., dissenting). 
 233. Id. at 1961. 
 234. Id. at 1961–62 (citations omitted). 
 235. “We have held, however, that the question presented by a motion to dismiss a 
complaint for insufficient pleadings does not turn on the controls placed upon the discovery 
process.” Id. at 1954 (majority opinion) (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 559). 
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Court entrusted district judges with the freedom to use judicial 
experience and common sense236 to dismiss a claim at genesis for 
noncompliance with a plausibility-pleading requirement, but, at the 
same time, denied them the freedom to manage the early phases of 
their cases efficiently and economically to test the viability of the 
challenged claim for relief.237 Moreover, it has been noted that it is 
odd that the Court so easily dismissed case management across the 
board when none of the then-sitting Justices had been a federal 
district court judge and therefore they collectively lacked federal civil 
trial experience.238 The Court’s dismissal is especially dubious because 
many district court local rules actively endorse case management, 
most judges use it,239 and a number of post-1989 Rule amendments 
have established constraints on discovery and broadened the matters 
that can be considered at pretrial conferences. Also significant is the 
empirical data recently collected by the Federal Judicial Center240 and 
the American Bar Association Section of Litigation,241 which reveals a 
general consensus among the surveyed practicing attorneys in favor 
of preserving case management in its current form.242 At the Duke 
 
 236. Id. at 1950. 
 237. See Twombly, 550 U.S. at 559. 
 238. McMahon, supra note 76, at 869. 
 239. See id. (“It is unfortunate that the Twombly majority views the efforts of district judges 
in this regard to be less than adequate, commenting that ‘the success of judicial supervision in 
checking discovery abuse has been on the modest side.’ But with hundreds of civil cases on their 
dockets, district court judges do their best. Moreover, criticism about case management from a 
Court that collectively lacks much experience with trial-level civil litigation is difficult to digest.” 
(footnote omitted) (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 1967 (Stevens, J., dissenting))); Paul W. 
Grimm & Elizabeth J. Cabraser, The State of Discovery Practice in Civil Cases: Must the Rules 
be Changed to Reduce Costs and Burdens or Can Significant Improvements Be Achieved 
Within the Existing Rules? 28–32 (2010) (unpublished manuscript), available at http:// 
civilconference.uscourts.gov/LotusQuickr/dcc/Main.nsf/$defaultview/47D6E0CDEF6484DA852
576EA004A9FDA/$File/Judge%20Grimm,%20The%20State%20of%20Discovery%20Practice
%20in%20Civil%20Cases.pdf?OpenElement; Charles R. Richey, Rule 16 Revised, and Related 
Rules: Analysis of Recent Developments for the Benefit of Bench and Bar, 157 F.R.D. 69 (1994). 
But see Robert E. Keeton, Commentary, Time Limits as Incentives in an Adversary System, 137 
U. PA. L. REV. 2053, 2056–58 (1989) (“I doubt . . . that it is possible to design such a shorter, 
better focused trial, without changing the trial judge’s role to one of somewhat more rigorous 
control over the process than that implicit in the role of the judge in the traditional adversary 
trial.”). 
 240. LEE & WILLGING, supra note 203, at 27–33. 
 241. AM. BAR ASS’N SECTION OF LITIG., supra note 56, at 3, 6, 11, 123–44. 
 242. “Taking questions 74 and 75 [of the Center’s survey] together, there appears to be 
some consensus that the Rules should not be revised to discourage case management by federal 
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Conference, speaker after speaker stressed the importance of 
management, with most emphasizing that judicial involvement in the 
process was critical.243 
B. The Costs of Litigation 
The Supreme Court’s negative view of case management in 
Twombly and Iqbal is instructive in that it is a reminder of how much 
is not known about litigation cost and delay. Twombly’s emphasis on 
the defendant’s costs also reveals how one-sided the discussions about 
expense and the expressions of concern have become. Moreover, the 
Court’s ready acceptance of the blunt instrument of plausibility 
pleading as a barrier to discovery indicates how little information is 
available about the potential positives and negatives of any solution 
that is advanced to counteract the perceived deficiencies of the 
pretrial system. It seems axiomatic that it would be highly desirable to 
conduct the needed research and analysis of the entire range of 
relevant considerations before the system succumbs further to the 
current pressure for more frequent and earlier pretrial dispositions. 
If litigation costs are to be considered in applying the pleading 
and motion-to-dismiss rules, all costs should be taken into account, 
including those borne by plaintiffs, the expenditure of system 
resources, and the loss to society from any impairment of important 
public policies as a result of non-enforcement. The costs to 
defendants—in particular, large corporate and government entities—
have been decried frequently.244 Twombly justified establishing 
 
judges and that, moreover, the Rules should not be revised to encourage additional case 
management by those same judges.” LEE & WILLGING, supra note 203, at 62–64. 
 243. One of the nation’s most highly regarded district judges and a long-term participant in 
the rulemaking process offers two “suggestions” to enhance judicial involvement in cases that 
require judicial supervision. Lee H. Rosenthal, From Rules of Procedure to How Lawyers 
Litigate: ‘Twixt the Cup and the Lip, 87 DENV. U. L. REV. 227, 240–43 (2010). In Epstein, supra 
note 172, the author—who is quite sympathetic to the supposed burdens of contemporary 
complex litigation on the defense—argues that judicial involvement in managing discovery on 
defendants is essential without acknowledging that relevant tools and practices are in place and 
being used by many judges. See id. at 26 (“[T]he process of discovery in large cases needs 
extensive management . . . .”).  
 244. E.g., Access to Justice Denied: Ashcroft v. Iqbal: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on the 
Constitution, Civil Rights, and Civil Liberties of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, supra note 53, at 
33, 46–53 (statement of Gregory G. Katsas, former Assistant Att’y Gen., Civil Division, U.S. 
Department of Justice). A number of corporate representatives forcefully argued for the 
reduction of litigation costs at the Duke Conference but again, they only focused on their 
companies’ costs. 
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plausibility pleading on the basis of assumptions about excessive 
discovery costs for these organizations and the threat of extortionate 
settlements.245 Justice Souter asserted that “the threat of discovery 
expense will push cost-conscious defendants to settle even anemic 
cases,”246 regardless of the merits. And, of course, a corporate 
defendant faces pressures beyond the purely monetary, in terms of 
disrupting a company’s operations, diminishing the value of its assets, 
decreasing investor confidence and stock prices, impairing its 
reputation, and intruding on pending business negotiations. 
How much of this is fact? How much is fiction? Large 
expenditures do characterize many complex cases that drag on for 
years. And it is true that litigants may face significant costs. But the 
extent of the costs may be somewhat overstated—or partially self-
inflicted—and certainly they are not universally imposed across the 
litigation universe. The excessive costs of discovery cited in Twombly 
seem to occur in a rather small percentage of cases. Indeed, according 
to work done for the Advisory Committee more than a decade ago, 
40 percent of federal cases employed no discovery at all, and a 
“substantial percentage” of the remaining docket employed very 
little.247 According to that same report, however, discovery may have 
constituted 90 percent of the costs in cases in which it was actively 
employed,248 and discovery still generated 50 percent of litigation costs 
overall.249 These figures may be questioned, and more recent surveys 
suggest significantly lower percentages.250 
 
 245. As the Court stated in Twombly, 
[w]e alluded to the practical significance of the Rule 8 entitlement requirement in 
Dura Pharmaceuticals, Inc. v. Broudo when we explained that something beyond the 
mere possibility of loss causation must be alleged, lest a plaintiff with “a largely 
groundless claim” be allowed to “take up the time of a number of other people, with 
the right to do so representing an in terrorem increment of the settlement value.” 
Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 557–58 (2007) (quoting Dura Pharm., Inc. v. Broudo, 
544 U.S. 336, 347 (2005)). 
 246. Id. at 559. The Twombly majority’s concerns recently were repeated by Judge Posner in 
his dissent in Swanson v. Citibank, N.A., No. 10-1122, 2010 WL 2977297, at *9 (7th Cir. July 30, 
2010) (Posner, J., dissenting in part). 
 247. Memorandum from Judge Paul V. Niemeyer, Chair, Advisory Comm. on Civil Rules, 
to Judge Anthony J. Scirica, Chair, Comm. on Rules of Practice & Procedure, supra note 226. 
 248. Id. 
 249. Id. 
 250. See, e.g., LEE & WILLGING, supra note 203, at 38–40 (reporting that lawyers who 
primarily represent defendants estimate that discovery accounts for 27 percent of total litigation 
costs, whereas lawyers who primarily represent plaintiffs estimate that discovery accounts for 20 
percent of total litigation costs). 
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It may be true that some of these costs, in an amount that 
remains unquantified, may be attributable to meritless suits and 
excessive discovery requests, but those costs may be smaller than 
claimed given the advent of judicial control through case 
management, rule amendments limiting discovery, and the techniques 
the system has developed for early termination. And how much of the 
overall cost reflects unnecessary or marginal resistance to discovery 
requests and motion practice billed at the high hourly rates typically 
charged by the major law firms that usually represent defendants in 
large-scale cases?251 The truth is that no one really knows. The 
empirical research has not investigated that deeply and it may prove 
difficult to reach beyond the impressionistic. 
Because there is no common definition of what is abusive or 
frivolous or excessive or purely tactical—let alone agreement on how 
frequently any of those types of discovery and motion activities 
occur—greater study is necessary to distinguish unavoidable high 
costs from those caused by inappropriate litigation behavior. The data 
that does exist—namely recent research by the Federal Judicial 
Center252—does not bear out Justice Souter’s major assertion that 
discovery costs push defendants to settle.253 In fact, the majority of the 
Center’s survey respondents reported that discovery costs had no 
effect on the likelihood of settlement,254 suggesting that the 
assumptions at the heart of Twombly may well wrong. Nor did the 
Court acknowledge the myriad factors other than discovery expense 
that can lead an economic or governmental entity to settle—for 
example, the maintenance of institutional secrets, the existence or 
desire to prevent the generation of adverse precedent, the distraction 
of employee energy, or the avoidance of reputational injury. 
Moreover, no one knows what is meant by excessive discovery cost. 
There is no established common ground for this metric; indeed, it 
 
 251. See, e.g., Nelson D. Schwartz & Julie Creswell, Who Knew Bankruptcy Paid So Well?, 
N.Y. TIMES, May 2, 2010, at B1 (reporting hourly billing by partners of $1,000 or more and 
charges of $500 or more an hour for second-year associates in major bankruptcy cases). 
 252. LEE & WILLGING, supra note 203. 
 253. Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 559 (2007). 
 254. LEE & WILLGING, supra note 203, at 32, 33 (finding that 49.8 percent of plaintiffs 
attorneys and 52.6 percent of defendant attorneys surveyed reported that the cost of discovery 
did not affect the likelihood that a case would be settled). But see AM. BAR ASS’N SECTION OF 
LITIG., supra note 56, at 145 (reporting that 97.5 percent of survey respondents answered that 
overall discovery costs were somewhat or very important factors when considering whether to 
settle a matter). 
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must be evaluated contextually. The matter at issue in many cases—
whether it be economic or ideological—may justify a substantial 
investment in discovery by the contestants. The resulting 
expenditures thus may not be excessive, even though the dollar 
amount is large. 
Thus, it may be that the concern about costs voiced by the 
Twombly Court is somewhat exaggerated. The Federal Judicial 
Center’s preliminary study regarding attorneys’ experiences with 
discovery and related matters sheds an interesting light on the 
question of cost; it indicates that expenditures for discovery, including 
attorneys’ fees, in the surveyed matters amounted to between 1.6 and 
3.3 percent of the total value at stake in the litigation.255 Although the 
significance of these numbers may be debated and the research to 
date has not explored the depths of what needs to be analyzed, they 
certainly do not seem to be the litigant-crushing figures Twombly 
indicated they might be. After all, real estate brokers (and others) 
charge a higher percentage for their services. 
Although discovery can be enormously expensive in a small 
percentage of federal cases, Twombly and Iqbal have stated a 
pleading rule that burdens all cases based on what may be happening 
in a small fraction of them. For the great body of litigation, 
Twombly’s and Iqbal’s cure may be counterproductive and worse 
than the supposed disease. As the Judicial Center’s work product 
indicates, anecdotal evidence of cost, delay, and abuse can depart 
widely from the reality experienced by most litigants.256 
Other aspects of the Center’s study are sobering: overall 
satisfaction with the pretrial process is higher and discovery costs 
appear more reasonable than the apocalyptic rhetoric has suggested. 
A majority of survey respondents disagreed with the idea that 
“discovery is abused in almost every case in federal court.”257 By and 
large, survey respondents were satisfied with the current levels of case 
management,258 and over half reported that the costs and extent of 
discovery were the “right amount” in proportion to the economic and 
 
 255. LEE & WILLGING, supra note 203, at 2. Admittedly these numbers are dependent on 
what it meant by the value at stake and on the accuracy of the recollections about expenses of 
the surveyed attorneys. 
 256. Id. at 27, 35–41. 
 257. Id. at 71. 
 258. Id. at 67–68. 
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substantive law values involved in their cases.259 Some surveys of 
lawyer impressions on these matters are somewhat at variance with 
the Judicial Center’s findings, however,260 which only emphasizes the 
need for further work. 
Not only are claims of excessive litigation costs questionable, but 
there is also no litmus test to identify extortionate settlements or 
measure how frequently they occur. Indeed, the wide range of factors 
that motivate settlements make assertions about extortion extremely 
speculative.261 It is reasonable to assume that litigation cost is a factor 
that may encourage or induce one or more parties to settle in some 
cases. Similarly, litigation cost is a factor that may discourage a citizen 
from asserting a potentially meritorious claim at all. 
Even more elusive are the benefits that accrue to society as a 
result of discovery that furthers the private enforcement of important 
public policies (some statutorily or constitutionally based), promoting 
deterrence, increasing oversight, providing transparency, and 
avoiding the expenditures that otherwise might be needed to support 
government bureaucracies.262 The diminution of these benefits 
 
 259. Compare id., with AM. BAR ASS’N SECTION OF LITIG., supra note 56, at 145 (citing 
discovery costs as a very important factor when attorneys decide whether to settle a matter). 
The Federal Judicial Center also has issued another study identifying the factors associated with 
higher litigation costs and confirming that very predictable causes are dominant. LEE & 
WILLGING, supra note 203, at 1–6. 
 260. See, e.g., AM. BAR ASS’N SECTION OF LITIG. ET AL., SUMMARY COMPARISON OF BAR 
ASSOCIATION SUBMISSIONS TO THE DUKE CONFERENCE REGARDING THE FEDERAL RULES 
OF CIVIL PROCEDURE § 3 (2010), available at http://civilconference.uscourts.gov/LotusQuickr/ 
dcc/Main.nsf/$defaultview/0F0CC2092ECAAEE2852577130049EBDD/$File/ABA%20Section
%20of%20Litigation%2C%20Comparison%20of%20Duke%20Conference%20Recommendat
ions.pdf (discussing various legal organizations’ proposed changes and additions to rules 
governing pre-litigation discovery). 
 261. Nonetheless, the speculation is repeated. For example, in William O. Gilley Enterprises 
v. Atlantic Richfield Co., 588 F.3d 665 (9th Cir. 2009), in the course of affirming the dismissal of 
an entity’s claim, the court remarked, “this is the type of ‘in terrorem increment of the 
settlement value’ that the Supreme Court mentioned in Twombly.” Id. at 668 (quoting Bell Atl. 
Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 558 (2007)). Ironically, the fact that only a small percentage of 
legally cognizable injuries—private or public—are ever the subject of litigation (or any form of 
remediation) goes comparatively unnoticed. Perhaps the more significant problem is 
underenforcement, not hyperactivity or meritless litigation. 
 262. It has been suggested that the plausibility standard may encourage manufacturers to 
hide evidence, thereby impairing the incentives state tort actions generally provide to improve 
product safety. William Funk, Thomas McGarity, Signey Shapiro & James Goodwin, 
Plausibility Pleading: Barring the Courthouse Door to Deserving Claimants 1–19 (Ctr. for 
Progressive Reform, White Paper No. 1005, May 2010), available at 
http://www.progressivereform.org/articles/Twombly_1005.pdf. 
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represents a “cost” to society. Unfortunately, the empirical work 
done so far on the expense of litigation, including the submissions to 
the Duke Conference, only explores one side of the cost-benefit 
equation. 
In addition, the costs incurred by plaintiffs are noted 
infrequently; indeed, they are not discussed anywhere in Twombly, 
Iqbal, or the empirical studies presented at the Duke Conference.263 
But they are no less important from a policy-formation perspective. 
As already noted, the defense bar and its clients are not always 
innocent victims of frivolous litigation or abusive conduct; indeed, 
defense attorneys—who usually are compensated by the hour at 
rather handsome levels and paid contemporaneously—frequently 
protract pretrial processes for various reasons, including to enhance 
their fees, to avoid reaching trial (particularly jury trial), and to 
coerce contingent-fee lawyers, who often have cash-flow difficulties 
and resource limitations, into settlement.264 The different litigation 
economics of the respective parties and the prospect of early 
termination encourage resource-consumptive practices by defendants 
in many situations.265 Given the present environment, contingent-fee 
lawyers usually must expend large amounts of time and money to 
 
 263. The closest the Court came in Twombly to discussing the plaintiffs’ costs is when it 
found that “it is one thing to be cautious before dismissing an antitrust complaint in advance of 
discovery.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 558. The Court alluded to the potential cost of throwing out a 
claim before discovery. After that, it only discussed the burdens of allowing a claim to proceed 
to discovery that would be imposed on a defendant. The Court in Iqbal only discussed the costs 
imposed on defendants: “The basic thrust of the qualified-immunity doctrine is to free officials 
from the concerns of litigation, including ‘avoidance of disruptive discovery.’” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 
129 S. Ct. 1937, 1953 (2009) (quoting Siegert v. Gilley, 500 U.S. 226, 236 (1991) (Kennedy, J., 
concurring)). 
 264. The existing studies of federal litigation costs do not break them down sufficiently to 
determine what portion is attributable to excessive activity by plaintiffs, particularly with regard 
to discovery requests (occasionally referred to as “pushing”), and which portion is attributable 
to defendants’ motion practice and resistance to plaintiffs’ attempted discovery (occasionally 
referred to as “tripping”). Although the effects of hourly billing are adverted to in general 
terms, no attempt has been made to calibrate them. 
 265. In Twombly, the plaintiff sought to limit the scope of the initial discovery and proposed 
a phasing approach—a proposal that ultimately was rejected by the Court. Twombly, 550 U.S. at 
593 (Stevens, J., dissenting). At oral argument, counsel for the plaintiff made it clear that the 
first phase of discovery would be limited to the conspiracy claim, which would be followed by a 
summary judgment motion that would establish the claim’s plausibility or terminate the case. 
Transcript of Oral Argument at 54, Twombly, 550 U.S. 554 (No. 05-1126) (statement of Mr. 
Richards), available at http://www.supremecourtus.gov/oral_arguments/argument_transcripts/ 
05-1126.pdf. 
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develop a case of any complexity before instituting litigation. This 
often requires the retention of experts and investigators. Expenses 
mount as plaintiffs must fend off sequential complicated pretrial 
motions, including some that could terminate the case or necessitate 
an interlocutory appeal.266 These financial realities, which relatively 
few plaintiffs’ firms can surmount, plus judicial scrutiny and the 
deterrent effect of possible sanctions, strongly discourage them from 
undertaking a sizable matter lacking a significant factual or legal 
underpinning.267 
The efforts of contingent-fee lawyers are not free goods; they 
have value and must be husbanded. For the reasons just noted, 
rational plaintiffs’ attorneys are very cost- and time-conscious. To 
avoid expenditures that may never be reimbursed and to prevent the 
loss of potentially more attractive alternative professional 
opportunities, they generally avoid marginal motions and screen 
potential cases using their own version of plausibility before taking on 
matters. Nor do contingent-fee lawyers want to conduct unnecessary 
depositions or be inundated with documents or e-discovery to hunt 
for the proverbial “smoking gun.” These restraints have become 
increasingly important as summary judgment has been invoked and 
granted more freely; they will become even more pronounced with 
the added burdens of Twombly and Iqbal and a growing awareness of 
the high dismissal rate in many substantive contexts. As a result, it 
will be harder for plaintiffs to find representation, even for potentially 
meritorious claims. Additionally, prospective plaintiffs and their 
attorneys will have to expend greater resources investigating claims 
prior to filing in the hope of being able to plead enough to survive 
 
 266. See Carl Tobias, Civil Justice Reform and the Balkanization of Federal Civil Procedure, 
24 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 1393, 1422 (1992) (discussing the difficulties for “attorneys and litigants who 
possess less money, time, and information”). 
 267. Two academic writers have argued that the unavailability of effective legal services, 
which they believe has been magnified by Twombly and Iqbal, falls most heavily on what one 
calls “social out-groups,” see A. Benjamin Spencer, Essay, The Restrictive Ethos in Civil 
Procedure, 78 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 353, 361–62, 366–70 (2010), and the other refers to as “the 
vanishing plaintiff,” by which she means those who have been marginalized by various social 
and economic factors, see Brooke D. Coleman, Vanishing Plaintiff 1 (2010) (unpublished 
manuscript) (on file with the Duke Law Journal). See generally Gillian K. Hadfield, Exploring 
Economic and Democratic Theories of Civil Litigation: Differences Between Individual and 
Organizational Litigants in the Disposition of Federal Civil Cases, 57 STAN. L. REV. 1275, 1312–
22 (2005) (“The more likely explanation rests in . . . symbolic differences in the nature and 
organization of the legal representation of individual and organizational litigants.”). 
MILLER IN FINAL 9/15/2010 11:50:51 AM 
68 DUKE LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 60:1 
under the higher standard. This again means that some meritorious 
claims never will be brought, leaving certain injured plaintiffs 
uncompensated, because prospective litigants or their counsel may 
not have—or be willing to risk—the resources needed to investigate 
sufficiently prior to institution to survive a motion to dismiss. 
Consequently, they will never gain access to critical information held 
by possible defendants or third persons.268 
In some instances, what this means is that contingent-fee lawyers 
may bear a larger burden of unreimbursed costs as they investigate 
more grievances but then decide that the risks appear too great to 
institute cases that they fear will then be dismissed on the complaint. 
All of this must be viewed against the palpable disparity in the legal 
services available to individual plaintiffs and institutional defendants. 
As a practical matter the Supreme Court simply has transferred some 
of the expenses typically borne on the right side of the “v.” to the left 
side in the form of imposing higher costs for entering and surviving in 
the system. And the question remains unanswered: to what extent 
does this inhibit individuals from asserting their rights and cause 
collateral damage to various other system values? 
Whereas the Twombly Court refers to the possibility that 
plaintiffs can extort settlements from defendants through threats of 
expensive discovery,269 there is no recognition in the opinion that the 
combination of economic costs of a more demanding pleading regime, 
increased grants of motions to dismiss, and summary judgment 
barriers may skew downward plaintiffs’ valuations of their claims. A 
plaintiff’s pretrial bargaining position is related directly to the 
probability of gaining access to merit discovery and making the threat 
of trial realistic. Both are diminished by the post-Twombly and Iqbal 
magnification of pretrial disposition opportunities for defendants,270 
 
 268. See Stephen J. Choi, The Evidence in Securities Class Actions, 57 VAND. L. REV. 1465, 
1472–73, 1499 (2003) (discussing the chilling effect of discovery reforms on meritorious 
litigation). Finding “confidential witnesses” and “whistleblowers” is now part of a plaintiff 
attorney’s preinstitution job description. 
 269. Twombly, 550 U.S. at 558–59. This and related theses are debunked in Charles Silver, 
“We’re Scared to Death”: Class Certification and Blackmail, 78 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1357 (2003). 
 270. “Similarly, the denial of a defendant’s motion for summary judgment may give the 
defendant an incentive to make a reasonable settlement offer, rather than face the risk and 
expense of going to trial.” EDWARD J. BRUNET, MARTIN H. REDISH & MICHAEL A. REITER, 
SUMMARY JUDGMENT: FEDERAL LAW AND PRACTICE 325–26 (2d ed. 2000); see also Samuel R. 
Gross & Kent D. Syverud, Getting to No: A Study of Settlement Negotiations and the Selection of 
Cases for Trial, 90 MICH. L. REV. 319, 320 (1991) (“More important, the nature of our civil 
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potentially obliging plaintiffs to settle earlier and for less than the 
merits of their cases otherwise might dictate. If settlements are 
procured because the system can be employed to wear one side down, 
that is its own form of extortion. 
If research and analysis is to address litigation cost and delay 
intelligently, the totality of party expenses, consumption of system 
resources, and diminution of societal benefits must be understood. 
Again questions abound. Realistically, which private and public costs 
can be ameliorated? By what procedural approach—heightened 
pleading, dispositive Rule 12(b)(6) or Rule 56 motions, effective 
judicial case management, or some combination of them—might 
these costs be reduced? And which techniques better serve the “just, 
speedy, and inexpensive” triad of objectives set out in Federal 
Rule 1? 
Appraising the system overall, it is unclear that aggressive Rule 
12(b)(6) and Rule 56 filtration will reduce costs in the segment of 
cases that use discovery extensively. The savings achieved by early 
termination may not offset the increased costs likely to be incurred as 
a result of more extensive preinstitution activities and fact-based 
pleading, the increased number of dismissal and summary judgment 
motions, and, potentially, the increased number of appeals from 
judgments following early terminations. Increased pretrial 
dispositions generate their own time and resource expenditures that 
have not been measured. One can assume that not only will the two 
motions be made with greater frequency but that adversarial combat 
over them will intensify, ultimately consuming more litigant and court 
time than in the past. Expanding on that theme, when a Rule 12(b)(6) 
motion is granted, the plaintiff is likely to seek leave to replead,271 and 
the resulting skirmishes about that and collateral Rule 15 amendment 
matters will generate their own expenditures. Should judgment be 
entered following a denial of leave to replead or following a final 
dismissal of the amended pleading when leave has been granted, 
 
process drives parties to settle so as to avoid the costs, delays, and uncertainties of trial, and, in 
many cases, to agree upon terms that are beyond the power or competence of courts to 
dictate.”). 
 271. See 5A WRIGHT & MILLER, supra note 3, § 1357 (“Rule 12(b)(6) generally is not 
immediately final or on the merits because the district court normally will give the plaintiff leave 
to file an amended complaint to see if the shortcomings of the original document can be 
corrected.”). 
MILLER IN FINAL 9/15/2010 11:50:51 AM 
70 DUKE LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 60:1 
appeals also will generate expenses.272 Similar questions have been 
raised about the supposed savings from the Supreme Court’s three 
1986 decisions enhancing the summary judgment motion.273 
Calculating party, systemic, and societal costs is not an easy task, 
but a thoughtful analysis that takes account of all the litigation 
players and expense elements—as well as the consumption and 
allocation of judicial and other public resources—is necessary to 
reach a reasoned conclusion about the heft of the cost and delay 
problems. The research efforts undertaken by the Federal Judicial 
Center are to be applauded, and one hopes they will be continued 
with a much more embracive field of vision so that even more 
sophisticated data is generated and other inquiries undertaken to 
understand these matters. Without these efforts, dramatic changes in 
federal practice will continue to be made in an information vacuum 
that obscures the true costs of litigation and the net gain—or loss—
produced by elevated-pleading and pretrial-motion practice. 
Beyond the difficulty of capturing the necessary data, it is even 
harder to monetize the soft, qualitative values of citizen access to the 
federal courts, merits adjudication, and the multifarious benefits of 
private enforcement of public policies. Again, for example, no one 
knows how to put a dollar figure on the societal loss when a 
meritorious discrimination, consumer-fraud, or antitrust case is 
terminated prematurely or never is instituted because of the deterrent 
effect of today’s more stringent pleading and motion regime. And, of 
course, no one knows how many cases fitting those descriptions exist. 
 
 272. Some commentators have suggested that the Twombly-Iqbal plausibility standard will 
consume more time and expense and lead to more appeals. See McMahon, supra note 76, at 868 
(“The Supreme Court may have thought it was providing relief to the federal docket by making 
it easier to dismiss complaints, but that will not be the result. Instead, district courts will have to 
entertain more motions to dismiss from defendants emboldened by Twombly, and they will 
spend more time deciding those motions.”); see also Jason Bartlet, Into the Wild: The Uneven 
and Self-Defeating Effects of Bell Atlantic v. Twombly, 24 ST. JOHN’S J. LEGAL COMMENT. 73, 
109 (2009) (discussing how dismissals with prejudice under the Twombly pleading standard may 
increase cost and delay in contravention of its intended purpose). 
 273. For a discussion of the need to investigate the claims of cost savings resulting from a 
more powerful summary judgment motion, see Miller, supra note 32, and see also Samuel 
Issacharoff & George Loewenstein, Second Thoughts About Summary Judgment, 100 YALE L.J. 
73 (1990); D. Theodore Rave, Note, Questioning the Efficiency of Summary Judgment, 81 
N.Y.U. L. REV. 875 (2006). See generally Keith N. Hylton, When Should a Case Be Dismissed? 
The Economics of Pleading and Summary Judgment Standards, 16 SUP. CT. ECON. REV. 39 
(2008) (applying an economic framework to the choice between pleading and summary 
judgment as points at which a claim can be dismissed). 
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What is known is that these matters have not been accorded 
meaningful attention. Given the current state of procedural flux and 
its direction, a wide-angle evaluation of the pretrial process must 
replace today’s telescopic focus on the burdens on defendants. That 
seems a necessary precursor for developing balanced and workable 
solutions. In light of the faulty premises of Twombly and Iqbal, 
perhaps the implementation of those cases and further procedural 
change should wait until far more knowledge is acquired and 
analyzed.274 
C. The Importance of Access to the Courts, Deterrence, and the 
Private Enforcement of Public Policies 
The Court’s establishment of plausibility pleading, with its 
emphasis on the need for factual allegations, has a direct impact on 
the accessibility of the federal courts to the citizenry in all categories 
of cases. To a degree not yet determined, it will chill a potential 
plaintiff’s or lawyer’s willingness to institute an action. And even if 
one is started, it will result in some possibly meritorious cases being 
terminated under Rule 12(b)(6), thereby reducing citizens’ ability to 
employ the nation’s courts in a meaningful fashion. Even though 
some federal judges may have deviated from notice pleading in the 
years preceding Twombly, those cases do not reflect the design of the 
pleading-and-motion structure promulgated in 1938, or the one 
described by the Supreme Court in Conley and the several other 
Supreme Court cases that followed it, or the one applied by most 
federal courts for decades after the Conley decision. And insisting on 
more pleading detail—on pain of dismissal—is not consistent with the 
view of American courts as democratic institutions committed to the 
resolution of civil disputes on their merits in an egalitarian, 
transparent fashion. Nor are pleading barriers consistent with the 
view that the federal courts are instruments for the private 
enforcement of public law and policy, an objective that appears to 
have been in eclipse—or at least in the shadows—in recent years.275 
What seems to be increasingly overlooked is that the modes of civil 
 
 274. At this juncture a moratorium of this type probably requires congressional 
intervention. See discussion infra Part III.C. 
 275. See Robert J. Lazarus, Advocacy Matters Before and Within the Supreme Court: 
Transforming the Court by Transforming the Bar, 96 GEO. L.J. 1487, 1531–32 (2008). 
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procedure are the mechanisms for operating an important societal 
regulatory system. 
Many of the cases on federal court dockets involve purely private 
matters that do not affect anyone other than the actual parties—the 
simple automobile fender-bender or breach of contract dispute being 
paradigms. But many of these cases have stare decisis value. Very 
significantly, many also have important deterrent implications, as in 
the product-defect and pharmaceutical fields. An excellent 
illustration of this therapeutic effect is provided by a report based on 
responses from the risk managers of 232 major American 
corporations regarding their litigation and legal cost experience: 
As a management function, product liability remains a part-time 
responsibility in most of the responding firms. Where product 
liability has had a notable impact—where it has most significantly 
affected management decisionmaking—has been in the quality of 
the products themselves. Managers say products have become safer, 
manufacturing procedures have been improved, and labels and use 
instructions have become more explicit.276 
In this category of purely private litigation, Twombly and Iqbal 
probably have had a negative impact on citizen access and the 
deterrent value of enforcing the substantive law effectively. These 
effects of the two decisions in private cases were not acknowledged 
by the Court; indeed, the expressions of concern in the majority 
opinions about costs, extortionate settlements, and burdens placed on 
governmental officials suggest these matters did not weigh heavily in 
the thinking of those Justices who joined in them. The Court’s 
preoccupation with the supposed deleterious effects of litigation on 
defendants may well reflect or be a by-product of the early-
termination mentality of significant segments of the federal judiciary 
that has developed in the last quarter century. 
Standing on a different footing are the myriad federal cases that 
have wider application because of either the range of persons directly 
or indirectly affected, or the nature of the underlying conduct at issue. 
These include a significant array of matters—such as actions involving 
constitutional, federalism, and other core systemic principles; federal 
 
 276. Nathan Weber, Product Liability: The Corporate Response (Conf. Bd., Rep. No. 893, 
1987), as reprinted in 133 CONG. REC. 20,169 (1986). See generally Gary T. Schwartz, Reality in 
the Economic Analysis of Tort Law: Does Tort Law Really Deter?, 42 UCLA L. REV. 377 (1994) 
(reviewing empirical studies of tort law efficacy). 
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statutes; governmental conduct; and judicially created private rights 
of action—that can have significant public consequences. Many class 
and mass actions fall into this category. Indeed, in some respects 
these cases represent a very significant aspect of the contemporary 
civil workload of the federal courts. This category is not limited to 
disputes arising under federal law. On the diversity-of-citizenship side 
of federal court dockets,277 or sometimes as a result of the availability 
of supplemental subject matter jurisdiction,278 there are numerous 
state law claims—often substantively parallel to federal claims—
raising important public policy issues of state law that are heard in the 
federal courts. 
If Twombly and Iqbal inhibit the assertion or prematurely 
dispose of claims of this character, then the new pleading-and-motion 
regime operates at cross-purposes with the enforcement of policies 
the federal court system is intended to support. To be sure, in the 
context of judicially created public and private rights and remedies, 
federal courts have considerable latitude in defining and redefining 
their contours and the conditions for their assertion. But even in these 
categories, it seems inappropriate for the Court to have restricted the 
effective assertion of those rights by altering the pleading burden and 
the motion to dismiss in the name of protecting defendants from 
hypothesized litigation costs and possible settlement pressures 
without any acknowledgement of the impact that restriction might 
have on the policy objectives at issue in the litigation.279 
The cases that warrant the greatest concern and consideration 
after Twombly and Iqbal are those that advance a statutorily 
authorized, private compensatory regime and those that are designed 
to have a regulatory effect by rectifying or stopping activity 
proscribed by a federal statute or federal common law.280 These 
 
 277. See 28 U.S.C. § 1332 (2006). The scope of these actions was enhanced by the 
federalization of the bulk of class actions by the Class Action Fairness Act of 2005. Id. 
§§ 1332(d), 1453. 
 278. Id. § 1367. 
 279. The policy objectives were antitrust enforcement in Twombly and remediation of 
possible constitutional violations by high-ranking government officials in Iqbal. 
 280. The private enforcement of public policy seems to have its roots in the legislative 
recognition of qui tam actions. False Claims Act, 31 U.S.C. § 3730 (2006). The development of a 
public-interest bar seeking social change through litigation was traced to the Supreme Court’s 
seminal desegregation decision, Brown v. Board of Education, 247 U.S. 483 (1954), in Stephen 
C. Yeazell, Brown, The Civil Rights Movement, and the Silent Litigation Revolution, 57 VAND. 
L. REV. 1975, 1977–84 (2004). The author goes on to argue that Brown also motivated the 
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provisions often represent a constitutional or congressional 
determination that private civil actions are necessary for one or more 
well-understood reasons—for example, securing deterrence; 
providing compensation for injured citizens; and addressing concerns 
that the relevant regulators lack sufficient resources, or may have 
come under the influence of those they are supposed to regulate, or 
have fallen into a period of inattention, desuetude, or worse.281 The 
private enforcers—appropriately dubbed private attorneys 
general282—are effectuating public policy. In a sense, it is a form of 
privatized regulation of commercial and governmental conduct. 
Congress intended that these plaintiffs and the issues they raise be 
given a meaningful day in federal court. 
The private enforcement model is not without its critics. 
Encouraging self-interested clients and their lawyers to pursue the 
public interest risks promoting bounty hunting. And the propriety of 
leaving the formation of public policy to private litigants and episodic 
judicial decisionmaking, rather than to public regulatory agencies, 
 
deregulation of the bar, for example, by recognizing a lawyer’s constitutional right to advertise, 
which then led to what he sees as the “reconstitution of the plaintiffs’ bar” and the growth of a 
cadre of lawyers seeking a more profitable practice by “combin[ing] strands of self- and public 
interest.” Id. at 1988; see also Abram Chayes, The Role of the Judge in Public Law Litigation, 89 
HARV. L. REV. 1281 (1976) (arguing that adjudication and civil procedure can usefully be 
analyzed as elements of a larger system of public regulation); Funk, McGarity, Shapiro & 
Goodwin, supra note 262, at 8–9 (describing Twombly’s impact on plaintiffs harmed by 
unregulated products and activities). 
 281. Consider the report that a number of SEC officials spent hours watching and 
downloading pornography on government computers before and during the financial system’s 
recent crisis. See, e.g., Nico Hines, Wall St Regulators Spent Hours Watching Porn Instead of 
Monitoring Crisis, TIMES ONLINE (Apr. 23, 2010), http://www.timesonline.co.uk/tol/news/ 
world/us_and_americas/article7106889.ece. Even more recently there has been a strong 
suggestion that the ecological disaster caused by an oil release in the Gulf of Mexico can be 
traced to various forms of inattention and misconduct by personnel of the federal Minerals 
Management Service of the Department of the Interior. Thus, there are proposals to reorganize 
that agency “to end a decades-old relationship between industry and government that has 
proved highly profitable—and some say too cozy—for both.” John M. Broder, U.S. to Split Up 
Agency Policing the Oil Industry, N.Y. TIMES, May 12, 2010, at A1. 
 282. The designation appears to have its origin in Associated Industries of New York v. 
Ickes, 134 F.2d 694, 704 (2d Cir. 1943). See generally Michael L. Rustad, Smoke Signals from 
Private Attorneys General in Mega Social Policy Cases, 51 DEPAUL L. REV. 511 (2001) 
(highlighting the predictive effect of private attorneys general); Richard B. Stewart & Cass A. 
Sunstein, Public Programs and Private Rights, 95 HARV. L. REV. 1193 (1982) (discussing the 
role of private citizens to hold government entities accountable). 
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may be questionable.283 But for several reasons, heightened pleading 
rules applicable to all cases are not an appropriate solution to 
possible private-enforcement hyperactivity. First, the points raised by 
the critics have limited or no relevance to the public interest bar. 
Second, in many, if not most, instances the plaintiff and his or her 
lawyer are acting out of a complex mixture of public and private 
motivations that are hard to quantify or separate, but their efforts 
have a social value.284 Third, federal judges, through case 
management, control of attorneys’ fees, and their obligation to 
evaluate settlements in many situations can sand off the rough edges 
of the practice. And, fourth, in many contexts the loss of private 
enforcement will result in little or no enforcement of important public 
policies. 
The characteristics of many of these private enforcement regimes 
are prescribed by Congress or state legislatures, often in terms of the 
perceived importance of the policies to be protected and often to 
incentivize private actors and their lawyers to invest in the litigation 
process. Thus, special rules of standing, evidence, burdens of proof, 
and limitations periods may be formulated and defenses eliminated to 
facilitate an enforcement action.285 For example, to make utilization of 
certain statutory rights of action economically feasible, Congress 
often provides fee awards for—and occasionally offers multiple 
damages to—a successful plaintiff, in order to encourage contingent-
fee attorneys and the public interest bar to take up the cudgels.286 
 
 283. See generally John C. Coffee, Rescuing the Private Attorney General: Why the Model of 
the Lawyer as Bounty Hunter Is Not Working, 42 MD. L. REV. 215 (1983) (discussing incentive 
problems within the private–attorney general system); Bryant Garth, Ilene N. Nagel & S. Jay 
Plager, The Institution of the Private Attorney General: Perspectives from an Empirical Study of 
Class Action Litigation, 61 CALIF. L. REV. 353 (1988) (reviewing empirical data concerning 
private attorneys general); Trevor W. Morrison, Private Attorneys General and the First 
Amendment, 103 MICH. L. REV. 589 (2005) (analyzing constitutional questions associated with 
suits by private attorneys general). 
 284. See generally William B. Rubenstein, On What a “Private Attorney General” Is—and 
Why it Matters, 57 VAND. L. REV. 2129 (2004) (recognizing a spectrum of private attorneys 
general, each of which mixes public and private functions in particular ways). 
 285. See generally Sean Farhang, Public Regulation and Private Lawsuits in the American 
Separation of Powers System, 52 AM. J. POL. SCI. 828 (2008) (providing examples of structural 
accommodation of policy attempts to address larger problems through citizen suits). 
 286. See id. See generally Hannah L. Buxbaum, The Private Attorney General in a Global 
Age: Public Interests in Private International Antitrust Litigation, 26 YALE J. INT’L L. 219, 223 
(2001) (noting that the 1976 Antitrust Improvements Act authorized treble damages to plaintiffs 
and included a fee-shifting provision); Frances Kahn Zemans, Fee Shifting and the 
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Conversely, Congress occasionally imposes restraints on private 
actions to prevent excessive activity by the private bar, as it did in 
enacting the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act in 1995. 
Although several of these private rights of action are long 
standing,287 such as the qui tam aspects of the False Claims Act of 
1863,288 they blossomed and multiplied in the second half of the 
twentieth century in response to the civil rights movement and a 
number of the other pressures of that period, many of which were 
designed to further social and economic equality and fairness. Each of 
them is an expression by Congress of its intent to promote the private 
enforcement of national policies.289 A great number of these statutes 
were enacted against the backdrop of the liberal ethos of the Federal 
Rules—especially their simplified notice pleading as prescribed by 
Rule 8(a)(2) and the Supreme Court’s construction of it in Conley, 
limited grants of motions to dismiss, relatively uninhibited discovery, 
and highly restrained summary judgment practice. The willingness of 
citizens to mobilize to enforce their legal rights obviously depends 
upon the receptivity of the process available for doing so. Congress 
presumably well understood that. But the last quarter century has 
radically changed the landscape. As Judge Patrick E. Higginbotham 
has observed, 
Recent events have laid bare the consequences of under-
enforcement of federal regulatory schemes. It seems odd to now 
impede their efficacy. Rather, control of access to discovery as a step 
back from the underpinnings of the 1938 rules must be balanced to 
serve the role of private attorneys general litigation. That is, a gate 
must be able to screen by merit. Perhaps we could move toward an 
 
Implementation of Public Policy, 47 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 187, 195–96 (Winter 1984) 
(noting that fee shifting is mandatory under the Interstate Commerce Act and the Clayton Act, 
and that courts have regularly exercised their discretion to implement fee shifting under Title II 
and Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964). 
 287. See, e.g., Clayton Antitrust Act of 1914, 15 U.S.C. § 15 (2006); Interstate Commerce 
Act of 1887, ch. 104, 24 Stat. 379 (codified in scattered sections of 49 U.S.C.). 
 288. False Claims Act (Lincoln Law), 31 U.S.C. §§ 3729–3733 (2006), amended by Fraud 
Enforcement and Recovery Act of 2009, Pub. L. No. 111-21, 123 Stat. 1617. 
 289. An excellent illustration is the Civil Rights Attorneys’ Fee Awards Act of 1976, Pub. L. 
No. 94-559, 90 Stat. 2641 (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 1988 (2006)). The Act was Congress’s reaction 
to the decision in Alyeska Pipeline Service Co. v. Wilderness Society, 421 U.S. 240 (1975), which 
reaffirmed the American rule, leaving litigation costs where they fall absent a congressional 
authorization to shift fees in a private attorney general context. See S. REP. No. 94–1011, at 1, 4–
6 (1979), as reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5908, 5911–13. 
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initial opening to limited discovery followed by a look at likely merit 
for greater or full access.290 
The inhibiting effect of Twombly and Iqbal, combined with the 
economic realities discussed in the preceding Section, significantly 
reduce the pool of potential enforcers of federal public policies 
through civil litigation seeking personal compensation.291 
Although it must be recognized that the federal procedural 
system is, as it must be, constantly evolving and that the federal 
judiciary, including the Justices of the Supreme Court, are entrusted 
with the interpretation and application of the Federal Rules, the 
shortfall of Twombly and Iqbal is the Court’s failure to acknowledge 
the potential those decisions have to impair meaningful access to the 
federal courts. This is especially worrisome in cases involving 
important issues—such as constitutional values and the private 
enforcement of federally and state-created rights—and the 
concomitant shift in the allocation of the litigation-resource burden 
from defendants to plaintiffs these two decisions produce. The result 
is likely to operate in derogation of effectuating rights and policy 
norms established by Congress and state legislatures.292 As Judge 
Higginbotham intimates, the problem today may well be under-
enforcement not over-enforcement. 
D. The Need for Further Research and Definition 
Given the various competing values at stake, and accepting the 
need for some form of continuing judicial gatekeeping or filtration, a 
question remains: what is the best mechanism for achieving that 
objective—pleadings, motion practice, summary judgment, or case 
 
 290. Patrick E. Higginbotham, The Present Plight of the United States District Courts, 60 
DUKE L.J. (forthcoming Dec. 2010) (manuscript at 6–7) (on file with the Duke Law Journal). 
 291. One author argues persuasively that these inhibiting factors fall most heavily on various 
groups of marginalized Americans, whose claims—if they could be addressed—would be most 
suited to perform the regulatory function of civil litigation. She believes that the new restrictive 
procedural ethos, particularly with regard to pleading, deprives society of the social utility of 
those claims. Coleman, supra note 267, at 1. 
 292. The significant drop in employment discrimination cases and the high rate of dismissal 
of civil rights cases noted by some must, to some degree, reflect the chilling effect of the 
procedural restrictions in recent years. See, e.g., Access to Justice Denied: Ashcroft v. Iqbal: 
Hearing Before the Subcomm. on the Constitution, Civil Rights, and Civil Liberties of the H. 
Comm. on the Judiciary, supra note 53; Schneider, supra note 44, at 531 (pointing out that the 
Court changed the pleading standards without any action from Congress); Mary Pat Gallagher, 
Where Have all the Employment Cases Gone?, NAT’L L.J., Oct. 6, 2008, at S19. 
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management? No one knows, and the question cannot be answered 
rationally—let alone with confidence—without a great deal of study. 
And even after that is done, reactions to the subject and any resultant 
changes may be the product of intuition, philosophy, or self-interest 
as much as they may be the result of research. But the latter is 
essential. 
The Court’s dramatic shift in attitude regarding judicial 
management in Twombly reflects the current divergence in 
philosophy on how district courts can best handle the pretrial process. 
With Twombly, the Court wiped the slate clean, starting anew with 
plausibility pleading as the system’s initial gatekeeper, rather than 
building on the existing tools of case management and the more 
vigorous post-1986 summary judgment motion. But change of that 
magnitude should have been based on a much greater understanding 
of the implications of the tectonic shift that has occurred in the 
character of federal civil litigation and procedural practices in recent 
decades, and on much more clarity about the utility of pleading 
practice and the actual quality of pretrial management. Data of a 
highly sophisticated character need to be gathered and analyzed to 
determine what the deficiencies of these techniques are, and what 
they are not.293 Who was closer to the mark, Justice Souter in 
Twombly or Justice Breyer dissenting in Iqbal? 
Despite the Rules Committee’s, the Supreme Court’s, and 
Congress’s pre-Twombly endorsement of case management as an 
appropriate method to contain cost and delay, a few commentators 
have argued that case management is doomed to fail on both 
theoretical and practical grounds.294 Practical objections reflect the 
 
 293. Asking for impressions about whether litigation is “too expensive” or “takes too long” 
is of little value, because few, if any, attorneys would say the process is “inexpensive” or “not 
long enough.” See, e.g., AM. BAR ASS’N SECTION OF LITIG., supra note 56; AM. COLL. OF TRIAL 
LAWYERS, supra note 54, at 17. For sharp criticism of the conclusions and principles drawn from 
the second of the cited surveys, calling them not supported by the survey results, see J. Douglas 
Richards & John Vail, A Misguided Mission to Revamp the Rules, TRIAL, Nov. 2009, at 52. 
 294. See Bone, supra note 52, at 900–01 (suggesting that Twombly’s skepticism about case 
management might be justified). See generally Judith Resnik, Managerial Judges, 96 HARV. L. 
REV. 376 (1982) (arguing that case management was not proven to be effective and that it may 
harm the standards of impartial adjudication and hinder constitutional rights such as due-
process safeguards). In JAMES S. KAKALIK, TERENCE DUNWORTH, LAURAL A. HILL, DANIEL 
MCCAFFREY, MARIAN OSHIRO, NICHOLAS M. PACE & MARY E. VAIANA, RAND INST. FOR 
CIVIL JUSTICE, AN EVALUATION OF JUDICIAL CASE MANAGEMENT UNDER THE CIVIL 
JUSTICE REFORM ACT (1996), the authors reported little effect on time and cost but did 
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view that judicial resources are limited and assert that some district 
judges spend little time managing cases or are insufficiently energetic 
in maintaining the district court’s involvement.295 Indeed, 
management is said to be left largely in the hands of magistrate judges 
in many instances.296 Philosophical objections range from a view that 
the function of judges is to adjudicate, not manage, to a concern 
about a loss of judicial impartiality and the possible deleterious 
effects judicial management may have on aspects of the adversarial 
system.297 Despite these criticisms, the managerial role of federal 
judges has been reaffirmed and expanded over the years and judicial 
involvement is deemed useful—if not essential—by practicing 
litigators.298 
Judge Easterbrook’s 1989 article—the basis for Justice Souter’s 
rejection of judicial management in favor of plausibility pleading in 
Twombly—contended that it would be impossible for judges to 
separate abusive discovery from extensive and “impositional”299 
 
conclude that certain management procedures could reduce time to disposition by 30 percent 
with no adverse effects. 
 295. See Paul Stancil, Balancing the Pleading Equation, 61 BAYLOR L. REV. 90, 96–97 (2009) 
(“The Rules permit, but do not require[,] that judges take an active role in case management, 
and judges and litigants have economic and social incentives to minimize judicial participation. 
As a result, courts tend to involve themselves only infrequently in the day-to-day administration 
of cases.”). 
 296. See Richard A. Posner, Coping with the Caseload: A Comment on Magistrates and 
Masters, 137 U. PA. L. REV. 2215, 2216 (1989) (“Abuse there is, but it is more likely to occur in a 
case supervised by a district judge, whose primary responsibilities lie in trying cases and 
managing—somehow—a huge docket, than in a case supervised by a magistrate, whose most 
challenging and responsible task is, precisely, to manage discovery in big civil cases.”). 
 297. See, e.g., Resnik, supra note 294, at 376–78 (“[T]he restraints that formally 
circumscribed judicial authority are conspicuously absent. Managerial judges frequently work 
beyond the public view, off the record, with no obligation to provide written, reasoned opinions, 
and out of reach of appellate review.”); see also Swanson v. Citibank, N.A., No. 10-1122, 2010 
WL 2977297, at *10 (7th Cir. July 30, 2010) (Posner, J., dissenting in part) (discussing the 
difficulty of managing discovery when much of the process is delegated to magistrate judges 
who “can have only an imperfect sense of how widely the district judge would want the factual 
inquiry . . . to roam”). See generally Michael E. Tigar, Pretrial Case Management Under the 
Amended Rules: Too Many Words for a Good Idea, 14 REV. LITIG. 137 (1994) (arguing that 
unwise case management harms the adversarial process). 
 298. See supra notes 205–43 and accompanying text. 
 299. See Easterbrook, supra note 226, at 637–38 (“Stated differently, an impositional request 
is one justified by the costs it imposes on one’s adversary rather than by the gains to the 
requester derived from the contribution the information will make to the accuracy of the 
judicial process.”). 
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discovery requests made by attorneys practicing in good faith.300 He 
concluded that “[j]udges can do little about impositional discovery 
when parties control the legal claims to be presented and conduct the 
discovery themselves.”301 
Although some contemporary critics of case management 
continue to cite Judge Easterbrook’s theoretical assumptions,302 there 
has been little research conducted that confirms his conclusions, let 
alone research that systematically measures the amount or 
consequences of any management shortfall.303 Even less effort has 
been devoted to exploring and explaining how today’s judicial 
management practices might be enhanced. Moreover, the article is 
now more than twenty years old. Its publication preceded the effects 
of the revolution in summary judgment practice, the narrowing 
amendments to the discovery rules, the district court expense-and-
delay plans, the local management rules that have emerged following 
the Civil Justice Reform Act, the great growth in consciousness about 
case management throughout the profession, the extensive control 
over discovery now commonly exercised by district judges, and the 
traction and sophistication the art of management has achieved under 
the 1983 and 1993 amendments of Rule 16 and the sequential editions 
of the Manual.304 It also preceded the growth in extremely complex 
litigation involving numerous new technologies and scientific 
developments, as well as electronic discovery. These phenomena 
seem to call for more—and better—judicial management, not less. 
Justice Souter’s reliance on that article simply is not persuasive, 
 
 300. Id. at 641 (“Lawyers practicing in good faith, therefore, engage in extensive discovery; 
anything less is foolish. . . . Indeed, many lawyers do not know whether their own discovery 
requests are proper or impositional; it is almost impossible to tell one from the other, and both 
are in the interests of the lawyer’s client.”). 
 301. Id. at 638. Note that this is the same passage cited in Twombly to justify the 
disparagement of case management. 
 302. See, e.g., Martin H. Redish, Electronic Discovery and the Litigation Matrix, 51 DUKE 
L.J. 561, 602 (2001) (“Even were it feasible to prevent all abusive discovery costs—an all-but-
impossible task—the costs inherent in discovery would be inescapable.” (citing Easterbrook, 
supra note 226, at 642)); Stancil, supra note 295, at 97–100. 
 303. The articles cited in the preceding notes do not refer to any empirical data that 
validates Judge Easterbrook’s conclusion. Moreover, the only evidence cited in his article 
concludes that discovery abuse may be a problem. This data do not seem relevant to a 
discussion that already has concluded that assumption is true. 
 304. For some indication of the widespread use of case management, see LEE & WILLGING, 
supra note 203, at 11–12. 
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especially since the new pleading standard established in Twombly 
and Iqbal is not limited to discovery-rich cases.305 
Absent any real evidence, both the supporters and critics of case 
management rely heavily on ideology, which colors their views about 
how to improve the civil justice system’s pretrial process. Little has 
been done to research the efficacy of judicial management through 
sophisticated studies of what district courts actually do, what works, 
and what does not.306 Anecdotal evidence, assumptions, and theory 
are not enough to validate the drastic changes that have been made to 
the process of determining the sufficiency of a complaint and related 
motions; they do not make credible what the Court wrote in Twombly 
and Iqbal. This subject should be evaluated in light of comprehensive, 
intelligent, and dispassionate information regarding the costs and 
challenges of civil litigation. This exploration must go well beyond 
simply surveying the impressions and attitudes of participants if the 
rulemakers are to achieve a satisfactory balance of efficiency, access, 
and quality. Fortunately, considerable progress on the research front 
is being made.307 
In addition to analyzing discovery and management, which 
clearly are inseparable from pleading and motion practice, it would 
be desirable, if possible, to reach a common understanding of what is 
meant by “abusive” or “excessive” discovery and “frivolous” 
litigation.308 These words are uttered in a mantra-like fashion in 
litigation cost and delay discussions. Yet despite their abundant 
recitation, it is unclear what they embrace. Does abusive discovery 
refer to almost all discovery, as the Easterbrook article may have 
 
 305. See discussion supra notes 115–17. 
 306. One commentator has asserted that there is no “reliable” empirical data about the 
ability of trial judges to curb discovery problems. Robert G. Bone, Who Decides? A Critical 
Look at Procedural Discretion, 28 CARDOZO L. REV. 1961, 1989 (2007). 
 307. In addition to the studies by the Federal Judicial Center, the American Bar Association 
Section of Litigation, the New York State Bar Association, and the American College of Trial 
Lawyers referred to in the notes in this article, numerous other studies by the Center, state 
organizations, other bar association groups, and academics are underway. For examples of these 
studies, see supra note 67. 
 308. These and related words were used repeatedly by speakers at the Duke Conference 
with no attempt to articulate a frame of reference or define their meaning. See generally Suja A. 
Thomas, Frivolous Cases, 59 DEPAUL L. REV. 633 (2010) (concluding that references to 
“frivolous cases” distract from effective discussion of costs and rights). 
MILLER IN FINAL 9/15/2010 11:50:51 AM 
82 DUKE LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 60:1 
suggested?309 If so, then the term basically is meaningless. Or is it 
abusive only when the plaintiff uses the discovery procedures as a 
“fishing expedition” or requests irrelevant information merely to 
pressure the defendant and extort a settlement? Are frivolous cases 
those “with no ‘reasonably founded hope that the [discovery] process 
will reveal relevant evidence?’”310 Or is the category broader than 
that? And what about the infrequently mentioned frivolous or 
abusive behavior on the defense side—dilatory motions, harassing 
discovery demands, or noncompliance with legitimate discovery 
requests—designed to delay progress toward trial and to consume the 
typically limited resources of contingent-fee plaintiffs’ lawyers? 
Attrition is all too often a strategy of choice.311 And why isn’t all of 
this a matter for the sanction structure, the discovery regime, or more 
effective judicial oversight rather than a burden on the pleading and 
related motion rules? The answer proffered by Twombly and Iqbal 
seems to reflect a policy of early termination über alles. 
I spent a great deal of time during the first six months of my 
tenure as Reporter for the Advisory Committee on Civil Rules 
participating in bar association meetings and judicial conferences, 
asking attendees what they thought constituted abusive discovery and 
frivolous litigation—phenomena I had been informed were at the 
heart of the litigation cost and delay problem that the Committee was 
trying to counteract. At times I felt like Diogenes with a lamp looking 
for an honest opinion. Although no single, generally agreed-upon 
standard emerged from these discussions, there were two nearly 
universal themes in the various explanations and examples I heard. 
First, frivolous litigation is the lawsuit the other side brings against 
one’s client; second, abuse is whatever the opposing counsel does. 
 
 309. See supra notes 299–01 and accompanying text. It is interesting to look at the sentence 
Justice Souter wrote in Twombly to reject the case-management approach. His opinion seems to 
imply that costly discovery and discovery abuse are one and the same:  
It is no answer to say that a claim just shy of plausible entitlement to relief can, if 
groundless, be weeded out early in the discovery process through “careful case 
management,” given the common lament that the success of judicial supervision in 
checking discovery abuse has been on the modest side. 
Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 559 (2007). They are not. 
 310. Twombly, 550 U.S. at 559 (alteration in original) (citation omitted) (quoting Dura 
Pharm., Inc. v. Broudo, 544 U.S. 336, 337 (2005)). Experienced litigators usually have had the 
epiphany of being in cases that initially appeared to be sows’ ears but that proved to be silk 
purses. 
 311. The tobacco litigation is but one example of a campaign of attrition by an industry and 
its lawyers, as is well described in Cabraser, supra note 127, at 18–33. 
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My research methods admittedly were unscientific and the 
foregoing summary of my “findings” somewhat glib. But despite the 
passage of more than thirty years and personal involvement in 
countless federal cases, I have yet to find a more specific or 
illuminating definition of these terms. Although in some instances 
one knows inappropriate litigation behavior when one sees it, wide-
angle consensus on what these terms mean and when they apply may 
well be unobtainable.312 The line between zealous advocacy and 
litigation misbehavior is obscure at best, and we really have no idea as 
to the frequency—or infrequency—of abuse and excessive motion 
and discovery activity.313 Yet cosmic anecdotes flood the Rialto, and 
urban legends constantly are being generated. This is troublesome; 
the alleged phenomena that have driven pretrial policy decisions over 
the past few decades remain largely subjective, unquantified, and 
anecdotal. 
By leaving the notions of abusive discovery and meritless 
litigation undefined in Twombly and Iqbal while simultaneously 
encouraging judges to factor concerns about them into their Rule 
12(b)(6) decisions, the Court has authorized judges to let their own 
views and attitudes regarding these phenomena influence their 
decisionmaking. This virtually unbridled discretion is inappropriate. 
It compounds the subjectivity inherent in the plausibility inquiry. And 
when exercised at the threshold of a case, it may undermine historic 
norms and debilitate the private enforcement of important 
substantive policies, as well as constitutional due process and jury-
trial rights.314 Moreover, it may lead to greater inconsistencies in the 
application of federal law, diminish the predictability of outcomes 
that is critical to an effective civil-dispute-resolution system and the 
confidence people have in it, and increase forum and judge shopping. 
 
 312. See Robert G. Bone, Modeling Frivolous Suits, 145 U. PA. L. REV. 519, 520 (1997) 
(“We know remarkably little about frivolous litigation. Reliable empirical data is extremely 
limited, and casual anecdotal evidence highly unreliable.”). 
 313. See AM. ANTITRUST INST., THE NEXT ANTITRUST AGENDA: THE AMERICAN 
ANTITRUST INSTITUTE’S TRANSITION REPORT ON COMPETITION POLICY TO THE 44TH 
PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES 227 (2009) (characterizing the notion that there is 
“widespread frivolous antitrust litigation” as a “myth”). 
 314. See Resnik, supra note 294, at 427–28 (“Therefore, management becomes a fertile field 
for the growth of personal bias. . . . Nevertheless, neither the Supreme Court, the lower federal 
courts, nor Congress has considered the effect of judicial management on impartiality.”). Since 
the Rule 12(b)(6) motion now acts as a gatekeeper, the greater discretion afforded the district 
judge gives him increased influence over the availability of a meaningful day in court. 
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These are potential consequences—and system costs—that must be 
considered in evaluating the present and future utility of case 
management and its relation to the current state of pleading and 
pretrial motion practice. In short, there is much to be examined. 
III.  THE FUTURE OF RULEMAKING AND THE FEDERAL RULES 
The Supreme Court’s legislative-like decisions in Twombly and 
Iqbal and the 1986 trilogy have caused many to question the 
continuing role of the rulemaking process and its current statutory 
structure. Congress’ delegation to the Court of authority to 
promulgate rules of practice and procedure for the nation’s courts 
through the Rules Enabling Act315 long has been understood to have 
established two principles: first, as the Supreme Court frequently has 
noted, only the rulemaking machinery or an act of Congress can 
change a properly promulgated Federal Rule;316 second, the Federal 
Rules must be general and transsubstantive—they must apply in the 
same way to all types of federal court actions. Twombly and Iqbal 
cast doubt on both of these foundational assumptions. These 
principles, their future, and the role of Congress require some 
exploration. 
A. The Value of the Rulemaking Process 
The Supreme Court repeatedly has expressed its faith in the 
rulemaking process for the better part of a century.317 Forty years ago, 
the Court said, “We have no power to rewrite the Rules by Judicial 
 
 315. 28 U.S.C. § 2072 (2006). 
 316. See Burbank, supra note 143, at 536. 
 317. See Swierkiewicz v. Sorema N.A, 534 U.S. 506, 515 (2002) (refusing to establish a 
heightened pleading standard for employment discrimination suits by judicial interpretation); 
Crawford-El v. Britton, 523 U.S. 574, 595 (1998) (emphasizing that the Court has consistently 
declined to revise established pleading rules); Leatherman v. Tarrant Cnty. Narcotics 
Intelligence & Coordination Unit, 507 U.S. 163, 168–69 (1993) (“Perhaps if Rules 8 and 9 were 
rewritten today, claims against municipalities under § 1983 might be subjected to the added 
specificity requirement of Rule 9(b). But that is a result which must be obtained by the process 
of amending the Federal Rules, and not by judicial interpretation. In the absence of such an 
amendment, federal courts and litigants must rely on summary judgment and control of 
discovery to weed out unmeritorious claims sooner rather than later.”); see also Miller, supra 
note 32, at 1010–11 (summarizing the Court’s refusal to establish heightened pleading standards 
in Leatherman, Crawford-El, and Swierkiewicz). 
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interpretations.”318 Less than a decade prior to Twombly, the Court 
noted that “our cases demonstrate that questions regarding pleading, 
discovery, and summary judgment are resolved most frequently and 
most effectively either by the rulemaking process or the legislative 
process.”319 These sentiments were repeated five years before 
Twombly.320 Then, just five months before Twombly, the Court in its 
unanimous opinion in Jones v. Bock321 stated, 
We are not insensitive to the challenges faced by the lower federal 
courts in managing their dockets and attempting to separate, when it 
comes to prisoner suits, not so much wheat from chaff as needles 
from hay stacks. We once again reiterate, however—as we did 
unanimously in Leatherman, Swierkiewicz, and Hill—that adopting 
different and more onerous pleading rules to deal with particular 
categories of cases should be done through established rulemaking 
procedures, and not on a case-by-case basis by the courts.322 
Critics argue that, with Twombly and Iqbal, the Court may have 
forsaken its long-held commitment to the rulemaking process by 
reformulating the Rules’ pleading and motion-to-dismiss standards by 
judicial fiat.323 These assertions echo much of the criticism directed at 
the Court following its 1986 summary judgment trilogy, when scholars 
complained that the Justices had amended Rule 56 without 
employing the Enabling Act’s procedure.324 Today, even those who 
defend the Court’s “pragmatic” shift away from notice pleading 
 
 318. Harris v. Nelson, 394 U.S. 286, 298 (1969) (noting that the discovery provisions of the 
Federal Rules do not apply to habeas proceedings); see also Amchem Prods. Inc. v. Windsor, 
521 U.S. 591, 620 (1997) (“Courts are not free to amend a rule outside of the process Congress 
ordered . . . .”). 
 319. Crawford-El, 523 U.S. at 595. 
 320. Swierkiewicz, 534 U.S. at 515. 
 321. Jones v. Bock, 549 U.S. 199 (2007). 
 322. Id. at 224. 
 323. See, e.g., Burbank, supra note 52, at 110, 113–14; Schneider, supra note 44, at 531. 
 324. See Miller, supra note 32, at 1029; Jeffrey W. Stempel, A Distorted Mirror: The 
Supreme Court’s Shimmering View of Summary Judgment, Directed Verdict, and the 
Adjudication Process, 49 OHIO ST. L.J. 95, 99, 181–87 (1988) (arguing that changes wrought by 
the trilogy should have been instituted by the Advisory Committee through the amendment 
process, because that process is more public and results in better and more substantial 
information for the profession than unilateral Supreme Court action); see also Nancy Levit, The 
Caseload Conundrum, Constitutional Restraint and the Manipulation of Jurisdiction, 64 NOTRE 
DAME L. REV. 321, 329–30, 360–62 (1989) (discussing changes in the standards for summary 
judgment as one example of courts inserting caseload concerns into the formulation of 
jurisdictional doctrines and, by doing so, treading on the legislature’s territory). 
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acknowledge that Twombly and Iqbal have redefined Rule 8(a)(2) 
and Rule 12(b)(6). The contesting viewpoints are hard to evaluate 
because the boundary between judicially changing a Federal Rule and 
simply interpreting and applying it is one of degree.325 
A significant drawback of amendment by judicial dictate is the 
Supreme Court’s lack of democratic accountability. Whereas the 
rulemakers generally conduct open meetings326 and follow an 
extensive notice-and-comment procedure that allows anyone 
interested some (albeit limited) form of participation,327 the Court’s 
Twombly-Iqbal methodology grants five Justices the power to bypass 
the statutorily established process and “legislate” on important 
procedural matters, often in ways that determine whether litigants 
ultimately will be able to have a meaningful day in court and whether 
important constitutional and congressional mandates and public 
policies are enforced. In addition to its comparatively democratic 
pedigree, the existing rulemaking process provides other advantages, 
such as the Advisory Committee’s superior access to academic studies 
and statistical research. As Professor Stephen B. Burbank points out, 
the Supreme Court is “ill-equipped to gather the range of empirical 
data, and lacks the practical experience, that should be brought to 
bear on the questions of policy, procedural and substantive, that are 
implicated in considering standards for the adequacy of pleadings.”328 
The Justices do not have the time, trial-court experience, or on-the-
 
 325. Although the cases can be distinguished, it might be argued, for example, that the 
Court “amended” the Rules in Amchem Products, Inc. v. Windsor, 521 U.S. 591 (1997) (Rule 
23), and Schiavone v. Fortune, 477 U.S. 21 (1986) (Rule 15). 
 326. 28 U.S.C. § 2073(c)(1) (2006). Meetings were closed during my tenure as Reporter; 
they became open while I was a member of the Committee. The history of that transition has 
been described by my successor as Reporter. See Carrington, supra note 43, at 22–25. 
 327. See Bone, supra note 99, at 884. The rulemaking machinery is in the hands of people 
appointed by the Chief Justice. It has been suggested that opening the Advisory Committee’s 
deliberations has allowed lobbying for various interests to infiltrate and perhaps influence the 
process, raising questions about the extent to which rulemaking is truly democratic. See supra 
note 43. 
 328. Burbank, supra note 143, at 537; see also Bone, supra note 99, at 883–85 (describing the 
comparative advantages of rulemaking by the Advisory Committee); A. Leo Levin & Anthony 
G. Amsterdam, Legislative Control over Judicial Rulemaking: A Problem in Constitutional 
Revision, 107 U. PA. L. REV. 1, 10 (1958) (proposing a balance of power in rulemaking between 
courts and legislatures); Catherine T. Struve, The Paradox of Delegation: Interpreting the 
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 150 U. PA. L. REV. 1099, 1133–36 (2002) (describing the 
comparative advantages of rulemaking by the Advisory Committee); Jack B. Weinstein, Reform 
of Federal Court Rulemaking Procedures, 76 COLUM. L REV. 905, 908 (1976) (same). 
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ground information to evaluate the consequences that procedural 
changes may have on private enforcement of substantive law or what 
alternative enforcement mechanisms should be established if 
litigation pathways are impaired. 
Considering the Court’s current ideological makeup and the 
continuing trend toward increasingly early case disposition, 
rulemaking by judicial mandate does not bode well for many of those 
policies that are furthered by private enforcement and the access 
principle. The members of the Advisory Committee therefore must 
determine whether they will reassert their role as independent 
architects of the Federal Rules, accept that an aspect of their 
responsibility now may be to codify the Court’s Federal Rule 
decisions, or simply remain silent and defer to case development. 
This question becomes especially important in light of the 
difficulties that arise when the Court announces piecemeal procedural 
revisions in the context of a case’s particular facts, rather than on the 
basis of a holistic appraisal of the effects that changes in a Rule’s 
interpretation might have on the application of other Rules and on 
the tremendous array of variegated matters that appear on federal 
court dockets. One commentator, for example, has described how 
plausibility pleading conflicts with several other Rules, most notably 
Rules 8(f), 9(b), 11(b), and 12(e).329 And perhaps other parts of Rule 
8, Rule 15(a), and the Forms should have been added to the list.  
This is an important point: at least in certain respects, the Court’s 
Twombly and Iqbal holdings may have eclipsed the established 
operation of one or more of these Rules, some of which have 
provided safeguards for ensuring that plaintiffs are given an 
opportunity to plead or replead potentially meritorious claims. The 
two decisions raise concerns that, instead of enabling plaintiffs to 
correct their pleadings when deemed factually insufficient—for 
example, by amendment under Rule 15, by pleading alternatively or 
inconsistently as permitted by Rule 8(d),330 or by pleading on 
information and belief within the boundaries of Rule 11(b)—the 
 
 329. See Spencer, supra note 108, at 469–72. 
 330. See Btesh v. City of Maitland, Fla., No. 6:10-cv-71-Orl-19DAB, 2010 WL 2639562, at *5 
n.4 (M.D. Fla. June 29, 2010) (holding that for pleading in the alternative, only one alleged 
theory need be plausible to survive a motion to dismiss). 
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motion to dismiss may be employed to dispose of claims the court 
believes should be disfavored.331 
Under the Twombly-Iqbal pleading standard, the role that other 
pretrial Rules will play in future cases is uncertain. For instance, 
although the Court denied creating a heightened pleading standard 
for substantive areas not mentioned in the first sentence of Rule 
9(b),332 it is difficult to understand how that proposition will operate in 
practice; the distinction between the demand for “particularity” in 
Rule 9(b)—an express heightened pleading provision—and the 
Court’s insistence on a “showing” of “factual sufficiency” under 
Twombly seems imperceptible.333 Moreover, even though the second 
sentence of Rule 9(b) allows conditions of mind, including knowledge 
and intent, to be alleged “generally,” Twombly and Iqbal required 
specific factual allegations on issues of precisely this character—
namely, conspiracy334 and purposeful discrimination.335 
And it is unclear how the forgiving and “justice”-seeking 
amendment policy of Rules 15(a) and 15(b) will function in a 
plausibility-pleading environment. It seems unlikely that the Court 
intended to diminish the force of Rule 15; the Supreme Court’s 
decisions do not speak to the subject. There is reason to believe that 
most district courts will continue to give the Rule 15(a)(2) words “the 
court should freely give leave when justice so requires” the liberal 
 
 331. See Miller, supra note 32, at 1016 (“Surveys confirm that judges view prompt rulings on 
summary judgment and Rule 12(b)(6) motions as the most effective procedural devices for 
filtering out frivolous litigation.” (citing Elizabeth C. Wiggins, Thomas E. Willging & Donna 
Stienstra, The Federal Judicial Center’s Study of Rule 11, FJC DIRECTIONS, Nov. 1991, at 3, 20 
tbl.11)). 
 332. Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 554, 570 (2007). 
 333. See SEC v. Tambone, 597 F.3d 436, 442 (1st Cir. 2010) (clarifying that Rule 9(b) 
requires, beyond Rule 8, the pleading of “time, place, and content . . . with specificity”). It is 
unclear how this interpretation of Rule 9 differs from the requirements for Rule 8 set forth in 
Twombly. The Twombly majority, in addition to affirming the validity of what is now Form 11’s 
specification of places, dates, and times, suggested the antitrust conspiracy complaint in that 
case did not provide adequate notice because it “mentioned no specific time, place or person 
involved in the alleged conspiracies.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 565 n.10; see also 5 WRIGHT & 
MILLER, supra note 3, § 1216. However, in Starr v. Sony BMG Music Entertainment, 592 F.3d 
314 (2d Cir. 2010), the court suggested that facts related to time, place, or the specific 
individuals involved are necessary to satisfy Rule 8 only if the other factual allegations do not 
provide notice. Id. at 325; see also Hollander v. Etymotic Research, Inc., No. 10-526, 2010 WL 
2813015, at *6 (E.D. Pa. July 14, 2010) (finding allegations might meet Rule 8 standards, but not 
Rule 9(b)). 
 334. Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555–56. 
 335. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. 1937, 1947–54 (2009). 
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application those courts have accorded that language in the past and 
not interpret Twombly and Iqbal as requiring a tightened application 
of that passage.336 Once again, sounding a pragmatic note, there are 
potential litigation cost and delay consequences to these amendment 
questions. If Rule 15 does survive unscathed, the growing number of 
dismissal-motion grants will generate additional amendment requests 
and grants of leave to replead, and in many instances a second motion 
to dismiss following that repleading. On the other hand, if the 
application of Rule 15 is narrowed, more judgments following Rule 
12(b)(6) dismissals will be entered and additional appeals from 
denials of dismissals and leave to replead are likely to result. 
In sum, if the principles articulated in Twombly and Iqbal are to 
be retained, either with or without formal Rule amendment, the 
remaining Rules will have to be canvassed—including Rule 84, as well 
as the supposedly sufficient practice Forms that Rule authorizes337—to 
determine whether corrective textual steps are necessary to restore 
the overall coherence of the pleading and pretrial motion rules. But 
before either engaging in that process or codifying the Court’s two 
decisions, which might not prove to be a simple task, one should step 
back and seriously assess the Rules’ fundamental principles and 
objectives. The subject’s importance warrants that. 
 
 336. Preliminary research has shown that several courts have continued to grant leave to 
replead liberally after Twombly-Iqbal. E.g., Lewis-Burke Assocs. LLC v. Widder, No. 09-302 
(JMF), 2010 WL 2926161, at *6–7 (D.D.C. July 28, 2010); Dupris v. McDonald, Nos. 08-8132-
PCT-PGR, 08-8133-PCT-PGR, 2010 WL 231548, at *6 (D. Ariz. Jan. 13, 2010); see also Krainski 
v. Nevada ex rel. Bd. of Regents, No. 08-17523, 2010 WL 2991397, at *8 (9th Cir. Dec. 3, 2010) 
(Fletcher, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (disagreeing with the majority’s finding 
that the plaintiff could not produce any new facts to save the complaint and, therefore, the 
district court’s denial of leave to amend was an abuse of discretion). This does not contradict—
and if anything, it supports—the potential cost consequences referred to previously. See supra 
notes 121–22 and accompanying text. Cases have appeared, however, in which the court has 
denied leave to replead on the ground that doing so would be “futile.” See, e.g., Cieniawa v. 
White, No.1:09-CV-2130, 2010 WL 2766170, at *5 (M.D. Pa. July 13, 2010); In re Young, 428 
B.R. 804, 827 (Bankr. N.D. Ind. Jan. 21, 2010). Similar questions arise as to the future of Rule 
11(b)(3), which allows court papers to be signed on the basis that “factual contentions” will have 
support “after a reasonable opportunity for further investigation or discovery.” See generally 5A 
WRIGHT & MILLER, supra note 3, § 1335 (noting the elements and application of the standard 
of certification under Rule 11). 
 337. See Elan Microelecs. Corp. v. Apple, Inc., No. C 09-01531 RS, 2009 WL 2972374, at *2 
(N.D. Cal. Sept. 14, 2009) (noting the difficulty of “reconcil[ing]” Form 18 with Twombly and 
Iqbal); see also supra notes 154–57 and accompanying text. 
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B. The End of Transsubstantivity? 
In addition to establishing the rulemaking process, the Rules 
Enabling Act’s provision for “prescrib[ing] general rules of practice 
and procedure”338 means that the Federal Rules should be “uniformly 
applicable in all federal district courts [and] uniformly applicable in 
all types of cases.”339 The concept is based on the principle that the 
Federal Rules should operate evenhandedly across the substantive 
universe, be framed in uncomplicated, general terms, and be applied 
in the same fashion for all litigants. This philosophy was consistent 
with the desire to keep the original Federal Rules textually simple 
and value neutral as much as possible.340 Because the mission of 
procedural rulemaking has been thought to be to help execute the 
policy choices made by others, the theory is that substance-specific 
rules should be generated by those other institutions and processes. 
Under the tenets of transsubstantivity, the general application of 
Rule 8’s pleading principles and the motion rules should not vary with 
the substantive law controlling a particular claim.341 Thus, Rule 9 
governs the only contexts in which pleading principles different from 
those prescribed by Rule 8 can be applied;342 it stands as a formal 
exception to the transsubstantivity rule. Accordingly, in Swierkiewicz, 
the Supreme Court rejected heightened pleading standards in 
 
 338. 28 U.S.C. § 2072 (2006). 
 339. Burbank, supra note 143, at 536. For a discussion of the 1935 Advisory Committee’s 
commitment to the transsubstantive quality of the Federal Rules, see id. at 541–42. See generally 
Robert G. Bone, Making Effective Rules: The Need for Procedural Theory, 61 OKLA. L. REV. 
319, 324 (2008) (discussing transsubstantivity as underlying the Federal Rules of Civil 
Procedure’s “distinctive features”); Robert M. Cover, For James Wm. Moore: Some Reflections 
on a Reading of the Rules, 84 YALE L.J. 718, 719 (1975) (describing the early English-law 
principle of transsubstantive rules); Geoffrey C. Hazard, Jr., Discovery Vices and Trans-
substantive Virtues in the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 137 U. PA. L. REV. 2237, 2244–47 
(1989) (describing the social benefit of transsubstantivity); David Marcus, The Past, Present, and 
Future of Trans-Substantivity in Federal Procedure, 59 DEPAUL L. REV. 371, 375 (2010) 
(arguing that only legislatures should engage in substance-specific rulemaking). 
 340. See generally 4 WRIGHT & MILLER, supra note 3, § 1029 (3d ed. 2002) (describing the 
purpose and construction of the Federal Rules). 
 341. See Paul D. Carrington, Making Rules to Dispose of Manifestly Unfounded Assertions: 
An Exorcism of the Bogy of Non-Trans-Substantive Rules of Civil Procedure, 137 U. PA. L. REV. 
2067, 2067–69 (1989); Spencer, supra note 108, at 457. 
 342. See generally 5A WRIGHT & MILLER, supra note 3, §§ 1291–1315 (describing the details 
and application of Rule 9). Aside from Rule 9, the notion of heightened pleading for actions 
thought to be “disfavored” presumably would have been anathema to the drafters of the 
original Rules. 
MILLER IN FINAL 9/15/2010 11:50:51 AM 
2010] A DOUBLE PLAY ON THE FEDERAL RULES 91 
employment discrimination cases and reaffirmed the status of the 
Federal Rules as general rules.343 And the same standards 
theoretically apply to all motions to dismiss and to all motions for 
summary judgment.344 
With Twombly and Iqbal, it is quite possible that the Court 
implicitly abandoned or compromised its devotion to the 
transsubstantive character of the Rules.345 True, the Court did state 
that the enhanced pleading standard will govern all civil actions, and 
the cases therefore can be thought of as establishing a “general” rule. 
But the Court also indicated that the principle is to be applied 
contextually. Thus far, it has applied plausibility pleading only to two 
atypical actions in substantive contexts in which several lower courts 
previously had advanced heightened pleading—antitrust and 
governmental discrimination claims.346 By way of counterpoint, as 
noted earlier, the Court insisted in Twombly that Form 9—now Form 
11—would continue to suffice for negligence pleading.347 If that holds 
true, plausibility may be transsubstantive in name only. In practice, 
some form of the preexisting notice pleading may survive for simpler, 
run-of-the-mine actions. But a universe of different applications of 
plausibility pleading may emerge in other substantive and complexity 
environments. This distinction in the standard’s application based on 
context, a note sounded by Justice Kennedy in the Iqbal opinion,348 
would mean that although the transsubstantivity concept would be 
preserved as a generic or overarching principle,349 divergent 
 
 343. Swierkiewicz v. Sorema N.A., 534 U.S. 506, 512 (2002). As previously discussed, at least 
one panel of the Third Circuit has concluded that Swierkiewicz is a victim of Twombly and 
Iqbal, although other courts have expressed a different view. See supra notes 113–17 and 
accompanying text. 
 344. See supra notes 30–31, 59–60 and accompanying text. 
 345. See Burbank, supra note 143, at 555–56. 
 346. It appears that the Court may have sanctioned the establishment of a hierarchy of 
actions, with a bias toward fairly stringent gatekeeping in three types of cases: disfavored 
actions, like libel or slander; actions that threaten to disrupt government functioning; and “mega 
cases” that impose large financial burdens on defendants. See supra note 52. 
 347. Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 554, 565 n.10 (2007); see also Xpoint Techs., Inc. 
v. Microsoft Corp., Civ. No. 09-628-SLR, 2010 WL 3187025, at *3 (D. Del. Aug. 12, 2010) 
(finding the complaint for patent infringement was sufficient because it mimicked Form 18). 
 348. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. 1937, 1953–54 (2009). 
 349. See Bone, supra note 52, at 890–91 (arguing that Twombly’s plausibility standard is in 
line with the rule drafters’ “pragmatic commitment to making procedure an efficient means to 
enforce the substantive law accurately”); see also Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. at 1950. See generally Epstein, 
supra note 52, at 62 (defending Twombly as a mini-summary judgment). 
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applications would be tolerated in different situations.350 But that is a 
curious form of preservation and ultimately might lead to the 
development of special pleading rules for various substantive areas. 
Viewed realistically, the substance behind the catechism of 
transsubstantivity actually may have been discarded in all but name 
long before Twombly and Iqbal; its continued existence certainly has 
been a subject of academic debate.351 In practice, many lower courts 
applied heightened factual pleading requirements in a variety of 
substantive areas—such as antitrust, discrimination, securities law, 
and suits against governmental officials—despite the Court’s repeated 
references to Conley and notice pleading.352 A system that accepts a 
three-page complaint for a negligence claim and effectively requires a 
one-hundred-page complaint for an antitrust suit hardly can be 
described as applying a uniform pleading standard, even if the 
articulated formula is the same. Moreover, the vast reservoir of 
judicial discretion in the application of the Federal Rules, coupled 
with the restraints on appellate review imposed by the final-judgment 
rule,353 probably undermines the transsubstantivity principle. 
 
 350. See Apps Commc'ns, Inc. v. S2000, Corp., No. 10 C 1618, 2010 WL 3034189, at *1 (N.D. 
Ill. Aug. 3, 2010) (stating that courts should “take into consideration the complexity of the case 
when addressing whether a complaint alleges sufficient facts”). Compare Limestone Dev. Corp. 
v. Village of Lemont, 520 F.3d 797, 803 (7th Cir. 2008) (“In a complex antitrust or RICO case a 
fuller set of factual allegations than found in the sample complaints in the civil rules’ Appendix 
of Forms may be necessary . . . .”), with Wiek v. Keane, No. 09 CV 920, 2010 WL 1976870, at *4 
(N.D. Ill. May 12, 2010) (holding that because the Fourth Amendment case was not as factually 
complex as Twombly or Iqbal, the pleading standard was not as high). 
 351. Mullenix, supra note 43, at 829 n.176 (citing Carrington, supra note 341, at 2067–69 
nn.1–7; Cover, supra note 339, at 732–40); Gene R. Shreve, Eighteen Feet of Clay: Thoughts on 
Phantom Rule 4(m), 67 IND. L.J. 85, 92 (1991). See generally Marcus, supra note 339 (discussing 
the history and current adherence to transsubstantivity); Schneider, supra note 44 (describing 
the disparate application of plausibility pleading to employment discrimination and civil rights 
cases); Carl Tobias, The Transformation of Trans-Substantivity, 49 WASH & LEE L. REV. 1501 
(1992) (recounting several statutory exceptions to transsubstantivity). 
 352. See, e.g., E. Food Servs., Inc. v. Pontifical Catholic Univ. Servs. Ass’n, 357 F.3d 1 (1st 
Cir. 2004) (antitrust); Gonzalez v. Reno, 325 F.3d 1228 (11th Cir. 2003) (suit against the INS); 
see also Fairman, supra note 37, at 1110–58 (observing heightened pleading standards for 
several other types of cases); Fairman, supra note 1, at 617–19 (same); Marcus, supra note 37, at 
482 (criticizing trial judges who would decide dismissals on instinct); Tobias, supra note 351, at 
1502 (citing environmental suits as a statutory exception to transsubstantivity). 
 353. 28 U.S.C. § 1291 (2006). See generally 15A–B CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT, ARTHUR R. 
MILLER & EDWARD H. COOPER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE: JURISDICTION AND 
RELATED MATTERS §§ 3905–3919.10 (2d ed. 1992) (discussing the history and application of the 
final-judgment rule). 
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There is additional evidence that the bloom is off the 
transsubstantivity rose. Rule 6(b), for example, authorizes the 
extension of time for doing an act in most situations but not in certain 
others, and Rule 16 provides judges with extensive discretion to 
manage cases on a differential basis depending on, among other 
factors, the complexity of the issues involved.354 In the discovery 
arena, Rule 26(a)(1)(B) exempts certain classes of cases from the 
mandatory disclosure requirements.355 And there are the two special 
pleading provisions in Rule 9(b) as well as elsewhere in Rule 9.356 In a 
related—although legislative—vein, the Civil Justice Reform Act of 
1990 produced a plethora of different district court expense and delay 
plans that are inconsistent in many respects and depart from the 
Federal Rules and with each other in various ways.357 Similarly, local 
rules and many individual judges’ standing orders magnify the 
procedural differences from case to case, judge to judge, and district 
to district. Thus it seems obvious that not all cases are treated alike by 
the federal courts, despite any ongoing aspirational devotion to 
transsubstantivity. At this point, therefore, it may be necessary to 
decide whether to reaffirm the principle, transmogrify it, or expressly 
abandon it. If the time has come to retire transsubstantivity, the 
 
 354. For example, Rule 16(c)(2)(L) encourages courts to consider “adopting special 
procedures for managing potentially difficult or protracted actions that may involve complex 
issues, multiple parties, difficult legal questions, or unusual proof problems.” FED. R. CIV. P. 
16(c)(2)(L). Some local rules call for “systematic differential case management” tailored to each 
individual case based on “complexity, time required to prepare a case for trial, and availability 
of judicial and other resources.” N.D.N.Y. R. 16.1. Congress clearly disregarded the notion of 
transsubstantivity in creating super-heightened pleading and sanction rules under the PSLRA 
for private securities fraud litigation; that legislation, of course, is not governed by the Rules 
Enabling Act, 28 U.S.C. §§ 2071–2077 (2006). 
 355. For a number of years, Rule 26(a)(1)(B) empowered each district to decide whether to 
apply the provision. Many opted out of mandatory disclosure, creating a substantial 
inconsistency of application. For a discussion of the history of the mandatory disclosure 
requirement, see infra note 433. 
 356. See FED. R. CIV. P. 9(c), (g). Several of the Court’s pre-Twombly decisions intimate 
that differential pleading standards could be established through the rulemaking process, a 
notion that is inconsistent with the assumed meaning of the Enabling Act’s reference to 
“general rules.” See, e.g., Jones v. Bock, 549 U.S. 199, 224 (2007); Leatherman v. Tarrant Cnty. 
Narcotics Intelligence & Coordination Unit, 507 U.S. 163, 168–69 (1993). 
 357. See generally Tobias, supra note 266 (noting the divergent district court procedures 
following the Civil Justice Reform Act); supra notes 216–17 and accompanying text. 
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possibilities for doing so are obvious—it can be done judicially, 
legislatively, or by benign neglect.358 More of that below.359 
C. Dealing With Twombly and Iqbal: A Return to the Rulemaking 
Process or Resort to Legislation? 
The Supreme Court’s bypass of the rulemaking process in 
Twombly raises the question: what is the purpose of today’s elaborate 
statutory process, given the Court’s willingness to revise important 
aspects of the Rules on its own rather than follow its existing 
precedents? If Twombly and Iqbal take us toward an era in which the 
role of formal rulemaking is reduced in part to deciding whether to 
codify the Court’s Rule-related decisions, it would be an unfortunate 
turn of events. Given the Justices’ dependence on the small number 
of procedural issues that reach the Court, they necessarily function 
reactively and their rulemaking inevitably is interstitial. Moreover, 
Court intervention would deprive the rulemaking process of the 
special competencies and experience bases typically found on the 
Advisory Committee and at other stages of Rule revision.360 The 
membership of these groups has been distinguished and dedicated 
over the years. The better approach, I think, would be for the 
Advisory Committee to take a “business-as-usual” approach. 
Although atypical pleading contexts were before the Court in both 
Twombly and Iqbal, the latter said plausibility applied to all cases. 
Thus, perhaps the two opinions should be read as an informal signal 
to the rulemaking bodies that a reexamination of pleading and 
pretrial-motion practice is in order. That would enable the 
rulemaking committees to proceed pursuant to their usual 
procedures, paying heed, of course, to the concerns the Court 
expressed. 
 
 358. See generally Cover, supra note 339, at 738–40 (arguing that allowing courts to have the 
ability to modify existing rules would not “destroy the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure nor 
violate some notion of separation of powers”). Given the significant deviations from 
transsubstantivity noted in text, that principle offers no justification for Iqbal’s extension of 
Twombly to all civil actions. There was no consensus at the Duke Conference on the question of 
whether transsubstantivity should be preserved. 
 359. See infra notes 448–78 and accompanying text. 
 360. The Committee is composed of federal trial and appellate judges; experienced federal 
practitioners; and an occasional academic, state court judge, or Department of Justice 
representative. A law professor who specializes in federal procedure serves as the Reporter. 
When effectively composed, the members have a wide range of viewpoints and professional 
backgrounds and might be thought of as an all-star team of seasoned proceduralists. 
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The Advisory Committee understandably has difficulty second-
guessing the Court’s decisions, let alone turning away from them, 
especially when they reflect a particular judicial mindset.361 Yet it is 
important to remember that Committee members are expected to 
exercise independent judgment, that they have the power to depart 
from existing Rule-related precedents in making proposals, and that 
the Court ultimately may accept the rulemakers’ decisions. Further 
study and inquiry into the validity of the assumptions underlying 
Twombly and Iqbal, as well as a full exploration of all the relevant but 
potentially countervailing policies, may arm the Committee and the 
Judicial Conference with a perspective and knowledge base that were 
unavailable to the Court. Given the importance of the issues under 
discussion, a lesser effort would be unfortunate. 
There are several avenues that can be taken. The Advisory 
Committee may codify Twombly and Iqbal and rewrite Rule 8(a)(2), 
in which event corresponding amendments to the other pretrial rules 
affected by the decisions might be necessary.362 Or the rulemakers 
may wish to await judicial developments and the emergence of a 
 
 361. An attempt to revise Rule 56 to take account of the Supreme Court’s 1986 summary 
judgment trilogy eventually went nowhere. According to the then-Reporter, 
the argument that seemed to prevail in the Standing Committee against the revision 
of Rule 56 was that it would be inappropriate for our committees to be trespassing on 
a lawmaking role that the high Court had appropriated for itself. I was not the only 
person present who was resistant to a notion that seemed to be misplaced modesty 
and deference by those to whom Congress had assigned the role of disinterested 
drafting of procedural law for its non-partisan approval. 
Carrington, supra note 43, at 62. This reluctance to depart from Supreme Court decisions is 
understandable since sitting federal judges comprise a significant portion of the membership of 
the relevant committees and the entirety of the Judicial Conference. 28 U.S.C. § 331 (2006). See 
generally Brooke D. Coleman, Recovering Access: Rethinking the Structure of Federal Civil 
Rulemaking, 39 N.M. L. REV. 261, 292–96 (2009) (discussing the structure and composition of 
the civil-rulemaking process and proposing changes). 
 362. In a white paper submitted to the Duke Conference, a group of organizations 
representing defense interests purport to “codify” Twombly and Iqbal by proposing that Rule 
8(a)(2) require “a short and plain statement, made with particularity, of all material facts known 
to the pleading party that support the claim, creating a reasonable inference that the pleader is 
plausibly entitled to relief.” Lawyers for Civil Justice, DRI—The Voice of the Def. Bar, Fed’n 
of Def. & Corporate Counsel & Int’l Ass’n of Def. Counsel, Reshaping the Rules of Civil 
Procedure for the 21st Century: The Need for Clear, Concise, and Meaningful Amendments to 
Key Rules of Civil Procedure, at x (May 2, 2010) (unpublished white paper) (emphasis omitted), 
available at http://civilconference.uscourts.gov/LotusQuickr/dcc/Main.nsf/$defaultview/ 
888E977DFE7B173A8525771B007B6EB5/$File/Reshaping%20the%20Rules%20for%20the%2
021st%20Century.pdf?OpenElement. In reality, that language is far more demanding than the 
Supreme Court’s decisions and the language advanced in other proposals. Indeed, the proposal 
amounts to a reversion to code, if not common law, pleading. 
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corpus of experience at the trial and appellate levels while 
commissioning the several empirical analyses that are needed.363 The 
latter approach might be criticized by some as an abdication of the 
Committee’s responsibility or creating a risk that events will overtake 
revision efforts that should be undertaken now. Finally, the 
rulemakers can bring Conley’s pure-notice-pleading philosophy out of 
“retirement,” with—but probably without—the hyperbolic “no-set-
of-facts” formulation.364 There is support for that approach in several 
quarters.365 
An imponderable in appraising these possibilities is the extent to 
which Congress will participate in the formation of policy on this 
subject. The legislative pot has been stirred. Shortly after Iqbal was 
decided, various interest groups—including civil rights and consumer 
advocates—began pressing for congressional action.366 Amidst these 
efforts came the proposed Notice Pleading Restoration Act of 2009,367 
introduced in the Senate by Senator Arlen Specter. The bill seeks to 
accomplish exactly what its title suggests. Formal hearings were held 
by the Committee on the Judiciary on December 2, 2009,368 and 
various constituencies provided input in the following months.369 In 
March 2010, Senator Sheldon Whitehouse circulated for discussion a 
potential substitute bill that enumerates a number of congressional 
findings, emphasizes that the proposed substitute legislation presumes 
 
 363. The Duke Conference focused on many of the problems under discussion. That 
conference, plus several studies undertaken by the Federal Judicial Center, were designed to 
expand the Advisory Committee’s knowledge base and identify areas of possible consensus. 
None was reached at the Conference regarding Twombly and Iqbal 
 364. For further discussion of Conley, see supra notes 3–5, 59–62 and accompanying text. 
 365. See, e.g., Burbank, supra note 143, at 547–53 (“In such garden-variety cases, I suggest, a 
pleading that provides sufficient notice to survive a Federal Rule 12(e) motion should also 
survive a motion under Federal Rule 12(b)(6) if its nonconclusory allegations, taken as true, and 
any inferences reasonably drawn from them, tell a plausible . . . story of liability.”); Clermont & 
Yeazell, supra note 52, at 856–59 (discussing methods of bringing back notice pleading through 
either an amendment to the Federal Rules or through congressional action). 
 366. See Tony Mauro, Groups Unite to Keep Cases on Docket: Plaintiff’s Lawyers Seek to 
Stop Dismissals After Iqbal Decision, NAT’L L.J., Sept. 21, 2009, at 1 (noting that civil rights 
groups, consumer groups, and trial lawyers attempted to fight the Iqbal decision). 
 367. S. 1504, 111th Cong. (2009). Several law professors have been providing assistance to 
the Senate staff. 
 368. Has the Supreme Court Limited Americans’ Access to Courts?: Hearing Before the S. 
Comm. on the Judiciary, supra note 41. 
 369. From conversations with congressional staff, my understanding is that a third bill is 
being drafted as well. A New York State Bar Association committee calls for the pleading of all 
“nonconclusory” matters. See infra note 375. For the defense bar’s proposal, see supra note 362. 
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subsequent action by the Advisory Committee, and ties restoration to 
the Supreme Court’s jurisprudence as it existed before Twombly.370 
As of this writing, therefore, the Senate bill is still a work in progress. 
The House of Representatives has been active as well. On 
October 27, 2009, a hearing entitled Access to Justice Denied: 
Ashcroft v. Iqbal was held by the Subcommittee on the Constitution, 
Civil Rights, and Civil Liberties of the Committee on the Judiciary, 
although no formal bill was before it.371 Following that hearing, the 
subcommittee’s chairman, Congressman Jerrold Nadler, introduced 
the Open Access to Courts Act of 2009,372 which would preserve 
Conley’s “no set of facts” language.373 Both the House and the Senate 
proposals—as well as others advanced by bar associations, circulated 
on the Internet, or emanating from other sources374—purport to be 
respectful of the rulemaking process and assume the Advisory 
Committee would either approach the subject from a pre-Twombly 
base point or formulate a new Rule 8(a)(2) standard.375 
Not surprisingly, there is substantial opposition to any legislation 
that might undermine the Supreme Court decisions. Defense interests 
opposed to any legislation on this subject have been mobilized, led by 
the Chamber of Commerce.376 Twombly and Iqbal serve them quite 
well. Legislation also is disfavored by those who are philosophically 
 
 370. The draft is still not public. With Senator Specter’s departure from the Senate, Senator 
Whitehouse appears to have assumed a leadership position on this subject. 
 371. Access to Justice Denied: Ashcroft v. Iqbal: Hearing Before the H. Subcomm. on the 
Constitution, Civil Rights, and Civil Liberties of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, supra note 53. 
 372. Open Access to Courts Act of 2009, H.R. 4115, 111th Cong. (2009). 
 373. Id. § 2. 
 374. Many law professors have chimed in with proposals. E.g., Michael C. Dorf, An 
Alternative to Senator Specter’s Notice Pleading Bill (July 29, 2009, 3:13 AM), 
http://www.dorfonlaw.org/2009/07/alternative-to-senator-specters-notice_28.html. Professors 
have circulated other proposals on FINDLAW, http://writ.news.findlaw.com (last visited Aug. 27, 
2010), and on the University of Notre Dame Law School’s Civil Procedure listserv, 
civ.pro@listserv.nd.edu. 
 375. In a report of the New York State Bar Association, it is suggested that Rule 8(a)(2) 
require “a short and plain non-conclusory statement of grounds sufficient to provide notice of 
the claim and the relief sought,” which demands less than Iqbal but will lead to litigation over 
the meaning of “non-conclusory.” N.Y. STATE BAR ASS’N, REPORT OF THE NEW YORK STATE 
BAR ASSOCIATION’S SPECIAL COMMITTEE ON STANDARDS FOR PLEADING IN FEDERAL 
LITIGATION 1 (2004). 
 376. See, for example, the multi-industry letter presented on the Chamber’s stationery 
opposing Senate Bill 1504. Letter from Multiple Industries to Senator Leahy, Chairman, Senate 
Comm. on the Judiciary (Dec. 1, 2009), available at http://www.uschamber.com/issues/ 
letters/2009/091201s1504.htm. 
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committed to the rulemaking process as it has developed for more 
than seventy years and do not wish to see any reallocation of 
authority over the Federal Rules. Nor is legislation favored by those 
who fear that the subject will be ill-handled if it is subjected to the 
political forces at work in Congress.377 The fate of the proposals is 
unclear as of this writing. Any action before the November 2010 
election is extremely unlikely. 
Legislation simply purporting to roll back the clock to restore the 
pleading standard to its pre-Twombly position has the virtue of 
minimal intrusion on the rulemaking process in contrast to Congress’ 
enactment of a specific pleading standard to replace Rule 8(a)(2), but 
it might not be politically feasible to achieve. Moreover, a rollback 
might not achieve the intended result because it would not necessarily 
resurrect the type of notice pleading that the original rulemakers and 
Conley sought to establish. As already noted,378 in the two decades 
prior to Twombly and Iqbal, many lower-court decisions had 
departed from Conley’s directive and established variegated versions 
of notice pleading, or fact pleading, or some combination of the two. 
What existed was a bit of a crazy quilt, which unfortunately could well 
be resurrected if the legislation simply returned things to what they 
were the day before Twombly was decided. The proposal circulated 
by Senator Whitehouse might obviate this problem by tying the 
rollback to adherence to the pre-Twombly Supreme Court 
jurisprudence, namely cases such as Leatherman and Swierkiewicz.379 
Another approach would be to define a pleader’s obligations in terms 
of the requirements of legal sufficiency and notice-giving, the 
functions intended in 1938.380 
So, if there is to be legislation, should it reestablish the pre-2007 
Supreme Court precedents, the mixture of notice and fact pleading 
that characterized federal court practice in the years preceding the 
two cases, or the purer notice pleading that dominated the decades 
 
 377. See, e.g., Bone, supra note 99, at 883–85; see also Charles E. Clark, The Challenge of a 
New Federal Civil Procedure, 20 CORNELL L.Q. 443, 457 (1935). A somewhat curious argument 
against any legislation, clearly designed to appeal to certain members of Congress, is that any 
relaxation of Twombly and Iqbal would facilitate lawsuits by people claiming injury as a result 
of governmental conduct in the War Against Terrorism. 
 378. See supra text accompanying notes 37, 61–62. 
 379. See supra notes 220–21, 224 and accompanying text.  
 380. See N.Y. STATE BAR ASS’N, supra note 375, at 42–43. This approach might be viewed 
as too great an incursion on the rulemaking process. 
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following the promulgation of the Federal Rules? A return to 
Conley’s “no-set-of-facts” formulation is quite unlikely and probably 
undesirable. Its literal application seems unworkable. Whatever the 
shortcomings of a particular legislative draft might be, congressional 
intervention to restore pleading to its status prior to Twombly and 
Iqbal might be an attractive way to establish a cooling-off or stop-
and-think period, allowing the rulemaking process to study the 
situation on a wide-angle basis and to propose a solution for what 
seems to be an imbalance in the post-Twombly-Iqbal operation of the 
pretrial Rules.381 Under any of the proposed legislative scenarios, 
Congress’ intercession would reduce premature dismissals in the 
interim and encourage federal courts to alleviate the current 
information-asymmetry problem, as well as provide the Advisory 
Committee with considerable motivation to come to grips with the 
subject. Corrective action seems especially desirable in light of the 
dubious assumptions underlying Twombly and Iqbal.382 
Establishing a pre-Twombly point of reference for the Advisory 
Committee is quite important, because it provides an appropriate 
backdrop against which its members can work. The rulemaking 
 
 381. At the same time, congressional intervention raises the concern that the cure may be 
worse than the disease. In 1938, when speaking of the rulemaking power under the Enabling 
Act, Judge Oscar R. Luhring remarked, “[t]he courts have been given the power to make their 
own rules without interference by Congress. It is up to us to justify that confidence, and if we 
don’t make good the Congressional goblin will get us!” AM. BAR ASS’N, supra note 6, at 216. 
Professor Fairman also noted concerns among the judiciary that congressional interference in 
procedural rules “avoids the scrutiny of comment by the bench, bar, and public inherent in the 
formal rulemaking process.” Fairman, supra note 1, at 615 (citing Year 2000 Readiness and 
Responsibility Act: Hearing on H.R. 775 Before the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 106th Cong. 126–
28 (1999) (statement of Walter K. Stapleton, J., U.S. Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit, on 
behalf of the Judicial Conference of the U.S.)). Congressional intervention has proven 
unfortunate from a drafting perspective on occasion. That was true of the 1983 legislation 
amending Rule 4, which required remedial rule amendments in 1993. See 4A WRIGHT & 
MILLER, supra note 3, § 1092.1 (3d ed. 2002) (describing the request for waiver of formal service 
of summons under Rule 4); Paul D. Carrington, Continuing Work on the Civil Rules: The 
Summons, 63 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 733, 733 (1988) (noting that Congress materially departed 
from the recommendation of the Supreme Court). 
 382. Those opposed to any legislation argue that Congress would be invading the 
rulemaking process. A wag might respond that it was the Court that initially invaded the 
rulemaking process, so turnabout is fair play. My successor as Reporter recently has written, 
“[g]iven the role of the Court in the rulemaking legislative process as established by the 1934 
Act, there is simply not much that the Advisory Committee or the Judicial Conference can 
reasonably be expected to do.” Carrington, supra note 43, at 87. Then, seemingly frustrated by 
the Supreme Court’s intervention and sounding a note of caution, he expressed support for 
congressional action on Twombly and Iqbal. Id. at 59–60. 
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process is appropriately deliberate and can take at least two to three 
years, even when time is thought to be of the essence.383 Moreover, if 
the discussions and papers presented at the Duke Conference are 
indicative,384 there is little support for rule revision now within the 
rulemaking establishment or among the many corporate and defense 
lawyers in attendance. A number of speakers urged “waiting and 
seeing” how the lower federal courts actually apply the two cases. 
That pathway means there would not be any effort at rule revision in 
the near future; even if there is, an actual change is not likely to 
materialize for four or five years. Because cases currently are being 
dismissed with significant frequency as a result of the Supreme Court 
decisions, congressional action would be desirable to avoid further 
hyperactivity under Rule 12(b)(6) until the rulemaking process has 
run its course.385 In an analogous vein, putting rule revision on hold 
and waiting for Congress’s reaction to a procedural phenomenon has 
its antecedents. For many years, including those that embraced my 
tour of duty as Reporter, the Civil Rules Committee maintained a 
moratorium on amending Rule 23, expecting that the political process 
would yield legislation on controversial aspects of class-action 
practice. 
Even if the Advisory Committee chooses to wait and see, or to 
codify plausibility pleading or some variant thereof, it will have to 
ensure that other pretrial rules are made consistent with it386 and 
consider other changes to Rule 8 in particular, so as to reestablish a 
balance in the parties’ pleading obligations. For instance, given the 
Court’s focus in Twombly on the precise language of Rule 8(a)387 and 
the Court’s conclusion that plaintiffs must provide a “showing” of 
 
 383. A proposed amendment typically goes through several drafts—which are considered at 
multiple Committee meetings—and a public comment period. It then must pass through the 
Standing Committee on Practice and Procedure of the Judicial Conference, and then the 
Judicial Conference itself, before it proceeds to the Supreme Court. After Court approval, the 
amendment must await congressional inaction for seven months before it is effective. 28 U.S.C. 
§ 2074 (2006). 
 384. For a sampling of the pieces presented, see Symposium, 2010 Civil Procedure 
Conference, 60 DUKE L.J. (forthcoming Dec. 2010). 
 385. The Committee apparently will engage in “continual study” and pursue a “deliberate, 
thorough approach.” Memorandum from Judge Paul V. Niemeyer, Chair, Advisory Comm. on 
Civil Rules, to Judge Anthony J. Scirica, Chair, Comm. on Rules of Practice & Procedure 3, 4 
(Dec. 8, 2009). 
 386. See supra notes 329–37 and accompanying text. 
 387. Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 546, 556 (2007). 
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factual sufficiency to support their claims,388 it follows that the 
plausibility standard similarly should apply to counterclaims, cross-
claims, and third-party claims. And the text of the relevant rules 
amply supports that conclusion.389 
Somewhat uncertain, however, are Twombly’s and Iqbal’s 
applicability to denials and affirmative defenses. Neither Rule 8(b) 
nor Rule 8(c) contains the magic word “showing,” and both modes of 
defensive pleading typically are alleged in a formulary, conclusory, 
and uninformative fashion along the style illustrated in Form 30.390 
Thus far, the cases are divided on the point.391 Equally uncertain is the 
applicability of Twombly and Iqbal to pleading the “grounds” for a 
district court’s subject matter jurisdiction under Rule 8(a)(1) or a 
demand for relief under Rule 8(a)(3). Neither provision calls for a 
“showing,” but that is not conclusive.392 Thus, for example, does the 
simple diversity jurisdiction allegation, “Defendant Jones is a citizen 
 
 388. Id. at 563, 580. 
 389. See, e.g., Carpenters Health & Welfare Fund of Phila. v. Kia Enters., No. 09-116, 2009 
WL 2152276, at *1 (E.D. Pa. July 15, 2009) (holding that defendant’s counterclaim failed to 
meet the Twombly standard); Sun Microsystems, Inc. v. Versata Enters., 630 F. Supp. 2d 395, 
404 (D. Del. 2009) (reviewing defendant’s counterclaim using the Twombly standard); 
Nesselrotte v. Allegheny Energy, Inc., No. 06-01390, 2007 WL 3147038, at *2, *6 (W.D. Pa. Oct. 
25, 2007) (same). 
 390. Often, one suspects, these defenses are alleged without any prior significant 
investigation into the facts. 
 391. The main factor in determining whether a particular district court judge applies the 
plausibility standard to affirmative defenses appears to be his or her interpretation of Twombly 
and Iqbal. Courts that read the decisions as a clarification of what information is necessary to 
provide fair notice to the other party extend the plausibility standard to the pleading of 
affirmative defenses. See, e.g., Barnes v. AT&T Pension Ben. Plan-Nonbargained Program, No. 
C 08-04058, 2010 WL 2507769, at *4 (N.D. Cal. June 22, 2010); Hayne v. Green Ford Sales, Inc., 
263 F.R.D. 647, 649–51 (D. Kan. 2009) (Rushfelt, Mag.); Shinew v. Wszola, No. 08-14256, 2009 
WL 1076279, at *2–5 (E.D. Mich. Apr. 21, 2009); Holtzman v. B/E Aerospace, Inc., No. 07-
80551, 2008 WL 2225668, at *2 (S.D. Fla. May 29, 2008); United States v. Quadrini, No. 2:07-
CV-13227, 2007 WL 4303213, at *4 (E.D. Mich. Dec. 6, 2007). Courts that interpret Twombly 
and Iqbal as a strict reading of Rule 8(a)(2)’s requirement of “showing” the grounds on which 
the claim rests do not extend the new standard beyond that domain. See, e.g., Charleswell v. 
Chase Manhattan Bank, N.A., No. 01-119, 2009 WL 4981730, at *6 (D.V.I. Dec. 8, 2009); 
Romantine v. CH2M Hill Eng’rs, Inc., No. 09-973, 2009 WL 3417469, at *1 (W.D. Pa. Oct. 23, 
2009); First Nat’l Ins. Co. of Am. v. Camps Servs., LLC, No. 08-cv-12805, 2009 WL 22861, at *2 
(E.D. Mich. Jan. 5, 2009). Ironically, some courts have excused defendants from compliance 
with Twombly and Iqbal because of the need for discovery. See Stoffels v. SBC Commc’ns., Inc., 
No. 05-CV-0233-WWJ, 2008 WL 4391396, at *2 n.3 (W.D. Tex. Sept. 22, 2008); Voeks v. Wal-
Mart Stores, Inc., No. 07-C-0030, 2008 WL 89434, at *6 (E.D. Wis. Jan. 7, 2008). 
 392. Rule 8(a)(1) requires “a short and plain statement of the grounds for the court’s 
jurisdiction”; Rule 8(a)(3) only calls for “a demand for the relief sought.” 
MILLER IN FINAL 9/15/2010 11:50:51 AM 
102 DUKE LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 60:1 
of New York and Plaintiff Smith is a citizen of North Carolina,” 
which is the style of Form 7, suffice under Rule 8(a)(1)? Perhaps that 
will be viewed as a conclusion that need not be accepted as true. Does 
it satisfy plausibility on its face or is more factual detail necessary? 
One hopes the former is the case.393 Should the pleading burden be 
made more demanding when the jurisdiction issue is one of corporate 
citizenship or party standing, on the ground that the naked assertion 
of either is more easily seen as a legal conclusion?394 Even more 
complex, some standing questions present difficult issues of causation, 
effectively merging questions of jurisdiction and substance.395 
If, in fact, plausibility pleading is retained and held to turn 
strictly on the language of Rule 8(a)(2), federal courts might not 
extend it to Rules 8(a)(1), 8(a)(3), 8(b), and 8(c). If that proves to be 
true, the Advisory Committee would have to consider whether to 
revise Rule 8 in order to correct this pleading burden imbalance in 
deference to the quest for the metaphorical level litigation playing 
field. What’s good for the goose should be good for the gander. 
Conversely, if the new pleading structure is applied to all pleading 
elements by judicial decision or Rule revision, then in theory 
defensive allegations could be challenged by a Rule 12(f) motion to 
strike for insufficiency as a corollary to Rule 12(b)(6), although the 
former now speaks of an “insufficient defense” and the latter of a 
“failure to state a claim.” In reality, any increase in the burden of 
pleading jurisdiction the demand for relief, or the plausibility of 
 
 393. Some courts have required plaintiffs to plead facts to show that there is a claim arising 
under a statute that warrants subject matter jurisdiction. See Riser v. United States, 93 Fed. Cl. 
212, 216–17 (2010) (applying the plausibility standard to the pleading of facts supporting subject 
matter jurisdiction under the Tucker Act); Stanislaus Custodial Deputy Sheriff’s Ass’n v. 
Deputy Sheriff’s Ass’n, No. CVF09-1988 LJO SMS, 2010 WL 2218813, at *5 (E.D. Cal. June 1, 
2010) (holding Lanham Act jurisdiction requires plaintiff to allege facts that plausibly assert the 
use of a trademark in interstate commerce). Courts have demonstrated confusion over the 
application of plausibility pleading under provisions other than Rule 8(a)(2). See Tripoli Mgmt., 
LLC v. Waste Connections of Kan., Inc., No. 09-CV-0167-CMA-KLM, 2010 WL 845927 (D. 
Colo. Mar. 9, 2010) (considering, but ultimately rejecting, the application of Twombly and Iqbal 
to a Rule 12(b)(2) motion, which is proper since plaintiffs are not required to plead personal 
jurisdiction). 
 394. See Laufen Int’l, Inc. v. Larry J. Lint Floor & Wall Covering, Co., No. 2:10-cv-199, 2010 
WL 1444869, at *3 (W.D. Pa. April 9, 2010) (holding that Rule 8 does not require the plaintiff to 
plead facts to describe the ways in which a corporation conducts its activities at the location 
allegedly constituting its principal place of business). 
 395. See, e.g., Mayor of Balt. v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., 677 F. Supp. 2d 847 (D. Md. 2010) 
(analyzing a complaint alleging the housing foreclosure crisis caused economic harm to 
Baltimore). 
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denials and affirmative defenses, also would cause cost and delay 
consequences that would have to be considered in determining 
whether efficiency and cost savings actually were being realized from 
the shift to plausibility pleading.396 
Even if the newly announced plausibility requirement governed 
all facets of every pleading, its application would not be fair or 
evenhanded. As Justice Stevens noted in dissent in Twombly, the 
defendants in that case never were required to answer the plaintiffs’ 
claims despite years of litigation.397 That typically will be the case. 
Even if the plausibility standard includes—and applies uniformly to—
all types of defensive pleadings, plaintiffs still will bear a disparate 
pleading burden as a practical matter because defendants only need 
to move to dismiss following the complaint rather than interpose an 
answer.398 In a sense, the defendants have been given a free pleading 
pass by the Supreme Court. As the preceding discussion suggests, 
there are a number of textual and policy issues confronting the 
rulemakers even if they decide to leave Twombly and Iqbal 
untouched or simply to codify them. 
IV.  REBALANCING THE FEDERAL RULES: A FEW THOUGHTS 
ABOUT POSSIBILITIES 
My thinking about the future begins with the observations about 
Twombly and Iqbal made earlier, none of them particularly positive. 
Some of the Court’s justifications are little more than unverified 
assumptions about the litigation world that are not based on reliable 
evidence but simply repeat well-trodden clichés.399 Most prominently, 
judicial management is more than a “modest” control technique, the 
claims of excessive costs, abuse, and frivolousness in litigation may 
have much less substance than many think, and extortionate 
settlements may be but another urban legend. Although I do not 
 
 396. Although affirmative defenses could be the subject of a Rule 12(f) motion to strike, 
plaintiffs rarely challenge them at the pleading stage. That could change, however. 
 397. Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 571 (2007) (Stevens, J., dissenting) 
(“Plaintiffs have alleged such an agreement and, because the complaint was dismissed in 
advance of answer, the allegation has not even been denied. Why, then, does the case not 
proceed? Does a judicial opinion that the charge is not ‘plausible’ provide a legally acceptable 
reason for dismissing the complaint? I think not.”). 
 398. One wonders how “admitted” or “denied” can be subjected to the plausibility standard, 
however. 
 399. See supra Part II. 
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claim special knowledge on these matters, my judgment is that 
whatever deficiencies some of the Justices may have seen in the 
current pretrial system, the chosen solution seems inappropriate. 
If federal pleading and motion-to-dismiss practice are not 
returned to their pre-Twombly-Iqbal state or something 
approximating it—and one assumes a continuation of the current 
approach—there is work to be done on the Rules. Therefore, a few 
suggestions seem appropriate at this point.400 The rulemaking process 
has been a dynamic and creative one; now is the time for that spirit of 
innovation to come to the fore. Ultimately, the Advisory Committee 
will have to reconcile the continuing viability of the values of 1938 
with the realities of 2010, and find a way to uphold the principle of 
access and the other policy objectives underlying the original Rules 
while adjusting to contemporary litigation conditions. It is unclear 
whether this will—or should—take the form of several textual 
modifications of the existing Rules or a wholesale revision of pretrial 
procedure.401 
I do not pretend that any of the offerings described below are the 
best way forward, or imply that they encompass all the approaches 
that are potentially useful; at a minimum, however, I believe each 
deserves study and evaluation. The thoughts that follow are just that, 
and require considerable further elaboration. Some of them also 
overlap. Moreover, as a past Advisory Committee Reporter and 
member, I have no illusions about the difficulties of working out the 
details. Every Reporter knows that is where the devil resides.402 Nor 
do I harbor any illusion about the ease of navigating through the 
political and ideological thickets that are likely to confront the 
members of the rulemaking process. 
In considering these thoughts, the following questions seem 
basic—at least in my mind. Has litigation changed so much that the 
 
 400. Proposals similar to some of those I offer below have been suggested by others. See, 
e.g., AM. COLL. OF TRIAL LAWYERS, supra note 54 (proposing ways to better the litigation 
system); INST. FOR THE ADVANCEMENT OF THE AM. LEGAL SYS., CIVIL CASE PROCESSING IN 
THE FEDERAL DISTRICT COURTS (2009) (analyzing discrepancies in case disposition times). 
 401. There was no support for the latter at the Duke Conference. 
 402. This popular saying, employed by many, from architect Mies van der Rohe to Admiral 
Hyman Rickover, apparently is, in fact, an ironic variation of “God is in the details.” Alden 
Whitman, Expressed Industrial Spirit, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 19, 1969, at 1 (discussing the life of Mies 
van der Rohe); see GREGORY Y. TITELMAN, RANDOM HOUSE DICTIONARY OF POPULAR 
PROVERBS AND SAYINGS 116 (2d ed. 2000). 
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ethos of access, private enforcement of public policies, merits 
adjudication, and equality of procedural treatment no longer can be 
served?403 Must the rulemakers and the federal courts abandon the 
foundational principles of the Federal Rules to meet the pressures of 
the complexity and density of modern litigation? What quality of civil 
dispute resolution system do we want? Can it be designed to be 
neutral among the contending interests? And how much will it cost? 
A. Providing Access to Information Needed to Satisfy the Plausibility 
Standard 
Since the combined effect of Twombly, Iqbal, and the summary 
judgment trilogy is to require a plaintiff to have greater knowledge 
concerning his claim either before instituting an action or 
immediately thereafter, inequality of information access during those 
critical time frames poses a significant—if not the most significant—
problem for many people seeking affirmative relief. This difficulty 
thus demands the most attention.404 But realistically any solution is 
likely to add to the burdens and protraction of the pretrial process in 
some cases.405 Perhaps that is a price that must be paid to achieve 
some of the citizen-access, private-enforcement, and fairness 
objectives of the American civil-justice system. 
Consideration might be given, for example, to some form of 
limited preinstitution discovery to provide access to critical 
information.406 The language of Rule 27 is much too restrictive to 
 
 403. See Charles E. Clark, Special Pleading in the “Big Case,” 21 F.R.D. 45, 46 (1957) (“I 
fear that every age must learn its lesson that special pleading cannot be made to do the service 
of trial and that live issues between active litigants are not to be disposed of or evaded on the 
paper pleadings . . . .”). 
 404. The problem was widely recognized at the Duke Conference and no opposition was 
voiced to the need for solving the information-asymmetry problem. 
 405. For employment discrimination cases—which require plaintiffs to bring their 
grievances to the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) to assess whether 
there is probable cause to institute an action—changes to the regulatory process might help 
reduce information asymmetry without burdening the court. When presented with a complaint, 
the EEOC could conduct a more robust investigation directed at uncovering information that 
demonstrates the claim’s plausibility. This change would require additional federal funding for 
the Commission. EEOC investigations would, however, limit judicial involvement at the pretrial 
stage, reduce the financial burden on individual plaintiffs, and restrict some of the back-and-
forth motion practice between the parties regarding access to discovery. 
 406. See, e.g., Scott Dodson, Federal Pleading and State Presuit Discovery, 14 LEWIS & 
CLARK L. REV. 43 (2010) (exploring the role that state presuit discovery could play in rectifying 
the information imbalance caused by Twombly and Iqbal); Lonny S. Hoffman, Using Presuit 
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perform that function and would require amendment.407 There are 
provisions authorizing preinstitution discovery currently in force in 
some states that could provide a model. One approach found in some 
states allows the pretrial preservation of evidence and the 
identification of witnesses.408 But that technique is not sufficient, 
either. However, Texas Rule of Civil Procedure 202.1(b) is somewhat 
broader and empowers the court to order a deposition on the basis of 
a verified petition “to investigate a potential claim or suit.”409 Only a 
provision of the Texas character would be a meaningful response to 
the information-asymmetry problem. But such provisions would be 
opposed by defense interests and those who believe they would 
engender meritless litigation, abuse, and extortion.410 These concerns 
could be ameliorated by requiring judicial authorization for presuit 
discovery on a demonstration of good faith and the applicant’s need, 
which would include a showing that relevant information was solely in 
the possession or control of a potentially adverse party or third 
 
Discovery to Overcome Barriers to the Courthouse, 34 LITIGATION 31 (2008) (examining the 
legal bases for presuit discovery). 
 407. Rule 27 is expressly limited to the perpetuation of testimony by deposition and requires 
a verified petition showing that the action presently cannot be brought, and listing the subject 
matter of the anticipated action, the facts the petitioner wishes to establish, details about the 
expected adverse parties, and the expected substance of the deponent’s testimony. See Martin v. 
Reynolds Metals Corp., 297 F.2d 49, 55 (9th Cir. 1961) (discussing Rule 27); In re Ford, 170 
F.R.D. 504, 508 (M.D. Ala. 1997) (finding that Rule 27 does not allow pre-complaint discovery 
under Rule 11). See generally Nicholas A. Kronfeld, Note, The Preservation and Discovery of 
Evidence Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 27, 78 GEO. L.J. 593, 594 (1990) 
(recommending courts interpret Rule 27 to help litigants preserve evidence and frame their 
complaints). 
 408. New York offers one example. N.Y. C.P.L.R § 3102(c) (McKinney 2010). 
 409. TEX. R. CIV. P. 202.1(b). For an analysis of the experience under the Texas rule, see 
Lonny Sheinkopf Hoffman, Access to Information, Access to Justice: The Role of Presuit 
Investigatory Discovery, 40 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 217, 247–69 (2007). Cf. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 
8, § 220(b) (1953) (allowing investor inspection of books and records for possible corporate 
fraud); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 400.0023 (West 2001) (authorizing “informal discovery” for unsworn 
statements and documents); PA. R. CIV. P. 4003.8 (sanctioning pre-complaint discovery); Ex 
parte Anderson, 644 So. 2d 961, 965 (Ala. 1994) (permitting presuit inspection of written records 
without explicit state civil procedure rule authorization). Connecticut has an independent action 
for discovery in aid of an action that is about to be brought. See Berger v. Cuomo, 644 A.2d 333, 
338 (Conn. 1994) (granting a bill of discovery). 
 410. Indeed, some of the post-Twombly surveys show a modicum of support for 
preinstitution discovery, but it is unclear what significance should be accorded to this because 
the issue has not been focused on. See AM. BAR ASS’N SECTION OF LITIG., supra note 260, at 8 
(summarizing Federal Rules amendment proposals). 
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person.411 There also could be provision for notice to potentially 
adverse parties, and narrow inquiry parameters as necessary 
ingredients of any expansion of Rule 27 or the development of a new 
provision. Other constraints on the procedure’s availability might be 
considered. 
Would it work, or would district judges require a showing by the 
applicant as demanding as that required for the complaint itself? 
Would an order for presuit discovery be enforced, especially with 
regard to documents and emails that company and governmental 
agency defendants typically are reluctant to produce in litigation? 
Would the permitted scope of inquiry be so limited, perhaps by 
justiciability or case and controversy requirements rooted in the 
Constitution,412 that the prospective plaintiff might not gain access to 
the critical information needed to frame a complaint? Even if federal 
presuit discovery is not expanded, perhaps use might be made of state 
presuit discovery procedures in aid of potential federal litigation.413 
A related possibility might be authorizing early, limited, and 
carefully sequenced discovery following the interposition of a motion 
to dismiss—so-called pinpoint or flashlight discovery.414 Contained 
discovery before the motion’s resolution could provide a fruitful 
middle ground for evaluating challenges to cases that lie between the 
traditional Rule 12(b)(6) motion based on the complaint’s legal or 
notice-giving insufficiency and a motion based on the complaint’s 
failure to meet the factual plausibility precepts of Twombly and Iqbal. 
 
 411. See Jones v. AIG Risk Mgmt., Inc., No. C-10-1374 EMC, 2010 WL 2867334, at *5 (N.D. 
Cal. July 20, 2010) (noting that a court has the ability to grant limited discovery under Twombly 
and Iqbal when relevant evidence is solely within the province of defendants); see also Santiago 
v. Walls, 599 F.3d 749, 759 (7th Cir. 2010) (“[Plaintiff] cannot know for certain what [defendant] 
knew without discovery. Consequently, the district court should not have dismissed this count of 
the complaint.”). “Need” also might include the absence of any alternative information source 
that was in the public domain. 
 412. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2. The Supreme Court has permitted the resolution of certain 
nonmerit matters without a prior determination that federal subject matter jurisdiction exists. 
See Ruhrgas AG v. Marathon Oil Co., 526 U.S. 574, 578, 87–88 (1999) (holding that in certain 
situations a “court does not abuse its discretion by turning directly to personal jurisdiction”). 
 413. For some of the possible limitations on presuit discovery, see Dodson, supra note 406, 
at 60–64. Most of the limitations that are discussed refer to the use of state presuit discovery. Id. 
 414. There is considerable support for this. See, e.g., SPECIAL COMM., AM. BAR ASS’N 
SECTION OF LITIG., CIVIL PROCEDURE IN THE 21ST CENTURY—SOME PROPOSALS 8 (2010), 
available at http://www.abanet.org/litigation/docs/civil-procedure-proposals.pdf. Indeed, it is 
simply a form of staggered discovery, which frequently is employed as part of judicial case 
management. 
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It would not permit full-fledged discovery with its accompanying costs 
and delays before the action’s legal viability and notice-giving 
functions were established. Indeed, in some instances the discovery 
might be achieved with little or no burden on the defendant. That 
would be true, for example, when the discovery involves documents 
already produced to the government, particularly in a related judicial 
or regulatory proceeding.415 
The suggested procedure, by which the district court authorizes a 
modicum of factual exploration before taking definitive action on the 
request for dismissal, is philosophically analogous to the principles 
embedded in Rule 11(b)(3) and Rule 56(f). Those provisions allow a 
party to try to secure needed information not yet available to it.416 The 
suggested procedure would provide the needed peek at the merits to 
avoid undesirable restraints on the institution of an action, reduce the 
premature termination of cases, and limit the impairment of the 
private enforcement of public policies.417 Like preinstitution 
discovery, however, the proposed approach would require the 
attention of a district or magistrate judge to oversee the procedure’s 
operation in an appropriately constrained fashion. But again, would it 
be effective? 
Perhaps a formula could be crafted to permit this type of 
circumscribed post-institution and pre-motion-to-dismiss discovery 
under careful management protocols. Discovery would focus solely 
on what is necessary to meet the plausibility requirement, assuming it 
is retained, especially in contexts involving a defendant’s mental state 
 
 415. See, e.g., In re Delphi Corp. Sec., Derivative & “Erisa” Litig., No. 05-md-1725, 2007 WL 
518626, at *8 (E.D. Mich. Feb. 15, 2007); In re Plastics Additives Antitrust Litig., No. 03-2038, 
2004 WL 2743591, at *10–12 (E.D. Pa. Nov. 29, 2004); In re LaBranche Sec. Litig., 333 F. Supp. 
2d 178, 183–84 (S.D.N.Y. 2004); In re Firstenergy Corp. Sec. Litig., 220 F.R.D. 541, 544–45 
(N.D. Ohio 2004). 
 416. In Ray Worthy Campbell, Getting a Clue: Two Stage Complaint Pleading as a Solution 
to the Conley-Iqbal Dilemma, 51, 55 (2010) (Pa. State Univ. Dickinson Sch. of Law, Legal Stud. 
Research Paper No. 30-2010), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm? 
abstract_id=1653962, the author proposes “bifurcating complaint pleading” to permit a “limited 
discovery phase . . . to allow knowledgeable pleading.” Whether that goal, comparable to the 
one I am advocating in the text, requires further elaboration of the pleading stage is 
questionable. 
 417. It has been suggested that if the plaintiff alleges under Rule 11(b)(3) that certain 
matters are likely to have evidentiary support after a reasonable opportunity for discovery, the 
court may so order if convinced that the allegations are sound. See Edward A. Hartnett, 
Responding to Twombly and Iqbal: Where Do We Go from Here?, 95 IOWA L. REV. BULL. 24, 
33 (2010), http://www.uiowa.edu/~ilr/bulletin/ILRB_95_Hartnett.pdf. 
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or motivation, and situations involving a private or government 
defendant or third party in sole possession of critical information.418 
This procedure would have to be constructed carefully to assuage 
those who would be concerned about anything that smacks of 
allowing the discovery camel’s nose under the pleading tent. But it 
might bring some equilibrium to the burdens on the parties at the 
pleading and motion-to-dismiss phases of litigation. 
The Iqbal Court indicated that the current structure of Rule 8 
forbids any access to discovery if the plausibility standard has not 
been met.419 That point is neither irrefutable nor immune from rule 
revision, and I understand that some district courts have since winked 
at it, although the Second, Third, and Seventh Circuits have repeated 
the Court’s statement.420 Nor is there any mandatory or automatic stay 
of discovery while a Rule 12(b)(6) motion is pending,421 except in 
cases under the Private Securities Legislation Reform Act. The 
district court judge therefore could permit discovery—presumably, 
but not necessarily, limited to matters relating to the issue of 
plausibility—prior to or during the pendency of the motion to dismiss 
and could then consider anything relevant that emerged.422 At least 
 
 418. When the district judge believes a complaint falls short of plausibility but additional 
information not reflected in the pleading is accessible to the plaintiffs, the district judge 
presumably will dismiss with leave to replead or simply hold the motion in abeyance and grant 
the plaintiff leave to provide an amended pleading. 
 419. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. 1937, 1954 (2009) (“Because respondent’s complaint is 
deficient under Rule 8, he is not entitled to discovery, cabined or otherwise.”). 
 420. See, e.g., Mann v. Brenner, No. 09-2461, 2010 WL 1220963, at *5 (3d Cir. Mar. 30, 2010) 
(staying discovery pending resolution of the motions to dismiss); Bissessur v. Ind. Univ. Bd. of 
Trs., 581 F.3d 599, 602–03 (7th Cir. 2009) (noting that a claim must have facial plausibility to 
survive a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss); S. Cherry St., LLC v. Hennessee Grp. LLC, 573 F.3d 
98, 113–14 (2d Cir. 2009) (dismissing defendant’s claim as mere speculation); see also 520 S. 
Michigan Ave. Ass’n. v. Unite Here, Local 1, No. 10 C1422, 2010 WL 2836666, at *1 (N.D. Ill. 
July 15, 2010) (noting that factual allegations must raise a right to relief above the speculation 
level); Ghaster v. City of Rocky River, No. 1:09CV02080, 2010 WL 2802682, at *2 (N.D. Ohio 
July 13, 2010) (noting that the Supreme Court applied the plausibility standard to all civil 
actions in Iqbal). 
 421. See, e.g., City of Aurora v. P.S. Sys., Inc., No. 07-cv-02371-WYD-BNB, 2008 WL 
4377505, at *8 (D. Colo. Jan. 14, 2008); see also Swanson v. Citibank, N.A., No. 10-1122, 2010 
WL 2977297, at *10 (7th Cir. July 30, 2010) (noting that a judge can allow discovery while 
deferring a ruling on a motion to dismiss); Coss v. Playtex Prods., LLC, No. 08 C 50222, 2009 
WL 1455358, at *5 (N.D. Ill. May 21, 2009) (noting that limited discovery may be appropriate 
prior to a court ruling on a motion to dismiss). 
 422. This recommendation has support from at least two other members of the academic 
community. See Has the Supreme Court Limited Americans’ Access to Courts?: Hearing Before 
the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, supra note 41, at 230 (statement of Suzette M. Malveaux, 
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one court has allowed limited discovery after dismissal of a claim 
when relevant information needed to meet the plausibility standard 
was in the sole province of the defendant.423 A matter of this 
magnitude should not be left to the inclinations of individual judges, 
however. Whether or not the Supreme Court’s proscription is taken 
literally, a significant revision of the pleading and motion rules 
appears to be necessary to create a more textured and balanced 
solution to the information-access problem. 
In line with the foregoing, a rational approach would be to relax 
the pleading structure if a plaintiff alleges the inaccessibility of critical 
information and articulates a reasonable basis for the information’s 
existence and the defendant’s control over it. When that is 
demonstrated, it might be reasonable to reverse the pleading burden 
and require the defendant to make the needed material available to 
the plaintiff along with whatever explanation it thinks appropriate. If 
the plaintiff felt the defendant’s production still did not make it 
possible to defend against the motion to dismiss, the court could 
authorize more discovery on a showing of good cause.424 The 
defendant’s discovery, however, should be stayed pending resolution 
of the motion to dismiss. 
B. A New Procedure Relating to Ascertaining Plausibility 
As an alternative to the suggestions in the preceding Section, 
consideration might be given to creating a new motion that would lie 
 
Associate Professor of Law, The Catholic University of America Columbus School of Law) 
(suggesting that courts should “be open, upon receipt of a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, to allowing 
plaintiffs some initial discovery focused on those discrete facts necessary to show a plausible 
claim” and that such limited discovery has been used in determining whether the requirements 
for class actions, qualified immunity, and jurisdiction have been met); see also Edward A. 
Hartnett, Taming Twombly, Even After Iqbal, 158 U. PA. L. REV. 473, 507–14 (2010) (noting 
that, except in cases of qualified immunity, district courts have broad discretion to allow 
discovery prior to a Rule 12(b)(6) decision); Suzette M. Malveaux, Front Loading and Heavy 
Lifting: How Pre-Dismissal Discovery Can Address the Detrimental Effect of Iqbal on Civil 
Rights Cases, 14 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 65, 69 (2010) (noting that courts should permit limited 
“plausibility discovery” in civil rights cases upon receipt of a Rule 12(b)(6) motion). 
 423. See Jones v. AIG Risk Mgmt., Inc., No. C-10-1374 EMC, 2010 WL 2867334, *5 (N.D. 
Cal. July 20, 2010) (allowing limited discovery after dismissal of a breach of contract claim to 
determine whether amendment is possible). 
 424. In addition to ameliorating the problem of information inaccessibility, limited 
preliminary discovery also might be useful for providing information so that both parties might 
be better able to appraise their claims for purposes of possible settlement. See generally 
Nagareda, supra note 126, at 8–9, 43–44. 
MILLER IN FINAL 9/15/2010 11:50:51 AM 
2010] A DOUBLE PLAY ON THE FEDERAL RULES 111 
between those now provided in Rule 12(b)(6) and Rule 56, one that 
would provide a new management tool for district judges. As 
previously discussed,425 the plausibility-pleading standard has 
destabilized the long-held assumption that the motion to dismiss only 
is addressed to a pleading’s legal sufficiency and notice-pleading 
quality.426 Rule 12(b)(6) motions under Conley served the legal 
filtering and notice functions well, but the plausibility requirement 
now authorizes additional factual assessments and judgmental 
evaluations. A new procedure might be useful to address the type of 
decisionmaking created by this shift. 
One approach might be to enhance the Rule 12(e) motion for a 
more definite statement.427 That Rule long has been considered a 
relatively weak procedure limited to assuring notice giving because of 
its restrictive language that, as a practical matter, only applies to the 
complaint and affirmative claims in other pleadings;428 but this need 
not continue to be the case. By expanding the scope of Rule 12(e), 
the rulemakers may be able to custom-tailor a more effective 
procedure. It would be one that would be invoked by a defendant 
when the statement of the claim is legally sufficient and provides 
 
 425. See supra notes 70–75 and accompanying text. 
 426. The summary judgment motion historically also has been thought to present a legal 
issue because it can be granted only when “there is no genuine issue as to any material fact 
and . . . the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” FED. R. CIV. P. 56(c). Even after 
the Supreme Court’s Celotex and Liberty Lobby decisions, which equated summary judgment 
with the directed verdict motion (now the motion for judgment as a matter of law), the Rule 56 
motion remains—at least in theory—a matter-of-law motion. See supra notes 189–92 and 
accompanying text.  
The moving party is ‘entitled to a judgment as a matter of law’ because the 
nonmoving party has failed to make a sufficient showing on an essential element of 
her case with respect to which she has the burden of proof. ‘[The] standard [for 
granting summary judgment] mirrors the standard for a directed verdict.’ 
Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986) (alteration in original). “In essence, though, 
the inquiry under each [summary judgment and directed verdict] is the same: whether the 
evidence presents a sufficient disagreement to require submission to a jury or whether it is so 
one-sided that one party must prevail as a matter of law.” Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 
U.S. 242, 251–52 (1986). 
 427. FED. R. CIV. P. 12(e) (“A party may move for a more definite statement of a pleading 
to which a responsive pleading is allowed but which is so vague or ambiguous that the party 
cannot reasonably prepare a response. The motion must be made before filing a responsive 
pleading and must point out the defects complained of and the details desired.”). 
 428. The motion is available only when “a pleading . . . is so vague or ambiguous that the . . . 
[movant] cannot reasonably prepare a response.” Id. See generally 5C WRIGHT & MILLER, 
supra note 3, §§ 1374–1379 (discussing the elements of a motion for a more definite statement 
under Rule 12). 
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adequate notice to enable a response, but the absence of facts makes 
the right to relief appear less than plausible. Whether responding 
parties would see any advantage to employing such a motion rather 
than one under Rule 12(b)(6), however, is questionable. Either one 
probably would be granted with leave to replead. Indeed, the net 
result simply might be the creation of yet another pretrial friction 
point. 
Perhaps more promising, although not strikingly different from 
the post-institution discovery technique just discussed,429 would be a 
new procedure that a plaintiff could invoke in response to a motion to 
dismiss, which would enable the district court to permit a modicum of 
discovery when plausibility, rather than pure legal or notice-giving 
sufficiency, was challenged.430 It might be the subject of a separate 
Rule or a new Rule 12 subdivision, possibly denominated “Motion to 
Particularize a Claim for Relief.”431 It could be raised as a free-
standing motion in anticipation of the defendant’s motion to dismiss 
 
 429. See supra text accompanying notes 414–20. 
 430. Such a proposal seems to have some judicial support assuming the continued ability to 
plead on information and belief post-Twombly-Iqbal. In Boykin v. KeyCorp, 521 F.3d 202 (2d 
Cir. 2008), the Second Circuit held that the plaintiff, alleging disparate treatment, did not need 
to allege examples of preferential treatment by defendant employees toward non-minority or 
male customers because the “names and records, if any, of persons who were not members of 
the protected classes and were more favorably treated . . . is information particularly within 
KeyBank’s knowledge and control.” Id. at 215. Without these facts, the plaintiff merely recited 
an element of the claim—that members outside the protected class were treated differently. In 
essence, the motion proposed in text, much like what happened in Boykin and Arista Records 
LLC v. Doe 3, 604 F.3d 110 (2d Cir. 2010), would allow plaintiffs to plead on information and 
belief that facts needed to establish plausibility are within the defendant’s possession and 
warrant a slight opening of the discovery door. 
 431. See, e.g., AM. COLL. OF TRIAL LAWYERS, supra note 54, at 6 (“A new summary 
procedure should be developed by which parties can submit applications for determination of 
enumerated matters (such as rights that are dependent on the interpretation of a contract) on 
pleadings and affidavits or other evidentiary materials without triggering an automatic right to 
discovery or trial or any of the other provisions of the current procedural rules.”). A proposal in 
FED. COURTS COMM., ASS’N OF THE BAR OF THE CITY OF N.Y., PROPOSALS FOR THE 2010 
DUKE CONFERENCE REGARDING THE FEDERAL RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE 4–7 (2010), 
available at http://www.nycbar.org/pdf/report/uploads/20071920-NYCBarProposalsforDuke 
Conference.pdf, suggests a summary adjudication motion primarily directed at determining 
issues rather than claims and calls for the exchange of enhanced initial disclosures following an 
answer and before summary judgment. The Association’s proposal was rejected as inefficient 
and potentially productive of “unfair outcomes” by the Federal Courts Committee of the New 
York County Lawyers’ Association. FED. COURTS COMM., N.Y. CNTY. LAWYERS’ ASS’N, 
COMMENTS ON THE PROPOSALS FOR THE 2010 DUKE CONFERENCE REGARDING THE 
FEDERAL RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE BY THE FEDERAL COURTS COMMITTEE OF THE 
ASSOCIATION OF THE BAR OF THE CITY OF NEW YORK 1–3 (2010). 
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or interposed as a cross-motion to a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, or both, 
and operate as something analogous to the pre–Federal Rule 
discovery device known as the bill of particulars.432 Alternatively, the 
procedure might take the form of a request that the defendant 
provide something—perhaps a critical document or sworn 
statement—that bears on the viability of the plaintiff’s claim. 
Once the judicially authorized discovery is secured or the request 
responded to, a plaintiff could stand on the complaint or, when 
appropriate, seek to amend it. When and how the procedure might be 
employed; the extent of the discretion the district judge might have to 
grant, deny, or modify the request; how much limited discovery might 
be permitted; and what form that discovery would take pose difficult 
policy questions. To be sure, the complaint’s possible deficiencies 
probably would have to be exposed by the motion or the request, but 
that is a reasonable trade-off for the plaintiff gaining access to 
important information that might stave off dismissal. Defendants, of 
course, might feel abused by having to come forward with potentially 
damaging material at this embryonic point in the case. Nonetheless, 
giving access to the inaccessible seems fair and the particularization 
would be limited to those matters. The effectiveness of this procedure 
would depend on the judicial officer’s involvement in the process, 
which admittedly makes it a potentially resource-consumptive tool. 
Another procedural route that might give the pleader access to 
information needed to meet a challenge to his complaint is to expand 
the concept of automatic disclosure. This could be accomplished by 
increasing the number of categories in the mandatory disclosure 
provision in Rule 26(a)(1),433 or by empowering district judges to 
order specified disclosure on a case-by-case basis as part of the initial 
or an early Rule 16 conference. The former approach would require a 
consensus concerning what categories of information should be added 
to the Rule to solve information-asymmetry problems—a matter that 
is not self-evident. The latter approach is far more flexible and would 
 
 432. See CLARK, supra note 74, § 54 (describing bills of particulars). 
 433. Mandatory disclosure was adopted despite the objection of virtually the entire bar. See 
generally 8A CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT, ARTHUR R. MILLER & RICHARD L. MARCUS, 
FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE: CIVIL § 2053 (3d ed. 2010). A history of the process 
that led to the adoption of mandatory disclosure has been published by the Advisory 
Committee’s then-Reporter. See Carrington, supra note 43, at 31–45. Although the present Rule 
26(a)(1) had some supporters, the overwhelming commentary on its utility at the Duke 
Conference was indifferent to negative. 
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be very similar to the notion of authorizing factual plausibility 
discovery discussed in the preceding Section. But it imposes more of a 
work burden on the court. Whatever form an expanded Rule 26(a)(1) 
might take, one of its benefits is that it would provide the district 
court judge with the particularization needed for making a more 
informed judgment as to the sufficiency of a claim for relief. A 
procedure of this type would be effective only if it could be utilized 
before resolution of a Rule 12(b)(6) motion—or even before one is 
made—whether the motion is based on plausibility or legal-
sufficiency grounds, or a combination of the two. 
As was true of those in the preceding Section, the ideas offered 
in this Section would generate more pretrial-motion practice and 
inevitably cause some cost and delay,434 consequences I have seen all 
too often over the years and deplore. Nonetheless, the emergence of 
a new procedural tool may be an inevitable byproduct of any attempt 
to ameliorate the deleterious consequences of an information 
imbalance. This approach still may be effective if it reduces the costs 
imposed by Twombly and Iqbal: more motions to dismiss, repleading, 
renewed motions to dismiss, and appeals, as well as impairing the 
value of private enforcement of important public policies. Perhaps 
this suggests a quest for pleading and motion formulae that lie 
between the “no set of facts” language of Conley and that of 
Twombly-Iqbal, abandoning the latter, or looking elsewhere in the 
pretrial process for solutions to the perceived systemic ills. 
C. Improving Case Management 
Evaluating the quality and utility of case management is 
inextricably interwoven with any consideration of pleading and 
motion practice. Is it completely defunct, in need of serious 
modification, or just awaiting some experience-based tweaking? I 
cannot see simply accepting as determinative Justice Souter’s lightly 
supported dismissal in Twombly of judicial management’s “modest” 
ability to shape and filter litigation efficiently. Even assuming that 
present-day case management does not offer an optimal set of tools 
for addressing the exigencies of contemporary litigation, it is 
extremely unlikely that it is—and has been for all these years—
 
 434. Indeed, cost and delay may be an inevitable byproduct of any attempt to ameliorate the 
information-imbalance consequences of demanding fact-based pleading. 
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incapable of meeting at least some of the practical concerns expressed 
by the Court and others.435 
Abandoning what has been developed over the years is not a 
rational option, and nothing in the Federal Judicial Center’s empirical 
work referred to earlier436 suggests it should be. A district or 
magistrate judge, through his or her control over scheduling and the 
discovery process, represents the best—if not the only—hope in the 
procedural arsenal for containing excessive litigation behavior and 
the type of attrition activity that breeds cost and delay, especially in 
large-scale cases. Indeed, this reality promotes strengthening the 
management process and being more insistent about judicial 
involvement in it. The complexities of contemporary litigation suggest 
we need that more than ever before. 
Perhaps judges should be firmer in requiring compliance with 
scheduling and other management orders, particularly discovery 
orders, and make it clear that a case’s movement toward trial is 
inexorable.437 Some judges already are, but a widespread acceptance 
of this approach will entail more hands-on activity by them and a 
willingness to make the threat of sanctions, including preclusion 
orders, a more realistic deterrent.438 One magistrate judge and his 
distinguished practicing-attorney coauthor firmly believe that neither 
the bench nor the bar is taking enough advantage of the existing 
 
 435. See Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 559 (2007). The Court’s statement stands 
in sharp contrast to the position voiced by numerous Duke Conference speakers that more 
management and direct judicial involvement was needed. For related discussion, see Epstein, 
supra note 172, at 18–19. 
 436. See supra notes 240–43 and accompanying text. 
 437. I fondly remember that when I was working as an informal reporter for the committee 
of district judges charged with developing the original Manual, the late Chief Judge of the 
Western District of Missouri, William H. Becker, who served as the group’s chair, repeatedly 
declared that the best management tool he knew was the establishment of an immutable 
schedule for a case with trial on a day certain. He forcefully (and colorfully) expressed the view 
that if the district judge never let the case deviate from the schedule, it “would settle if it were 
capable of being settled.” Some obviously believe this approach is too inflexible. 
 438. See, e.g., In re Phenylpropanolamine (PPA) Prods. Liab. Litig., 460 F.3d 1217, 1252–53 
(9th Cir. 2007) (upholding the district court’s dismissal of the case for failure to comply with 
case management orders); Nick v. Morgan’s Foods, Inc., 270 F.3d 590, 597 (8th Cir. 2001) 
(imposing monetary sanctions against a party for lack of good-faith participation in alternative 
dispute resolution); In re FLSA Cases, No. 6:08-mc-49-Orl-31GJK, 2009 WL 129599 (M.D. Fla. 
Jan. 20, 2009) (imposing sanctions for noncompliance with show cause orders). 
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extensive procedural toolkit and that “the problem is an absence of 
will.”439 
With the benefit of further empirical research that takes account 
of all pretrial costs, the Advisory Committee, the Board of Editors of 
the Manual, and individual judges may be able to make more refined, 
dispassionate decisions about the utility and proper role of case 
management as it relates to the pleading and motion structure.440 
There may be procedural mechanisms and techniques, for example, 
that would compensate for the alleged defects in case management 
and meet legitimate concerns about cost, abuse, and delay, yet allow 
for the resurrection of some or all aspects of the pre-Twombly-Iqbal 
notice pleading and Rule 12(b)(6)-motion practice. Perhaps more 
emphasis should be placed on phasing or logically sequencing 
discovery, so that possible silver-bullet issues can be identified to 
promote the acceleration of a resolution on the merits.441 In a related 
vein, differential case management, in the form of either individual 
case custom tailoring or “tracking” according to case characteristics,442 
has not been fully explored or developed, let alone exploited.443 It 
should be. The highly circumscribed discovery suggested by plaintiffs’ 
counsel in Twombly to determine the viability of the class’s claims 
 
 439. Grimm & Cabraser, supra note 239, at 11. There was no dissent from this proposition at 
the Duke Conference. References occasionally are made to the relatively light use of the wide 
authority given district judges to limit the frequency and extent of discovery provided by a 1983 
amendment now found in Rule 26(b)(2)(C). As the Reporter at that time, I regret that the 
“proportionality” concept embedded in the provision has not been seen as a more useful 
element of the “toolkit.” See generally 8 WRIGHT, MILLER & MARCUS, supra note 433, § 2008.1. 
 440. See supra notes 269–74 and accompanying text. 
 441. See Epstein, supra note 172, at 18 (recommending staggered discovery with periodic 
reassessments as to whether the case should continue). 
 442. For a description of “tracking,” see infra notes 451–56 and accompanying text. 
 443. Both techniques showed up in various expense-and-delay plans formulated under the 
Civil Justice Reform Act of 1990. See supra text accompanying notes 216–19. Compare FINAL 
REPORT & RECOMMENDATIONS: DIFFERENTIATED CASE MGMT. PLAN WITH SUGGESTED 
RULES & COMMENTARY, 1991 WL 525120, R. 8:2.1 (N.D. Ohio Nov. 27, 1991) (Civil Justice 
Reform Act Plan) (establishing a five-track system), with EXPENSE & DELAY REDUCTION 
PLAN, 1991 WL 525091, Art. 1 (D. Mass. Nov. 18, 1991) (Civil Justice Reform Act Plan) 
(delineating an individualized and case specific monitoring system). The RAND Institute’s 
evaluation of experience under the Civil Justice Reform Act was rather lukewarm about the 
implementation of management policies under the district court plans but was quite positive 
about the utility of certain methodologies. See KAKALIK, DUNWORTH, HILL, MCCAFFREY, 
OSHIRO, PACE & VAIANA, supra note 294, at 47–50 (stating that even though cases at the ends 
of the spectrum of complexity would be easy to place into tracks, most of the cases would fall in 
the middle and be placed into a “standard” track, which might lead to the loss of many of the 
predicted benefits of tracking). 
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should not have been rejected by the Supreme Court.444 The Justices 
should have had more faith in the ability of district judges to manage 
their cases. Indeed, similar procedures have been used in many other 
cases.445 Framing this type of special-purpose discovery will require 
careful crafting by counsel and the court, depending on the needs in 
particular cases. It also will require more experimentation and 
evaluation. 
Furthermore, other disciplines, such as information science, 
efficiency analysis, and business management, could help identify the 
best—or, at least, more-effective—practices for reducing litigation 
costs. Importing relevant skills and experiences from other fields, 
which might involve new forms of education for both district and 
magistrate judges, may illuminate ways to restructure the pretrial 
process to produce more flexibility, better management, and less 
Rambo-like lawyer conduct,446 as well as to reduce disparities in the 
utilization of procedures to prevent under- or overuse. New ideas 
even might include reformulating the roles of magistrate judges and 
para-judicials in civil cases, or adjusting the pretrial workload 
distribution among courthouse personnel or the modes of skill-
training that should be made available through the Federal Judicial 
Center.447 Who is in the best position to do which pretrial tasks is not 
self-evident. Nor is what should be included in a catalogue of the best 
procedural practices. Educational programs also might be developed 
for the practicing bar regarding the effective use of and participation 
in meet-and-confer and pretrial conferences, cooperative discovery, 
and techniques for expense and time containment. It may be that 
recent thinking about management matters has been too static and 
that Rule 16 and the Manual are not yet sufficiently delineated and 
 
 444. The proposal by plaintiffs’ counsel was noted in Justice Stevens’s dissenting opinion, 
Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 593–95 (2007) (Stevens, J., dissenting) (citing 
Respondents’ brief), and has been confirmed in private conversation with the class’s counsel. It 
was rejected by the Court’s dismissal of “phased” discovery. Id. at 560 n.6 (majority opinion). 
 445. See, e.g., Kendall v. Visa U.S.A., Inc., 518 F.3d 1042, 1051 (9th Cir. 2008) (affirming the 
district court’s order to limit discovery and dismiss the case). 
 446. This became the generic referent in the 1990’s for litigation tactics that were hyper-
active and overly aggressive, invoking the Sylvester Stallone character in three popular action 
movies: FIRST BLOOD (Orion Pictures 1982), RAMBO FIRST BLOOD: PART II (TriStar Pictures 
1985), and RAMBO III (TriStar Pictures 1988). 
 447. The Center is the training and education arm of the federal judiciary as well as its 
research resource. See 28 U.S.C. § 620 (2006). 
MILLER IN FINAL 9/15/2010 11:50:51 AM 
118 DUKE LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 60:1 
textured to meet the challenges of the more difficult aspects of 
contemporary litigation. 
Whatever management pathways prove promising, variations in 
judicial practice born of habit, temperament, philosophy, and context 
inevitably will continue to exist. One must be mindful, however, that 
although judicial discretion is a necessity in the implementation of 
management techniques, it must be exercised in a realistic and even-
handed manner that does not weaken substantive policies, reflect 
personal philosophical preferences, or counter-productively burden 
the pretrial process. 
All of this raises the satellite questions of how much detail is 
appropriate for inclusion in Rule 16—which was lengthened 
considerably in 1983 and 1993 to elaborate and expand the pretrial 
conference process—and what the future status and content of the 
Manual should be. Many of the thoughts expressed in the preceding 
paragraphs are inappropriate for inclusion in the Rules; they really 
call upon the assistance of the Judicial Center, bar associations, and 
even law schools to assist the bench and bar in achieving what 
amounts to a cultural shift in the handling of pretrial matters in 
federal civil cases. All participants in federal litigation must be 
incentivized to make case management—to paraphrase the former 
army recruitment slogan—“be all it can be.” 
D. A Tracking System 
Professor Lonny S. Hoffman has criticized some legal writers as 
“traditionalists”—those who are so wedded to the principles the 
original drafters championed that they overlook the practical 
deficiencies of notice pleading in light of contemporary litigation 
realities.448 According to him, this relentless focus on the past leads 
many traditionalists to argue—unconvincingly, he believes—for the 
reinstatement of notions from a bygone era.449 So, a personal mea 
culpa may be in order; in many respects I am a “traditionalist.” I was 
brought up, educated, and trained in the heyday of the original 
conception of the Rules by people who believed in their liberal ethos 
of access, transsubstantivity, equality of treatment, private 
enforcement of public policies, and quality merit adjudication. But, as 
 
 448. See Hoffman, supra note 106, at 1236–37. 
 449. See id. 
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noted at the outset of this Article, the earth has moved. Procedure 
does not exist in a vacuum. It must reflect and effectuate the 
substantive law and serve the needs of the judicial system and those 
who participate in it. It may be, therefore, that the transsubstantivity 
principle may be nothing but a cherished relic.450 
So, at the risk of being branded a heretic by certain fellow “old 
fogies,” I find somewhat attractive the fact that several “modern” 
thinkers have proposed adopting a tracking system that has different 
procedural rules depending on a case’s substantive underpinnings or 
dimensions.451 This is a more radical notion than simply grouping 
cases according to certain characteristics for case- or discovery-
management purposes and then applying the same procedural rules 
to all cases with those characteristics within the individual tracks. 
Although this and similar proposals have elicited strong resistance in 
the past, the concept bears scrutiny.  
The aspirations of Federal Rules 1 and 2, which once seemed to 
be in harmony, have become irreconcilable in some respects. A recent 
survey conducted for the Federal Judicial Center, for example, 
bolsters this conclusion by showing sizable discontinuities in litigation 
costs.452 A second document produced by the Center concluded that 
litigation cost variations resonate to such predictable factors as higher 
monetary stakes, longer processing times, electronic discovery, and 
greater case complexity.453 Consequently, the general applicability of 
the Federal Rules to “one form of action”454 may have come into 
 
 450. See supra Part III.B. 
 451. See Federal Courts Study Committee Implementation Act and Civil Justice Reform Act: 
Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Courts, Intellectual Property, and the Administration of Justice 
of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 101st Cong. 213 (1990) (statement of Stuart Gerson, Assistant 
Att’y Gen., Civil Division, U.S. Department of Justice); John Burritt McArthur, Inter-Branch 
Politics and the Judicial Resistance to Federal Civil Justice Reform, 33 U.S.F. L. REV. 551, 560–62 
(1999); see also Tobias, supra note 266, at 1398–99, 1418–19. But see Burbank, supra note 143, at 
545 (noting the judiciary’s consistent objections to statutory proposals to “fashion a particular 
procedural rule for a particular substantive context”). A number of speakers at the Duke 
Conference expressed support for tracking—at least in terms of differentiating between simple 
and complex cases. 
 452. The survey found that the median costs reported by defense attorneys was $20,000 in 
cases that employed at least one type of discovery. LEE & WILLGING, supra note 203, at 37. Yet 
the top-fifth-percentile group of cases reported $300,000 in costs. Id. Obviously, it is only in a 
relatively small percentage of cases that these substantial litigation expenditures are 
experienced. 
 453. Id. at 2. 
 454. FED. R. CIV. P. 2. 
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conflict with the “just, speedy, and inexpensive determination of 
every action and proceeding,”455 especially for contemporary cases at 
either end of the complexity spectrum.456 Tracking—at least in some 
form—is an idea whose time may have come. 
I do not believe that the transsubstantivity philosophy of the 
Rules should be abandoned based on unproven assumptions about 
abusive practices, meritless lawsuits, and excessive costs and delays. 
Instead, movement toward differential procedural treatment must be 
based on an extensive exploration of the present situation to 
determine how best to approach different types of cases, ranging from 
the mundane to the burdensome, and how much discretion to give the 
judicial officer to individualize the treatment of cases. The task 
undoubtedly will be arduous and possibly contentious. In part it will 
be difficult to create a workable differential system based on 
substantive law or litigation dimensions because it is unclear how best 
to define groups of cases with common characteristics and then draft 
customized rules for each category. I remember when working with 
the judicial authors of the original Manual for Complex and 
Multidistrict Litigation—as it was then titled—that they thought long 
and hard about a possible definition for “complexity” to clarify the 
ambit of the document. In the end, those attempts proved frustrating 
and fruitless, and the authors decided to include only a highly 
generalized statement about the Manual’s coverage.457 
Perhaps tracking by case dimension would be more promising 
and easier to administer than segmenting by case complexity or 
substantive context. The British have constructed such a system. It 
consists of three tracks: the small-disputes track, for claims up to 
£5,000; the fast track, for claims between £5,000 and £15,000; and the 
multi-track, which applies to cases of larger value, complexity, and 
 
 455. Id. 1. 
 456. See 5 WRIGHT & MILLER, supra note 3, § 1217 (“These rules fully reflect the basic 
philosophy of the federal rules expressed in Rule 1 that simplicity, flexibility, and the absence of 
legalistic technicality are the touchstones of a good procedural system.”). 
 457. The original Manual defined complex litigation as follows: 
“Complex litigation,” as used in this Manual, includes one case or two or more 
related cases which present unusual problems and which require extraordinary 
treatment, including but not limited to the cases designated as “protracted” and 
“big.” 
MANUAL FOR COMPLEX LITIGATION (FIRST) § 0.10 (rev. ed. 1973). 
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importance.458 Claims not based on monetary value are assigned to the 
most appropriate track. Because each track provides standardized 
procedural instructions meant to apply to all cases within its scope, 
most require little specialized judicial attention. Although there 
actually are multiple opportunities for judicial involvement under 
each track, small claims cases generally are handled with minimal 
supervision and technicality. The fast track provides litigants with an 
efficient means of bringing relatively simple cases to trial, with a focus 
on one-day hearings within thirty weeks of their assignment to that 
track. The multi-track offers the greatest variety in management, with 
procedures that can vary from simple standardized directions similar 
to the fast track, to regular, hands-on judicial involvement in complex 
matters. 
Because British civil procedure does not have an elaborate 
discovery regime comparable to that found in Federal Rules 26 
through 37, or the prospect of trial by jury with its attendant 
procedures, a tracking model of that type would have to undergo 
major revision to work in the federal courts, and any assignment by 
dollar amount would have to be different. The British small-claims 
track, with its modest cap on case value, for example, does not align 
with the federal courts’ requirement of more than $75,000 in 
diversity-of-citizenship cases and the absence of any such requirement 
in federal question cases.459 Also, the rules delimiting the tracks might 
be adjusted based on complexity level or each case’s substantive 
context. Nonetheless, the British system’s focus on standardized rules 
for each track and different levels of judicial involvement may 
provide a useful concept and experience base for a federal tracking 
experiment. 
 
 458. See generally ADRIAN ZUCKERMAN, ZUCKERMAN ON CIVIL PROCEDURE: PRINCIPLES 
OF PRACTICE 482–500 (2d ed. 2006). A number of countries employ special procedures for 
different types of actions. E.g., ZIVILPROZESSORDNUNG [ZPO] [CODE OF CIVIL PROCEDURE] 
§§ 592, 689 (Ger.), reprinted in ZIVILPROZESSORDNUNG (C.H. Beck ed., 57th ed. 1999) 
(delineating the German system of summary proceedings for actions seeking payment on a sum 
of money or the delivery of goods); see also PETER L. MURRAY & ROLF STÜRNER, GERMAN 
CIVIL JUSTICE 425–28 (2004) (describing the German Code provision). Many civilian systems 
have specialized commercial courts or panels. See, e.g., CODE DE COMMERCE [C. COM.] arts. 
L.721-1 to 724-7 (Fr.); GERICHTSVERFASSUNGSGESETZ [GVG] [Constitution of the Courts Act] 
§ 105 (Ger.), reprinted in ZIVILPROZESSORDNUNG (Richard Zöller ed., 23rd rev. ed. 2002). 
 459. 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a) (2006). 
MILLER IN FINAL 9/15/2010 11:50:51 AM 
122 DUKE LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 60:1 
Tracking is not alien to the existing federal system.460 Rule 
26(a)(1)(B) creates a modest track by allowing eight categories of 
cases to bypass the mandatory disclosure requirement.461 The Manual 
for Complex Litigation provides something in the nature of ad hoc 
tracking for managing an important portion of the federal docket.462 
Interestingly, the promulgation of the mandatory disclosure rule 
followed an intramural debate within the rulemaking community in 
the early 1990s; some favored a provision for differential case 
management customized to the needs of particular cases based on 
both Congress’ directive in the Civil Justice Reform Act of 1990463 and 
a rule then in force in the Eastern District of Texas that established 
different discovery tracks ranging from no discovery to “[s]pecialized 
treatment.”464 Indeed, the subject was dealt with at length in a model 
civil-justice expense-and-delay-reduction plan developed by the 
Judicial Conference465 pursuant to its reporting obligations under the 
1990 Act.466 In the end, the transsubstantive mandatory disclosure 
rule—with its exceptions—prevailed over the case-by-case standard 
and the tracking techniques.467  
 
 460. For an early tracking suggestion, see Maurice Rosenberg, The Federal Civil Rules After 
Half a Century, 36 ME. L. REV. 243, 244 (1984). 
 461. Similarly, some local rules enumerate certain categories of actions that are exempted 
from the scheduling and planning provisions of Rule 16(b). E.g., LR, D. Mass. 16.2. 
 462. Early editions of the Manual recommended the use of “waves” of discovery as needed. 
See MANUAL FOR COMPLEX LITIGATION (SECOND) supra note 213, § 21.421. The current 
Manual speaks of “[p]hased, sequenced, or targeted discovery.” MANUAL FOR COMPLEX 
LITIGATION (FOURTH), supra note 208, § 11.422. 
 463. The Act directed the consideration of “systematic, differential treatment” of civil cases. 
28 U.S.C. § 473(a)(1). The response was said to be limited, see KAKALIK, DUNWORTH, HILL, 
MCCAFFREY, OSHIRO, PACE & VAIANA, supra note 294, at 25–27, although some districts had 
modest tracking systems before the Act and a number of the plans offered a multi-track model. 
See generally AM. BAR ASS’N SECTION OF LITIG., REPORT OF THE TASK FORCE ON THE CIVIL 
JUSTICE REFORM ACT 6–7 (1992); Dunworth & Kakalik, supra note 216 (evaluating the RAND 
Corporation’s review of the Civil Justice Reform Act of 1990). 
 464. Civil Justice Expense & Delay Reduction Plan Pursuant to the Civil Justice Reform 
Act of 1990, 1991 WL 525100 (E.D. Tex. Dec. 20, 1991). 
 465. See JUDICIAL CONFERENCE OF THE U.S., MODEL PLAN FOR REDUCTION OF EXPENSE 
AND DELAY IN CIVIL CASES, 7–15 (1992) (discussing differentiated case management disclosure 
requirements). 
 466. 28 U.S.C. § 477(a)(1) (2006). 
 467. See Samuel Issacharoff & George Loewenstein, Unintended Consequences of 
Mandatory Disclosure, 73 TEX. L. REV. 753, 782–85 (1995); Edward F. Sherman, A Process 
Model and Agenda for Civil Justice Reforms in the States, 46 STAN. L. REV. 1553, 1567 n.63 
(1994). 
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In contrast to the mandatory disclosure provision, Rules 
16(a)(1), 16(c)(2)(1), and 26(f)(2), as well as the Manual’s 
management guidelines for complex cases, naturally encourage 
greater judicial involvement and permit more case-by-case judicial 
tailoring for discovery than typically is seen in simpler cases, in order 
to minimize discovery costs and to reduce delay.468 Similarly, the 
multidistrict litigation statute469 and the Judicial Panel on Multidistrict 
Litigation470 facilitate combining factually and legally related cases to 
coordinate the pretrial process and to avoid resource-consuming 
redundancy, effectively forming a track. The Civil Justice Reform Act 
of 1990 authorized the district courts to consider “differential 
treatment of civil cases” in formulating their expense-and-delay 
plans.471 Local rules in some district courts have the same effect.472 At 
the state level, New York473 and California,474 among many others, use 
various forms of tracking: they assign cases to courts or divisions 
thereof based on the amount in controversy, or they assign them to 
specialized tribunals by type of action, such as commercial matters or 
disputes with governmental entities, as deemed appropriate.475 
Tracking may be a workable solution, particularly if a cost-
benefit analysis shows that the Federal Rules’ procedural gold 
standard has become too resource consumptive to be employed in all 
cases, but the judgment is that as a society we are not willing to give 
 
 468. See Cavanagh, supra note 211, at 23–25. 
 469. 28 U.S.C. § 1407. 
 470. Created by Congress in 1968, the Judicial Panel on Multidistrict Litigation is composed 
of seven federal circuit and district court judges who determine whether similar cases instituted 
in separate districts should be combined in one district for coordinated pretrial proceedings. See 
generally 15 WRIGHT, MILLER & COOPER, supra note 353, §§ 3861–3868 (3d ed. 2007). 
 471. 28 U.S.C. § 473. 
 472. Local Rule 16.1(a)(3)(G) of the Western District of New York calls for a “meaningful” 
discussion of “the need for adopting special procedures for managing difficult actions involving 
complex issues, multiple parties or difficult legal questions.” 
 473. New York has established a Commercial Division of its Supreme Court with monetary 
thresholds, designated categories of actions that can be heard in the Division, and a number of 
rules of practice. Uniform Rules for the New York State Trial Cts [22 NYCRR] § 202.70. 
 474. California calls for the coordination of complex actions, defined as any action “that 
requires exceptional judicial management” and lists a number of factors to be considered by the 
court in deciding whether to make that designation. Cal. Rules of Courts, rules 3.501–3.550. A 
number of procedural rules are provided that govern the coordination of complex cases. Id. 
 475. See generally Holly Bakke & Maureen Solomon, Case Differentiation: An Approach to 
Individualized Case Management, 73 JUDICATURE 17 (1990) (describing differential case 
management and local variations). 
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up our high-quality system entirely. If there is resistance to 
abandoning the transsubstantivity principle because of its 
longstanding character or the current language of the Rules Enabling 
Act, it may be necessary for Congress to recast the statute to modify 
the “general-rules” requirement to fit contemporary circumstances 
and to afford the rulemakers more flexibility.476 Or it may be 
appropriate to reassess the existing understanding of the existing 
statutory words. For example, rules general to each track, similar to 
those in the British system, may be thought sufficiently “general” 
without requiring a legislative change in the Rules Enabling Act. 
Perhaps what is needed is a more open recognition that the “one-
size-fits-all” philosophy that prevailed in the 1930s no longer may be 
the most apt litigation model; there is considerable recognition of 
that.477 Indeed, that was Congress’ judgment in enacting the Civil 
Justice Reform Act of 1990. Similarly, the same realization that some 
variations in the Rules’ application were necessary led the drafters of 
the original Rules to establish the heightened pleading requirement 
for fraud and mistake in the first sentence of Rule 9(b) and the 
lightened pleading requirement for “[m]alice, intent, knowledge, and 
other conditions of a person’s mind” in the second sentence of that 
provision.478 These deviations from the transsubstantivity principle 
might lead present and future rulemakers to draw corresponding 
distinctions for other litigation categories. It must be recognized, 
however, that opposition to abandoning transsubstantivity continues 
in some quarters. 
Moreover, tracking is a pathway fraught with danger, involving 
the drawing of lines that are difficult—perhaps impossible—to see. 
Inevitably, attempting to establish distinctions will bring to the fore 
vast differences in philosophy, ideology, and self-interest that merge 
substantive predilections with procedure. Indeed, that may be the 
reality underlying Twombly, Iqbal, and the PSLRA, which in a sense 
are the contemporary analogues to the forces that led to the special 
pleading provisions found in Rule 9(b). Fashioning different pleading, 
motion, and discovery procedures to protect the ability of 
 
 476. See supra text accompanying note 358. 
 477. The Federal Judicial Center Preliminary Report shows support for conducting an 
experiment with a simplified procedure system in several districts by party consent. See LEE & 
WILLGING, supra note 203, at 52–54. 
 478. FED. R. CIV. P. 9(b). 
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government officials to function effectively or economic entities to 
compete not only requires the drafting skills of a Leonardo da Vinci 
but depends on what those who write the rules believe is needed 
either to protect governmental functionality and corporate America 
or to hold them accountable. Those who formulate court rules also 
must be mindful of the often competing interests of minority group 
members, consumers, investors, and any of us who breathe the air or 
drink the water or enjoy the environment—in short, all the people. 
Thus, the intellectual honesty and integrity of those who draft, 
approve, and apply tomorrow’s procedures become central to the 
enterprise. 
It may be that attempting to create a tracking system is a fool’s 
errand: today’s pressures and philosophical divisions may not allow 
the policymakers, rulemakers, and interest groups to leave their 
clients at the meeting-room door. Any sophisticated sea change from 
transsubstantivity to tracking will require multiple rule sets; involve 
arduous, difficult, and politically charged processes; and demand a 
considerable amount of time to formulate and execute. And who 
knows what the law of unanticipated consequences will bring? But 
the effort may be worth undertaking. Some lines might prove to be 
visible and may well command consensus. The initial effort might be 
relatively primitive—perhaps simply using the type of objective 
criteria exemplified by the British model or constructing an 
experiment in one or more districts. A potential downside is that even 
a simple approach would breed, at least at the outset, litigation over 
determinations of which track was appropriate for which cases. 
E. Sanctions 
I mention this subject with some trepidation given my prior 
involvement with the 1983 amendment of Rule 11 as an Advisory 
Committee Reporter and then Committee member.479 But it seems 
worth observing that more-effective enforcement of the certification 
required by Rule 11 of each paper presented to a federal court480 
might be desirable, keeping in mind that since 1993 the Rule does 
have a “safe-harbor” provision and that subdivision (b)(3) contains 
 
 479. I am bemused by the fact that several participants at the Duke Conference bemoaned 
the fact that sanctions were few and far between. 
 480. See generally 5A WRIGHT & MILLER, supra note 3, § 1335 (describing the elements and 
application of Rule 11). 
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another safety valve permitting the signer to assert that the accuracy 
of the document’s contents will likely be borne out by “further 
investigation or discovery.”481 
Consideration might be given to restoring some of the elements 
of the 1983 amendment to Rule 11 that were eliminated by the 1993 
amendment.482 This might include a partial reinstatement of 
compensation and punishment as legitimate objectives of the sanction 
process to promote efficiency and compliance, principles that 
continue to be applicable under Rule 16(f) and parts of Rule 37.483 If it 
can be achieved, meaningful judicial deterrence seems desirable to 
curtail inappropriate pleading, motion, and discovery conduct and to 
maximize the effectiveness of judicial management. In addition, 
perhaps the sanction rules should be revisited to see if standards of 
lawyer behavior can be further articulated to produce a sophisticated 
and nuanced regime that will minimize litigation misconduct, 
whatever its form, but at the same time recognize the need to protect 
adversarial-system values.484 
Opposition can be expected from various civil rights and public-
interest groups who fear—with some justification—the 
disproportionate application of sanctions against them and the 
concomitant chilling effect.485 Any changes in the sanction structure 
 
 481. FED. R. CIV. P. 11(b)(3). 
 482. See 5A WRIGHT & MILLER, supra note 3, §§ 1331–1332. For example, the district 
court’s discretion to deny sanctions might be limited and the range of sanctions restored. 
 483. Rule 16(f) authorizes the imposition of compensatory sanctions for certain types of 
noncompliance with pretrial management matters. FED. R. CIV. P. 16(f). The Private Securities 
Litigation Reform Act preserves the mandatory sanction character of the 1983 version of Rule 
11. 15 U.S.C. § 77z-1(c) (2006). 
 484. Various legislative proposals to strengthen Rule 11 have been put forward in recent 
years. See, e.g., Frivolous Lawsuit Prevention Act of 2009, S. 603, 111th Cong. § 2. Care must be 
taken to avoid the possible use of Rule 11 to undermine access through over-deterrence or to 
promote attrition tactics. 
 485. That concern was strenuously voiced about practice under the 1983 amendment. See 
generally Melissa L. Nelkin, Sanctions Under Amended Federal Rule 11—Some “Chilling” 
Problems in the Struggle Between Compensation and Punishment, 74 GEO. L.J. 1313 (1986) 
(discussing the potential chilling effects of Rule 11 sanctions and suggesting nonmandatory 
sanctions as a remedy for the problem); Georgene M. Vairo, Commentary, Rule 11: Where We 
Are and Where We Are Going, 60 FORDHAM L. REV. 475 (1991) (asserting that Rule 11 is being 
used to limit advocacy in federal courts). The issue has been relatively quiet under the 1993 
amendment. But see Jeffrey W. Stempel, Contracting Access to the Courts: Myth or Reality? 
Boon or Bane?, 40 ARIZ. L. REV. 965, 994 (1998) (“[B]oth the 1983 Amendment and the 1993 
Amendment represent increased procedural hurdles and risk for litigants, resulting in a net 
shrinkage of access to courts.” (footnote omitted)). 
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would have to be handled with considerable delicacy and applied 
evenhandedly, and in a way that avoided the motion cottage industry 
that arose under Rule 11 between 1983 and 1993.486 
CONCLUSION: DIOGUARDI REDUX 
Admittedly, contemporary litigation realities are strikingly 
different from the world that generated the original Federal Rules. 
Strong forces have moved case disposition earlier and earlier in an 
attempt to solve the perceived problems of discovery abuse, meritless 
lawsuits, and litigation expense and delay. Although rulemakers and 
courts must live in the present and plan for the future, it is important 
not to forget the important citizen-access and private-enforcement 
values and objectives at the heart of the 1938 Rules. The pendulum 
appears to have swung too far away from those values. In that vein, 
one wonders how Dioguardi would be decided today.487 
John Dioguardi’s complaint actually alleged a number of facts, 
but would those facts be sufficient today to support a plausible 
inference of wrongdoing? The allegations consisted of a series of 
disjointed statements, left holes in many key elements, and did not 
provide any articulated legal theory. Judge Clark’s opinion identified 
a conversion claim, even though Dioguardi never stated that the 
Collector of Customs took his tonic, but merely alleged: “[I]t isn’t so 
easy to do away with two cases of 37 bottles of one quart. Being 
protected, they can take this chance.”488 And any first-year law 
student can extrapolate—or intuit—a trespass claim and a number of 
other possible theories. Would the Second Circuit be as tolerant 
today?489 
Now, unlike then, a federal judge is instructed to determine 
whether an inference of wrongdoing by the Collector was plausible. 
Judicial experience and common sense—matters beyond the 
 
 486. See 5A WRIGHT & MILLER, supra note 3, § 1332; Note, Plausible Pleadings: Developing 
Standards for Rule 11 Sanctions, 100 HARV. L. REV. 630, 631–32 (1987). 
 487. See Am. Compl., Dioguardi v. Durning, 139 F.2d 774 (2d Cir. 1944) (No. 157), reprinted 
in JACK H. FRIEDENTHAL, ARTHUR R. MILLER, JOHN E. SEXTON & HELEN HERSHKOFF, 
CIVIL PROCEDURE: CASES AND MATERIALS 561 (10th ed. 2009). 
 488. Id. ¶ 5. 
 489. It is interesting to note that the Second Circuit upheld the complaint’s sufficiency in 
both Twombly and Iqbal and has interpreted the Supreme Court’s decisions in those cases in a 
reasonably moderate fashion. E.g., Starr v. Sony BMG Entm’t, 592 F.3d 314, 323–27 (2d Cir. 
2010). 
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complaint—might counsel a judge that property conversion or 
negligent damage to goods at a major customs facility was a realistic 
concern and thus plausible, depending, perhaps, on the reputation of 
the federal agency’s workings. Is there a more likely alternative 
explanation? Perhaps it is just as plausible that Dioguardi did not 
follow the applicable procedures to receive his goods, leading to their 
sale at auction, or that they were improperly packaged when shipped, 
as it is that customs personnel were dishonest or careless. In light of 
Iqbal’s assumption that high-ranking government officials could not 
plausibly act toward Muslim Pakistanis with a discriminatory motive 
following 9/11, a claim of conversion or trespass against a government 
official might be regarded as implausible. Yet, ruminations about 
Dioguardi’s and anyone else’s conduct are sheer speculation. In truth, 
how is a district court judge, regardless of his judicial experience and 
common sense, supposed to know what is or is not plausible in these 
circumstances based solely on a complaint like Dioguardi’s?490 
The judge then might weigh the burdens of subjecting the 
Collector of Customs to discovery and trial. Perhaps Dioguardi’s is 
one of the relatively modest, simple cases in which these rigors would 
be seen as limited. If a case-tracking system replaced 
transsubstantivity, his complaint might slide by under an easier 
pleading standard for small cases and be expedited. However, the 
Collector of Customs runs a large, complex operation that generates 
countless transactions and records each day. Discovery—especially e-
discovery—to track the goods and identify the personnel who came in 
contact with them could be quite costly and might disrupt an 
important government agency’s functioning. A federal court today 
might conclude that allowing Dioguardi to go beyond the complaint 
“just ain’t worth it.”491 
Perhaps most striking is the difference in attitude between Judge 
Clark and the thrust of the Supreme Court’s latest pleading decisions. 
Within the muddled complaint, Judge Clark found two claims and 
intimated there were more.492 He even evinced a desire to see 
 
 490. Obviously, some would argue that this is the type of issue that should be determined by 
a jury, although in the legal context of Dioguardi—a suit against the government—one would 
not be available. 
 491. It is even conceivable that the judge might consider the litigation as intrusive on 
matters of national security or an interference with monitoring imports to deter terrorist 
activities. 
 492. Dioguardi v. Durning, 139 F.2d 774, 775 (2d Cir. 1944). 
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Dioguardi’s claim adjudicated on its merits rather than on a 
formalistic assessment of his statements’ linguistic quality.493 Judge 
Clark apparently valued Dioguardi’s right to a day in court and a 
judgment on the merits more highly than minimizing the potential 
cost to the governmental defendant and the burden on the court 
system. After Twombly and Iqbal, a complaint whose sufficiency was 
as problematic as Dioguardi’s might be dismissed based on concerns 
about judicial resources, potentially frivolous lawsuits, and the costs 
of discovery.494 That seems myopic. It fails to recognize the democratic 
significance of litigation as a form of governance or oversight on 
bureaucratic activity, an enforcement mechanism, and a channel for 
citizens to express their grievances against their government or fellow 
citizens. And it fails to recognize the economic restraints on most 
plaintiffs and contingent-fee lawyers. 
Of course, Dioguardi does not reflect the types of cases that 
probably motivated the procedural changes that have occurred in the 
last quarter century and that are jeopardized by today’s quest for 
early disposition. Consider a contemporary version. Suppose that 
Dioguardi were the representative plaintiff in a class action on behalf 
of all importers who were of certain racial, ethnic, or religious 
backgrounds claiming systematic discriminatory behavior in the 
handling of their goods by the Collector of Customs in the Port of 
New York. What factual presentation would Twombly and Iqbal 
require for his complaint to meet the plausibility threshold and 
survive a Rule 12(b)(6) motion? Would the calculus have shifted 
because of the change in context? Would judicial discretion be so 
broad as to empower a district judge to brand the claim implausible 
and to dismiss on the basis of his judicial experience and common 
sense, even though the critical information about the government’s 
 
 493. Id. (“In view of the plaintiff’s limited ability to write and speak English, it will be 
difficult for the District Court to arrive at justice unless he consents to receive legal 
assistance . . . .”). 
 494. Perhaps Dioguardi could survive under a plausibility standard on the ground that 
pleadings by pro se plaintiffs are to be construed liberally. See Erickson v. Pardus, 127 S. Ct. 
2197, 2200 (2007) (per curiam) (“A document filed pro se is ‘to be liberally construed’” (quoting 
Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 106 (1976))); see also Granda v. Schulman, No. 09-12564, 2010 
WL 1337716, at *4 (11th Cir. Apr. 7, 2010) (construing the complaint liberally because the 
plaintiff was acting pro se, even though the complaint did not allege whether the defendant was 
acting under color of state law for a § 1983 claim); Cann v. Hayman, 346 F. App’x 822, 824 (3d 
Cir. 2009) (noting the principle that pleadings of pro se litigants are liberally construed). This, 
however, is an analytical approach that is of limited application. 
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behavior and motivation was in the sole possession of the defendant? 
And then how would a court of appeals effectively review that 
dismissal? And what would be the result? Putting the question of 
class certifiability aside, why should procedures not be available to 
assure that the hypothetical class members have access to enough 
information to provide an opportunity to present an intelligent, 
principled, and nonspeculative statement of their claim? 
Returning to Rule 1, I close with several questions worthy of 
attention. Are we still serious about achieving “the just, speedy, and 
inexpensive determination of every action and proceeding”?495 Can 
we afford to preserve a gold standard procedural system? Can we 
afford not to? Even assuming it is efficient, does the current 
treatment of pleadings and pretrial motions undermine important 
system values—meaningful citizen access, the quality of justice, 
governance and private enforcement, and the societal values of 
litigation? Should the rulemaking process be encouraged to construct 
a procedural system that properly balances all of these values? After 
all, embedded in Rule 1 there always has been a sense that the 
Federal Rules and their application should accommodate all three of 
the objectives it identifies.496 “Speedy” and “inexpensive” should not 
be sought at the expense of what is “just.” The latter is a short word, 
but it embraces societal objectives of enormous significance that 
should not be subordinated to the other two. 
 
 
 495. FED R. CIV. P. 1. 
 496. Admittedly these objectives are somewhat in tension with each other. 
